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ABSTRACT 
 
S. WILLOUGHBY ANDERSON: The Past on Trial: The Sixteenth Street Baptist Church 
Bombing, Civil Rights Memory and the Remaking of Birmingham 
(Under the direction of Jacquelyn Dowd Hall) 
 
 In 2001 and 2002, the last of the suspects in the 1963 Sixteenth Street Baptist Church 
bombing went on trial for a crime that had remained unsolved for almost forty years.  The 
trials invoked memories of the events that had made Birmingham, Alabama, a notorious site 
of violent resistance to the civil rights movement in the 1960s.  Since that moment, city 
leaders and citizens had been working to reshape “Bombingham” according to an “image of 
reform”; yet the events of 1963 remained a contested site of memory and the unsolved status 
of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing challenged that progressive stance.  This 
dissertation asks how memories of the civil rights demonstrations and violent resistance in 
the 1960s have played out in political and legal battles in the city, as well as in public 
moments of commemoration.  Focusing on the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing 
trials and the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute, I examine moments in which residents have 
pushed the city’s civil rights history to the foreground in order to showcase real reform or to 
challenge the current political progress narrative and thereby force a reckoning with the past.  
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Introduction 
 
Birmingham’s Troubled History 
 
 
“Until this good day the idea of Birmingham raises certain specters in people’s minds.  
You know what I’m talking about.” 
-Arthur Hanes, Jr.1  
 
 A year after I graduated from college, I found myself back in Birmingham.  Images 
and faces I had studied for my senior honors thesis flickered across a screen set up in the 
biggest downtown courtroom.  Many of the same archival photographs that I had examined 
at the public library punctuated the prosecution’s opening statement as the trial of one of the 
last suspects in the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing got underway.  Reporters for 
national media outlets jockeyed for position and helped each other identify the main players.  
The whole affair had a strange, almost eerie quality of rewinding to a moment in the past; the 
conceit was broken only by the advanced age of the defendant and the victims’ family 
members.  Sandwiched in the back of the balcony beside a retired Birmingham News reporter 
and a school kid on a field trip, I couldn’t help but think that I was witnessing history being 
rewritten.  The past itself, not just past crimes, was here on trial.  Returning to watch my 
hometown attempt to lay this almost forty-year old crime to rest, I felt relieved and wondered 
if now those outside observers could finally concede that “Bombingham” had made some 
progress.  
                                                
 
1Arthur Hanes, Jr., interview by author, tape recording, Birmingham, Ala., 27 May 2003, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
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Once characterized by Martin Luther King as “the most thoroughly segregated city in 
America,” Birmingham, Alabama, remains a symbol of the best and worst of the southern 
civil rights movement.2  While the city rightfully plays a pivotal role in what has become the 
standard narrative of the movement—an arc that traces the attack on legalized segregation 
from Brown to the Voting Rights Act—Birmingham’s history of violence haunts it in the 
present.  Even as civil rights movement scholarship moves forward into the 1970s and 1980s, 
the city’s story has remained behind, mired in a moment of national headlines-making police 
brutality and vigilante terrorism.  So why, despite the lapse of over forty years and the 
insistence of its residents that the lingering image is unfair, does Birmingham continue to 
suffer under the weight of its national infamy?     
The city’s place as the moral dark before the dawn of the Civil Rights Act in the 
standard national narrative of the movement resulted from dramatic mass demonstrations, 
state action in defense of segregation, and state inaction on the Sixteenth Street Baptist 
Church bombing prosecution.  Known as “Bad Birmingham” since its origins as a rough steel 
town, the city’s perceived public image obsessed Birmingham leaders beginning in the early 
1960s when prominent businessmen scrambled to reverse the negative international publicity 
generated by Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene “Bull” Connor’s use of violence to 
enforce segregation ordinances.3  After installing a more moderate segregationist government 
in what amounted to a well-orchestrated electoral coup d’état, elite white and black power 
players saw their fragile peace once again threatened when local civil rights leaders and the 
                                                
 
 
2Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait (New York: Penguin, 2000), 66.  
 
 
3Glenn T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil Rights 
Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 170-74. 
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Southern Christian Leadership Conference began demonstrations in spring 1963.  Connor, 
still in power while disputing the election, brought out the now iconic dogs and fire hoses for 
crowd control.  Meanwhile leading businessmen sat down with progressive lawyers to broker 
a deal to end the marches and media frenzy in exchange for token desegregation.  Although 
crafted by people of good will, the businessmen’s concessions resulted in little more than 
what historian Glenn Eskew has dubbed “an image of reform.”4  The accords did serve to 
deflect the media to other flashpoints of the movement; yet continuing protests, followed by 
the deaths of four young girls in the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing, threw the 
newly crafted reform image into question.  These images of violence have repeatedly clashed 
with the progressive version of the city as a succession of leaders and residents have tried to 
reform both the city and its image.  
More than even the fire hoses and police dogs, the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church 
bombing stood as a persistent challenge to the “image of reform” constructed in 1963.  
Although the bombing dramatically underlined the connections between political and 
vigilante defense of the racial status quo, local leaders attempted to separate the bombing 
from the city’s long history of segregation and cast it as an isolated event perpetrated by 
outsiders.  Yet the broad harms that radiated out from the crime prompted residents to resist 
this attempt to fold the bombing into a progressive narrative of race relations.  Instead of an 
“image of reform,” the city now had an enduring image of violent resistance to the civil 
rights movement.  Residents grasped for some way to explain the bombing, with some 
interpreting it as a moment of redemptive suffering for the movement as a whole, while 
others characterized it as the tragic event that shocked moderate whites into support for 
                                                
 
 
4Eskew, But for Birmingham, 180-88; 193-297; 308. 
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desegregation.  As the bombing emerged as a contested site of meaning in the city, in the rest 
of the country it secured Birmingham’s position as the most recalcitrant defender of 
segregation, helping to fix the national image of the city in 1963.  
The bombing has retained its symbolic weight.  At the twentieth anniversary of the 
bombing in 1983, the Birmingham News, working with Chris McNair, then a state legislator 
and father of one of the girls killed, created the Memorial Fund for the Children.5  In 
announcing the scholarship fund, News editor James E. Jacobson characterized the bombing 
using the theme of redemption then embraced by many black and white residents alike: “the 
bombing has meant more to Birmingham than the tragic loss of those lives or the unhappy 
reputation which the event gave the city nationally and internationally.  Largely due to the 
shock of the bombing, Birmingham moved quickly to establish the apparatus of bi-racial 
harmony.”6  Folding the bombing and even the belated memorial—the first public 
recognition of the bombing by the city or its main institutions—into a narrative of progress 
for the city, the News hoped that the Memorial Fund would serve to spark additional 
improvements in race relations and redeem what another article dubbed “Birmingham’s 
stigmata,” “the deep stain left from those four deaths” that remained with the city.7      
Yet at the twentieth anniversary of the crime, only one of the original five suspects 
had been tried, despite a widespread belief that local and federal officials had known the 
identities of the bombers since 1963.  Furthermore, the attorney general confirmed that, 
                                                
 
 
5Editorial, “For the Children,” Birmingham News, 15 September 1983.  
 
 
6Ibid.  
 
 
7Ibid.; Olivia Barton, “Girl’s Father Doesn’t Want City to Wash Hands of Bombing,”  Birmingham 
News, 11 September 1983, 2A.   
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barring the discovery of substantial new evidence, no further action would be taken on that 
case or on the fifty or so other unsolved racially-motivated bombings in the city.8  No city-
sponsored memorial to the bombing existed, despite monuments across the nation including a 
commemorative chair at the Washington Cathedral, sculptures of the four girls in Arizona, 
and a learning center named for Carole Robertson in Chicago.9  Locally, the bombing has 
remained a constant symbol of state involvement in the violence of that time and in unequal 
enforcement of the laws since, calling into question the reform image so carefully tended by 
local leaders.   
Birmingham’s history after 1963 is more complicated than either the “image of 
reform” or the static image of “Bombingham” suggests.  As local individuals have struggled 
over the meanings of their history, they have suffered under the weight of being made a 
symbol in their own and others’ eyes.  The fire hoses, dogs, and demonstrations, while 
iconic, might have remained fixed in the city’s own and the nation’s narratives of the civil 
rights movement as the crest of nonviolence that changed the heart of the nation.  However 
reprehensible, the violence of the early 1960s in Birmingham rivals but does not necessarily 
surpass that of either the Mississippi Delta or northern urban centers as the movement wore 
                                                
 
 
8Olivia Barton, “Odds Today are Slim That Anyone Else Will Ever Be Brought to Trial,” Birmingham 
News, 11 September 1983, 1A.  In response to a New York Times Magazine article by Birmingham native 
Howell Raines, local authorities briefly reopened the case in 1980.  Greg McDonald, “Police, DA Reopen Probe 
of ’63 Church Bombing,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 20 February 1980.  In 1980, J.B. Stoner, renowned Georgia 
racist and anti-Semite, was convicted of the 1958 bombing of Bethel Baptist Church, Fred Shuttlesworth’s 
pastorate in Birmingham.  At that time, although around fifty other unsolved bombings remained, local 
authorities did not believe that successful prosecutions could be obtained.  Andrew Kilpatrick and Peter A. 
Kovacs, “Time Running Out in Church Bombing Cases,” Birmingham News, 22 May 1980. 
 
 
9Geraldine Watts Bell, “Death in the Morning,” Down Home (Fall 1982): 18-19.  Chris McNair, a 
professional photographer, founded the local magazine Down Home.  Howell Raines, “The Birmingham 
Bombing,” New York Times Magazine, 24 July 1983, 29.  Smaller local memorials included plaques at the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church and St. John’s A.M.E. Ibid. 
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on.  Nevertheless, the combination of state-sponsored violence against desegregation 
embodied by Bull Connor, standing in for white power structures across the South, and the 
horror of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing, which underlined for a national 
audience that vigilante violence worked hand-in-hand with official resistance, gave these 
events powerful weight.  While this one-two punch would have been enough to cement “Bad 
Birmingham” in the nation’s historical memory of the movement, just after the bombing, it 
was widely known that local and federal officials had suspects and did nothing, with no 
convictions surfacing as the late 1960s turned into the mid-1970s.  The lack of prosecutions 
kept the memory of the bombing alive and attached an image of violent resistance to 
Birmingham that haunts local people to the present.   
  
The Civil Rights Movement in Historical Memory 
Treatments of the civil rights movement have clustered in community studies,10 
biographies, specific campaign treatments,11 and weighty syntheses.12  Using social history 
                                                
 
 
10Among the most noted of these are William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North 
Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) and Robert J. 
Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York: Knopf, 1985).  Two more 
recent community studies are John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1994) and Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing 
Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).  Even while 
establishing this general historiographic trend, works like Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom; and Adam 
Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1995), point to the movement’s longer arc.   
 
 
11Some examples of the multitudes of these works include: Claybourne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and 
the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); David J. Garrow, Bearing the 
Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: Morrow & Co., 
1986); and Raymond Arsenault, Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).    
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methodologies, in particular oral history, these works participated in a broader shift 
throughout the historical discipline that sought to rework the definition of “political” to 
include previously overlooked or discounted forms of activity, including African-American 
community organizing and women’s activism.13  Yet, civil rights histories, and with them the 
public understanding of the civil rights movement, have traditionally ended with the passage 
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, or with the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968.  
While labor historians have plumed the depths of civil rights organizing antecedents 
in 1930s and 1940s unions and the left,14 and have been recently joined by legal historians,15 
                                                                                                                                                  
12See Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963-1965 (New York: Touchstone, 
1998), Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963 (New York: Touchstone, 1988), and At 
Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).  Also Robert 
Weisbrot, Freedom Bound: A History of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Norton, 1990) and Andrew 
Young, An Easy Burden: The Civil Rights Movement and the Transformation of America (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1996).  The standard historiographic summary remains Steven F. Lawson, “Freedom Then, 
Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement,” American Historical Review 96, 2 (1991): 
456-71, updated in Civil Rights Crossroads: Nation, Community, and the Black Freedom Struggle (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2003), 3-28.  See also Charles W. Eagles, “Toward New Histories of the Civil 
Rights Era,” Journal of Southern History 66, 4 (2000): 815-48 and Charles M. Payne, “Bibliographic Essay: 
The Social Construction of History,” in I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 413-41.   
 
 
13Work on women in the civil rights struggle has expanded our understanding of the interworkings of 
the movement itself.  Some examples of work on women in the movement include: Vicki L. Crawford, ed., 
Women in the Civil Rights Movement: Trailblazers and Torchbearers, 1941-1965 (New York: Carlson 
Publishers, 1990); Kay Mills, This Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer (New York: Dutton, 
1993); Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Catherine Fosl, Subversive Southerner: Anne Braden and the 
Struggle for Racial Justice in the Cold War South (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); Kathryn L. 
Nasstrom, Everybody’s Grandmother and Nobody’s Fool: Frances Freeborn Pauley and the Struggle for Social 
Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Gail S. Murray, ed., Throwing Off the Cloak of Privilege: 
White Southern Women Activists in the Civil Rights Era (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004); and, 
informed by sociological method, Belinda Robnett, How Long? How Long?: African American Women in the 
Struggle for Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).  Note that these works also tend to remain 
within the standard frame of biography.  Sara Evans, in her now classic, Personal Politics: The Roots of 
Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York: Knopf, 1979), drew 
connections between SNCC workers experience and their later involvement with the women’s movement.  
Women within the white supremacist movement remain almost an invisible empire unto themselves. 
While some articles examine women’s roles in ladies Klan auxiliaries, again, attention has been sparse.  For one 
of the few studies, see Kathleen Blee, “Evidence, Empathy, and Ethics: Lessons from Oral Histories of the 
Klan,” Journal of American History 80, 2 (September 1993): 596-606.  For an intense, personal recollection of 
a woman caught within Klan violence, see Petric J. Smith/Elizabeth H. Cobbs, Long Time Coming: An Insider’s 
Story of the Birmingham Church Bombing that Rocked the World (Birmingham: Crane Publishers, 1994).   
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civil rights scholars are only beginning to look beyond what has become the classical 
chronology of the movement.16  Historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall defines this dominant civil 
rights movement narrative as not just a reification of great leaders and well-worn, victorious 
moments within a foreshortened timeframe between Brown and the Voting Rights Act, but 
also as a subsequent story of declension, in which a formless white backlash “rights” the 
country, protecting us from liberalism gone too far in the form of black militancy, feminism, 
and affirmative action.17  To look carefully for both the origins and the heirs of the classical 
phase of the movement reinvigorates the politics of this story by challenging comfortable, 
contained images of activism and drawing that history closer to present-day questions of 
inequality.18   
Within the current narrative of the movement, as told in civil rights histories and in 
popular memory, certain flashpoints, cities, and moments take prominence.  To shift the 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
14Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1996), was a pioneering look at the beginnings of the movement in the 1930s and 
1940s.  See other excellent studies of the radical and labor origins of the movement: Robert Korstad and Nelson 
Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Lost and Found: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement,” Journal 
of American History 75 (December 1988); Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: 
Organizing Memphis Civil Rights Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Robert Korstad, Civil 
Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth-Century South 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Glenda E. Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical 
Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).  
 
 
15Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
Other histories of the NAACP include Lee Sertain, Invisible Activists: Women of the Louisiana NAACP and the 
Struggle for Civil Rights, 1915-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007).  
 
 
16New works push at these boundaries, see for example Glenn Feldman, ed., Before Brown: Civil 
Rights and White Backlash in the Modern South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004).  
 
 
17Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal 
of American History 91, 4 (March 2005): 1234.  
 
 
18Hall, “Long Civil Rights Movement,” passim, see especially 1262. 
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chronological frame is to necessarily draw these emphases into question.19  Pockets of 
research have pushed at the timeframe, most notably new analyses of black power,20 urban 
histories focused on suburbanization and integration,21 and local studies of school 
desegregation.22  Yet there is a moral urgency to our understanding of what Hall defines as 
                                                
 
 
19Other scholars have developed new themes as well, including: the international Cold War’s influence 
on domestic civil rights policy, see Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American 
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); intellectuals, see Carol Polsgrove, Divided Minds: 
Intellectuals and the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Norton, 2001); the role of the media, see Brian Ward, 
ed., Media, Culture, and the Modern African-American Freedom Struggle (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2001) and Radio and the Struggle for Civil Rights in the South (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2004), as well as Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff, The Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights 
Struggle, and the Awakening of a Nation (New York: Vintage, 2006); and armed resistance in the non-violent 
movement, see Lance E. Hill, The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004) and Simon Wendt, The Spirit and the Shotgun: Armed 
Resistance and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007).  
For white resistance, see the classic Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and 
Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969). Other works 
from the 1960s and 1970s include James W. Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: the Byrd Organization 
and the Politics of Massive Resistance (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976) and Robbins Ladew 
Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia’s Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954-1956 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964). Recent works include: Yasuhiro Katagiri, The 
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights and States Rights (Jackson: University of Mississippi 
Press, 2001); Matthew D. Lassiter and Andrew B. Lewis, eds., The Moderate’s Dilemma: Massive Resistance to 
School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998); Neil R. McMillen, The 
Citizen’s Council: Organizing Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964 (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994); and Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 
1945-1975 (New York: Knopf, 2006). 
 
 
20See Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert E. Williams and the Roots of Black Power (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) and Blood Done Sign My Name: A True Story (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 2004); Robert Self, “‘To Plan Our Liberation’: Black Power and the Politics of Place in 
Oakland, California, 1965-1977,” Journal of Urban History 26 (September 2006): 759-92 and American 
Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Charles E. 
Jones, ed., The Black Panther Party (Reconsidered) (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1998); and Peniel E. 
Joseph, The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era (New York: Routledge, 
2006).  
 
 
21See Kenneth J. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985); Kenneth D. Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working-Class Politics in 
Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent 
Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Kevin M. 
Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005); and Ronald H. Bayor, Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996). 
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“the long civil rights movement.”23  More than an extension of the chronology, an 
understanding of the long civil rights movement necessitates a reconceptualization of the 
movement as not just an organized demand for legal rights, but also as a continuing struggle 
to define and implement those rights.  This expansion requires that we broaden our scope, 
seeing anti-police brutality and welfare rights campaigns, as well as contests over the 
memory of the movement itself, as part of a continuing process.  Historians must also take a 
clear-eyed look at underlying economic and ideological issues and ask harder questions about 
why many of the goals of the movement have yet to be achieved.  This approach will widen 
the impact of civil rights histories, pushing these studies toward a more pointed social 
critique, and one that cannot be limited to the South.  
 Following the current move in civil rights historiography to look past the 1960s to 
continuing civil rights activity and the slow push of integration, this dissertation examines the 
legacy of the movement for a particularly iconic city.  Through the lens of the Sixteenth 
Street Baptist Church bombing, the subsequent trials, and the creation of the Civil Rights 
Institute, “The Past on Trial” explores the public memory of the city’s national moment.  
Asking how memories of 1963 have surfaced in political, legal, and cultural battles in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
22These works push the chronology into the 1970s but are focused on school desegregation rather than 
redefining the contours of the movement per se.  See Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The 
Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Frye Gaillard, 
The Dream Long Deferred: The Landmark Struggle for Desegregation in Charlotte, North Carolina (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2006); and David S. Cecelski, Along Freedom Road: Hyde County, North 
Carolina and the Fate of Black Schools in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).   
 
 
23Hall, “Long Civil Rights Movement,” 1235.  Also see her previous article, “Mobilizing Memory: 
Broadening Our View of the Civil Rights Movement,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 27 July 2001, as 
well as other essays calling for a move forward in the historiography including, Anthony Walton, “A Dream 
Deferred: Why Martin Luther King Has Yet to Be Heard,” Harper’s (August 2002): 67-72 and Nell Irvin 
Painter, “America Needs to Reexamine Its Civil Rights History,” Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 32 
(summer 2001): 132-34. 
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city extends the movement’s influence and illustrates how individuals have challenged static 
interpretations of the movement.  Using oral history, newspapers, and archival resources, I 
trace the intersections between public moments of remembering, such as the creation of a 
civil rights museum, and residents’ reactions to those official versions of the past, including 
how those expressions interact with their own identity.  I show how alternative narratives and 
individual memories challenged the public stories, and how the struggle to reckon with the 
city’s violent past has made the negative image of “Bombingham” almost an historical actor 
in its own right.  
Histories of Birmingham generally fall within the standard narrative arc of the civil 
rights movement.  And, despite its prominent role in the movement, a relatively small body 
of scholarship deals with the city during the civil rights era.  Many of the larger syntheses, 
including those by Taylor Branch and Andrew Young, devote chapters to the demonstrations 
in Birmingham but tend to repeat King-centered narratives filled with stock characterizations 
of blacks and whites in the city.24  The fullest and most thoughtful analysis of Birmingham 
remains Glenn Eskew’s But for Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil 
Rights Struggle (1996).25  This remarkably researched study illuminates the various facets of 
local participation in the movement while positioning Birmingham as the turning point in the 
struggle nationwide.  Ending with the assassination of King, Eskew concludes that the 
                                                
24Branch, Pillar of Fire; Young, An Easy Burden.  
 
 
25Eskew, But for Birmingham. David Garrow, Birmingham, Alabama, 1956-1963: The Black Struggle 
for Civil Rights (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, 1989) represents the only other major scholarly work on 
Birmingham and the civil rights movement generally.  It is an edited collection containing Eskew’s master’s 
thesis, a Harvard undergraduate honors thesis examining the key players in the 1963 demonstrations and 
accords, and an early biographical essay on Fred Shuttlesworth based primarily on personal interviews. 
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limited goals of desegregation failed to address the wider problems of structural economic 
inequities.26 
Even recent treatments of the city often reiterate the image of “Bad Birmingham” 
without questioning its foundations or acknowledging change.27  The large number of 
autobiographies set in this period of Birmingham’s history, as well as the fiction and plays 
produced on its themes, speak to the powerful way that the city’s standard civil rights 
narrative interacts with personal identity and memory.28   Other works, which examine the 
city’s civil rights history generally29 or take up specific subjects within its classic civil rights 
                                                
26Eskew, But for Birmingham, 333-40.  
 
 
27For the most recent of these, see Diane McWhorter, Carry Me Home: Birmingham, Alabama, the 
Climactic Battle of the Civil Rights Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). McWhorter’s Pulitzer-
Prize winning work is reminiscent of the larger syntheses of the movement produced by Garrow and Branch.  
Interweaving reminiscences of her own family’s life in Birmingham, McWhorter takes on the white elites and 
their support for vigilante segregationist tactics.  She examines the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing 
investigation in detail.  
 
 
28Histories with autobiographical components, autobiographies, and memoirs of this period include: 
McWhorter, Carry Me Home; Charles Morgan, Jr., A Time to Speak (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Paul 
Hemphill, Leaving Birmingham: Notes of a Native Son (New York: Viking Press, 1993); Cobbs/Smith, Long 
Time Coming; Gary Thomas Rowe, My Undercover Years with the Ku Klux Klan (New York: Bantam, 1976); 
and Deborah E. McDowell, Leaving Pipe Shop: Memories of Kin (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998).  New York 
Times reporter and Birmingham native Howell Raines often utilized autobiographical framing in his work on 
the bombing.  See Raines, “The Birmingham Bombing,” 12. 
Fictionalized depictions of this period multiply–most are written by Birmingham natives.  On the 
bombing, see Christopher Paul Curtis, The Watsons Go to Birmingham–1963 (New York: Bantam Doubleday, 
1995); Hubert Grissom, “BapBomb,” unpublished play, premiered 11 January 2007 in Tampa, Florida (see 
Susan Strickland, “Hubert Grissom Play to Premiere in Tampa,” Birmingham News, 26 December 2006, 3D); 
Sena Jeter Naslund, Four Spirits: A Novel (New York: William Morrow, 2003); Anthony Grooms, 
Bombingham: A Novel (New York: Press Free, 2001).  See also Howard Cruse, Stuck Rubber Baby (New York: 
Paradox Press, 1995), a graphic novel about growing up and coming out in Birmingham in the early 1960s.  On 
Richard Arrington, David Vann, and the “Bonita Carter Incident,” see John Northrop, Mayor Todd 
(Montgomery: New South Books, 2005). 
 
 
29J. Mills Thornton III, Dividing Lines: Municipal Politics and the Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 2002).  This magnum opus 
synthesizes much of the work on Birmingham, with a broad sweep from the late 1930s to 1964 and an emphasis 
on community organizing and municipal politics. 
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history30 limit their focus chronologically and do not attempt to interrogate the image of 
Birmingham or the memory of the civil rights movement in the city.  Labor historians have 
long explored the economics of segregation in the city and the links between union and civil 
rights organizing.31  Urban history, following upon this examination of the structural causes 
and effects of inequality, constitutes the most dynamic current work on Birmingham. 
Influenced by the pioneering work of Thomas Sugrue on Detroit,32 historians have 
begun to question the “race neutral” bureaucratic face of later resistance to desegregation and 
trace the civil rights struggle into the arenas of neighborhoods and employment, while 
emphasizing external pressures such as deindustrialization and federal funding.  Louise 
Passey Maxwell’s recent dissertation, “Remaking Jim Crow: Segregation and Urban Change 
in Birmingham, Alabama, 1938-1963” traces the legacy of industrial housing on pre-1963 
                                                
30For example, see S. Jonathan Bass, Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Martin Luther King, Jr., Eight 
White Religious Leaders, and the “Letter from Birmingham Jail” (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2001); Andrew M. Manis, A Fire You Can’t Put Out: The Civil Rights Life of Birmingham’s Reverend 
Fred Shuttlesworth (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999); William A. Nunnelley, Bull Connor 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991); and Frank Sikora, The Judge: the Life and Opinions of 
Alabama’s Frank M. Johnson, Jr. (Montgomery: NewSouth Books, 2001).  These biographical works align 
with the first wave of civil rights histories.  Eskew’s local study of grassroots organizing and its links to the 
national campaign placed Birmingham histories in line with the larger trends of movement historiography.   
 
 
31For example, see Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great 
Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990) and “The Black Poor and the Politics of 
Opposition in a New South City, 1929-1970,” in The “Underclass” Debate: Views from History, ed. Michael B. 
Katz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Horace Huntley and David Montgomery, eds., Black 
Workers’ Struggle for Equality in Birmingham (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004) and Huntley, “Iron 
Ore Miners and Mine Mill in Alabama, 1933-1952” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1977); Henry M. 
McKiven, Iron and Steel: Class, Race, and Community in Birmingham, 1875-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1995); Daniel Letwin, The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 
1878-1921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Nell Irvin Painter, The Narrative of Hosea 
Hudson: His Life as a Negro Communist in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Philip Taft, 
Organizing Dixie: Alabama Workers in the Industrial Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981); Brian 
Kelly, Race, Class, and Power in the Alabama Coalfields, 1908-1921 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2001); and Robert H. Woodrun, “Everybody was Black Down There”: Race and Industrial Change in the 
Alabama Coalfields (Athens: University of Georgia, 2007). 
 
 
32Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).  See also the urban/suburban literature discussed in footnote 21. 
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attempts at neighborhood integration and violent resistance, as well as the way that urban 
planning, including highway construction, maintained segregated boundaries.33  Looking 
through to the 1970s, Christopher Scribner charts how federal funding, vital for the city’s 
failing economy, brought with it the requirements of change: first, city leaders necessarily 
lost autonomy under governmental spending oversight; then, with the implementation of the 
War on Poverty, mandated black participation and desegregation literally changed the city’s 
political composition.34  Charles Connerly pushes this story into the 1980s, examining how 
urban planning wrote segregation onto the landscape, but then became the structure upon 
which black neighborhoods built autonomy and political clout under federal Citizen 
Participation Plans in the 1970s.35  
Informed by concepts of narrative, identity, and memory, as well as oral history 
methodology, this dissertation explores the legacy of the long civil rights movement in the 
city.36  The heavy weight of Birmingham’s civil rights demonstrations pushes them again and 
                                                
 
 
33Louise Passey Maxwell, “Remaking Jim Crow: Segregation and Urban Change in Birmingham, 
Alabama, 1938-1963” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1999). 
 
 
34Christopher MacGregor Scribner, Renewing Birmingham: Federal Funding and the Promise of 
Change, 1929-1979 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002).  Also see Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running 
America: Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1998), 37-38, 68, tracing deindustrialization and lamenting how, despite Birmingham’s steel and unions 
history, civil rights remained a social, not an economic issue.  “Much future trouble resulted from this shallow 
understanding,” she asserts.  Ibid., 38. 
 
 
35Charles E. Connerly, “The Most Segregated City in America”: City Planning and Civil Rights in 
Birmingham, 1920-1980 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005).  Geographer Bobby M. Wilson 
analyzes these same urban and spatial trends.  See his theory-heavy America’s Johannesburg: Industrialization 
and Racial Transformation in Birmingham (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000) and Race and Place in 
Birmingham: The Civil Rights and Neighborhood Movements (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
 
 
36Oral history blossomed in the 1980s, producing a large body of scholarship.  Two classics of oral 
history method most often used by historians include Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and 
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again into public discussion.  Birmingham, 1963, emerges at each lieux de mémoire 
examined in this dissertation: the three bombing trials and opening of the Civil Rights 
Institute.37  Deliberately created and maintained, these sites of memory, which take the form 
of public displays and monuments, trials, archives, or celebrations, among many others, 
represent a moment of history removed from its context, showcased, and disputed.38  “The 
Past on Trial” examines how, over and over, city leaders attempted to establish a progressive 
                                                                                                                                                  
Other Stories (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991) and Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: 
Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  Other key articles include: Gwyn Pris, “Oral History” in 
New Perspectives on Historical Writing, ed. Peter Burke (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2001), 120-56; Kim Lacy Rogers, “Oral History and the History of the Civil Rights Movement,” Journal of 
American History 75, 2 (September 1988): 567-76; and Blee, “Lessons from Oral Histories of the Klan.”  On 
the potential for oral history to disrupt the master narrative of American history to better include African-
American history and memory, see Geneviève Fabre and Robert O’Meally, “Introduction,” in History and 
Memory in African-American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 
 
37Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” trans. by Marc Roudebush, in 
History and Memory in African-American Culture, 284-300.  Although Nora remains the touchstone for 
memory studies, his argument that historical memory, as manifest in lieux de mémoire, completely replaced 
collective memory has come under attack.  See Susan Crane, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective 
Memory,” American Historical Review 102, 5 (December 1997): 1375-76.  She explains: “For if historical 
memory is only one form of collective memory, it may well be that collective memory has not been lost or 
supplanted but in fact has persisted in a way altogether unlike what has been proposed so far.  In order to 
reconceptualize collective memory and show that it is not simply an historical artifact, I will suggest relocating 
the collective back in the individual who articulates it—the individual who disappeared in the occlusion of 
personal historical consciousness by the culture of preservation.”  Ibid., 1375. 
Furthermore, historian Bruce Baker cautions against applying Nora’s model of history, memory, and 
lieux de mémoire to the American South.  Unlike France, the American South never developed one dominant 
history, due largely to the lack of a centralized administrative state or even a leading center of culture.  Bruce E. 
Baker, What Reconstruction Meant: Historical Memory in the American South (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2007), 5-6.  Similarly, France’s history of nationalization and then modernization in the context 
of the two world wars creates a very particular context for the disassociation of memory and history, something 
that Baker does not find in the American South. Ibid.  I am not arguing for the application of Nora to the 
American South generally, or even during this specific period following the civil rights movement.  Rather, I 
am using Nora’s construct of a site of memory as a way to interrogate the recurring image of 1963 that appears 
over and over in public discussions in Birmingham.  Birmingham, 1963, has the material, symbolic, and 
functional aspects that define a lieux, according to Nora.  Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 295.  The 
image of a progressive Birmingham, 1963, became material through the constant discussion of it by leaders and 
in the media, culminating finally in its expression in the Civil Rights Institute itself.  Invested with intense 
symbolic weight, balanced by the parallel, competing image of “Bombingham,” this site of memory is 
functional in that it is expected to do the work of representing the city’s race relations progress in the face of 
much contrary evidence.  I have chosen the lieux as a theoretical tool to help make sense of the way the city’s 
past haunts it in the present. 
 
 
38Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 289.  
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“image of reform” as the public memory of Birmingham’s history since 1963, and how, at 
each articulation, each site of memory, individuals contested and questioned this telling of 
their past. 
Memorializations and public expressions of collective memory are necessarily in 
dialogue with individual memories.39  Within personal memories we can find the seeds, 
images, and language of public discussions, just as certain groups and individuals align the 
larger narrative to fit their own visions of the past.  Historian David Thelan described this 
linkage as “popular negotiations over memory.”  It is this sense of contention, Nora’s “push 
and pull” of public and private, that oral histories and close attention to residents’ reactions, 
as reported in newspapers and other contemporary sources, can illuminate.40   
The events of 1963 have become a pivot from which individual stories spin out, either 
willingly, as in the case of former activists or those sympathetic to the movement, or 
unwillingly, as among segregationists who still feel victimized by civil rights’ demands.  
This fixation on 1963 is the result, in part, of intense media coverage and historical interest, 
along with the drama and violence of that moment in time.41  The reoccurring nature of this 
                                                
 
 
39The key articulation of the relationship between private memories and collective or shared memory 
remains James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). These authors argue 
that personal “memory is structured by language, by teaching and observing, by collectively held ideas, and by 
experiences shared with others.  This makes memory social as well.”  Ibid., 7.  They distinguish themselves 
from Maurice Halbwach’s pioneering study, The Collective Memory, by emphasizing the social “process” of 
memory creation, rather than the relationship of individual to collective memory.  See Halbwach, The Collective 
Memory, trans., Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).   
 
 
40David Thelan, “Memory and American History,” Journal of American History 75, 4 (March 1989): 
1127.  Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 289: “it is this very push and pull [of history and memory] that 
produces lieux de mémoire—moments of history torn away from the movement of history, then returned; no 
longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded.” 
 
 
41Work on memorialization and the public memory of the movement expands.  Some examples 
include: Kathryn L. Nasstrom, “Down to Now: Memory, Narrative, and Women’s Leadership in the Civil 
 17 
memory also speaks to the way that 1963 has become entangled with the personal identity of 
residents and their understandings of the city.42   
Attention to the words of Birmingham residents shows how individual memory 
diverges from and shapes the public memory of the movement.43  Furthermore, a focus on 
individual reactions to public articulations of memory can provide the theoretical 
intervention necessary, at this point, to help anchor memory studies.  Alon Confino, in his 
state-of-the-field article published in 1997, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: 
Problems of Method,” explains that memory studies have become popularized and 
unmoored, ranging from subject to subject without the strong theoretical exploration needed 
to ground the new history.44  Confino resists analyzing cultural artifacts as evidence of social 
                                                                                                                                                  
Rights Movement in Atlanta, Georgia,” Gender and History 11 (April 1999); Renee C. Romano and Leigh 
Raiford, eds., The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006) 
(collection of essays examining “civil rights movement consensus memory,” its political weight, and 
challengers); and David A. Zonderman, review of the Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historic Site, 
Birmingham Civil Rights Institute, and National Civil Rights Museum, Journal of American History 91 (June 
2004): 174-83.   Fitzhugh Brundage puts public spaces at the heart of contests over historical memory in the 
South.  See W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past: A Clash of Race and Memory (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005).  For an analysis of Reconstruction memory, see Baker, What Reconstruction Meant. 
 
 
42According to Halbwachs and Crane, social or collective memory reflects individual memory as 
expressed via group identification.  Crane explains: “Collective memory maintains the lived experience of 
individuals within groups, according to Halbwachs, because that individual experience is never remembered 
without reference to a shared context.”  Crane, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory,” 1381.  
See also Fentress and Wickam, Social Memory, 87-89; John R. Gillis, “Memory and Identity: The History of a 
Relationship,” in ed., Gillis, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 3-24.  David Thelan highlights the social aspects of memory, especially the interaction 
of individual memory with the memory of others, in “Memory and American History,” Journal of American 
History 75, 4 (March 1989): 1122-23. 
 
 
43For an intriguing analysis of the interplay between autobiographical and historical writing about the 
movement, see Kathryn L. Nasstrom, “Between Memory and History: Autobiographies of the Civil Rights 
Movement and the Writing of Civil Rights History,” Journal of Southern History 74, 2 (May 2008): 325-64. 
 
 
44Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” American Historical 
Review 102, 5 (December 1997): 1386-1403.  The most recent state-of-the-field article reiterates this need for 
attention to reception in order to “distinguish among the abundance of failed collective memory initiatives on 
the one hand and the few cases of successful collective memory construction on the other.”  Emphasizing the 
need for theoretical precision in our understanding of “collective memory” and drawing heavily on German 
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attitudes and instead advocates “look[ing] for memory where it is implied rather than said, 
blurred rather than clear, in the realm of collective mentality.”45  Emphasizing how an 
individual reacts to collective expressions of memory, Confino asks historians to examine the 
messy “multiplicities of memory,” constantly made and received from the collective level to 
the individual.  He calls for us to embrace this complexity, to allow it to serve “as a reminder 
to realize what is declared more often than practiced, namely the multiplicity of social 
experiences and representations, in part contradictory and ambiguous, in terms of which 
people construct the world and their actions.”46  Just as attention to the individual can point 
us toward “truer” narratives of the past,47 so memory studies tethered to these recollections 
may expose values and beliefs, webs of race and class, that the general characterization of the 
civil rights movement (and recent history and politics for that matter) would rather we forget.  
This exploration of memory can broaden our understanding of the legacy of the movement, 
the way it lingers in individual lives, and its relentless hold over the city’s civic image. 
                                                                                                                                                  
language sources, this article presents compelling arguments about the usual conflation of individual and 
collective memory while calling for a more expansive and rigorous methodology.  Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding 
Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” History and Theory 41, 2 
(May 2002): 179-97. 
 
 
45Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History,” 1395. 
 
 
46Ibid., 1398-1400.  Susan Crane also points to the “body/body problem” within some theories of 
collective memory: that groups cannot remember as if possessed of a single brain.  Rather, “collective memory 
ultimately is located not in sites but in individuals.  All narratives, all sites, all texts remain objects until they are 
‘read’ or referred to by individuals thinking historically.”  Crane, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective 
Memory,” 1381.  Every manifestation of collective memory, she reminds us, is designed by an individual (or 
small group of individuals) for consumption by a larger group.  Ibid., 1382. 
 
 
47In his classic oral history text, The Voice of the Past, Paul Thompson passionately explains: “Finally, 
oral evidence can achieve something more pervasive, and more fundamental to history.  While historians study 
the actors of history from a distance, their characterizations of their lives, views, and actions will always risk 
being misdescriptions, projections of the historian’s own experience and imagination: a scholarly form of 
fiction.  Oral evidence, by transforming the ‘objects’ of study into ‘subjects’, makes for a history which is not 
just richer, more vivid, and heart-rending, but truer.”  Thompson, The Voice of the Past, 117.  
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 The Past on Trial: Birmingham After 1963 
This dissertation asks how memories of the civil rights demonstrations and violent 
resistance have played out in political and legal battles in the city, as well as in public 
moments of memorialization.  The recurring discussions of police brutality and the bombing 
throughout the city’s history since 1963 are moments where individuals have pushed these 
iconic images to the foreground in order to challenge the political progress narrative and to 
force a kind of reckoning with the past and the present.  By tracing the ways that the civil 
rights demonstrations have been discussed, and how the memory of the unsolved bombing 
has challenged or confirmed that presentation of the city’s history, we can think through the 
ways in which it is easier to re-live and re-interrogate those same moments and stock images 
rather than engage with slippery questions of race and equality today.   
Many studies of the civil rights movement generally, and of Birmingham specifically, 
end on the down note of defeat even when reaching to cover the long civil rights movement.  
Birmingham does face continuing challenges, most notably in its school system and the lack 
of suburban involvement in the urban core.  But the city deserves credit for negotiating what 
Odessa Woolfolk, president emerita of the Civil Rights Institute, has called “the elephant in 
the room”—the city’s history of white supremacy and violence.  Many residents, from Chris 
McNair, father of one of the bomb victims, to others less powerful and prominent, have 
struggled to confront the city’s history and image while pushing Birmingham forward 
socially, politically, and economically.  Attention to these individual reactions to the image 
of “Bombingham” can give us a truer and more complicated understanding of the legacy of 
the movement for the city. 
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The first chapter examines the 2001 and 2002 trials of aging former Klansmen 
Thomas E. Blanton, Jr. and Bobby Frank Cherry for murder in the Sixteenth Street Baptist 
Church bombing.  Part of a larger trend of prominent civil rights-era cases resurrected during 
the Clinton administration, these trials brought forth questions of racial justice, the passage of 
time, and memory.  The 2002 trial of Bobby Frank Cherry hinged on the personal ability to 
remember–his defense attorneys claimed that age and dementia should excuse him from 
standing trial.  But in these cases, both inside and out of the courtroom, former Klansmen and 
women, the victims’ families, as well as many other Birmingham residents, reflected on their 
own roles in the 1960s, changing attitudes, and a changed city.  These public debates 
disputed the legacy of the movement and the meaning of trials so long delayed.  Generated 
and supported by the work of the victims’ families and their activist allies in the black 
community, these trials and the protests around them provided an unprecedented opportunity 
for Birmingham residents to discuss and contest their own history, leading to some very 
honest portrayals of the state sponsorship of vigilante violence during the 1960s and the 
failures of the justice system since. 
To delve into Birmingham’s relationship with its troubled past, I then move 
backwards in time and begin the story where most civil rights histories of the city end: the 
spring 1963 demonstrations.  I look first at the bombing itself as an extension of resistance to 
the spring demonstrations and token school desegregation in 1963.  While city fathers and 
elite black leadership crafted token desegregation accords in the wake of the spring mass 
demonstrations, continuing violence and threats of civil rights activity during the summer 
undermined this carefully constructed “image of reform.”  This escalating violence 
culminated in the Sixteenth Street bombing that fall.  Chapter Two focuses on school 
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desegregation in the days leading up to the bombing in order to emphasize the state-
condoned violence that subsequent attempts to remake the “image of reform” would have to 
struggle to incorporate or to explain away.   
In 1977, during the trial of the first suspect in the bombing, competing narratives of 
the meanings of events in the early 1960s emerged.  The third chapter analyzes the discussion 
of the events of 1963 during the 1977 trial and the reaction to the conviction.  As economics, 
political power, and demographics transformed the city, so did the memory of the events of 
1963 and of local government’s complicity in those events.  While the new trial allowed city 
leaders and the media to reiterate the “image of reform” by incorporating the trial into the 
progress narrative, questions about the long delay in prosecution and remaining uncharged 
suspects kept “Bombingham” alive.  
Chapter Four examines the creation of the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute in 1992, 
focusing on how residents reacted to this official version of the city’s civil rights past.  The 
proposal to create a civil rights museum in the city prompted strong feelings, both in favor 
and in opposition.  I look at how the “image of reform” was challenged or solidified through 
the establishment of the Institute itself and in the history told in its displays.  While some 
residents’ sense of their identities, past and present, comported with the Institute’s telling of 
the city’s history, others resisted this presentation of their past.  And even as Birmingham 
leaders attempted to turn what for many years was considered a liability—the city’s infamous 
role in the civil rights movement—into a source of city pride and tourist dollars, the still-
open Sixteenth Street bombing case lingered around the edges of this public celebration. 
As Birmingham residents lived with the weight of the events of 1963, many aspired 
to a better city.  Christopher McNair, the father of one of the girls killed in the bombing, 
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served on the committee that represented Birmingham to the Look magazine 1970 “All-
American City” contest.  When first approached about attending the Look nominating 
conference, McNair remembered that one of the leaders described it as “a real nice trip.”  
McNair continued, “I think that he thought that I accepted it that way, and I also think that 
the people–the power structure–who were pushing my going thought that I was too naïve to 
know why they wanted me to go.”48  McNair went anyway because he hoped the award 
would benefit the city as a whole: “I honestly believed . . . that if I could do something by 
going out there that would help Birmingham—and when I say Birmingham, I mean the 
general area—to not be looked down on, but to be looked up to, that then I wouldn’t just be 
pleasing those power magnates who wanted me to go.  But that if it made it better for the 
whole city, then it would be better for all people.”49  Aware of the symbolic power of his 
presence, McNair helped to shape the image of a progressive Birmingham in the hope that 
the reality would follow. 
 
 
                                                
 
 
48Howell Raines, My Soul is Rested: The Story of the Civil Rights Movement in the Deep South (New 
York: Penguin, 1983), 184. 
 
 
49Raines, My Soul is Rested, 185. 
Chapter One 
 
Closing the Bombing Case and Putting the Past on Trial 
 
 
 In 2002 Birmingham finally laid the 1963 Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing 
case to rest.  The prosecution of Bobby Frank Cherry, then seventy-one, the last remaining 
suspect in the 1963 bombing, followed the 2001 conviction of Thomas E. Blanton, sixty-
two.1  Observers throughout the country heralded the Cherry guilty verdict as “an end to an 
era.”2  As the aging civil rights firebrands Fred Shuttlesworth and Abraham Woods stood on 
the courthouse steps singing, “Justice ain’t free, keep your eyes on the prize,” the U.S. 
Attorney declared, “We’ve shown that justice delayed doesn’t have to be justice denied.  It’s 
a great day in Birmingham.  It’s a great day in the state.”3  
 Since 1989, state and national law enforcement authorities have reopened or begun 
serious investigations into at least eighteen civil rights-era murders across the South.  Of 
those, seven cases resulted in murder or manslaughter convictions.  In almost as many, one or 
more of the primary suspects had already died.  While some other civil rights-era cases can 
no longer lead to viable prosecutions due to immunity issues, the passage of time, or political 
                                                
 1Jamie Kizzire, “An End to An Era: Cherry Convicted in Killing of 4 Girls,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 
23 May 2002, A1. 
 
2Ibid. 
  
3Taylor Bright, “Tears of Joy, Pain Follow Verdict,” Birmingham News, 23 May 2002, A3; Kizzire, 
“An End to An Era,” A3. 
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inertia, other investigations remain active.4  These trials have captivated a national audience 
as elderly Klansmen sat before juries, answering for their attempts to maintain segregation 
and, for many observers, personifying the society that the civil rights movement struggled to 
eradicate.  For Birmingham in particular, these trials represented a symbolic moment in a 
long struggle to put this traumatic part of its history to rest.  
 Yet questions remained.  Many Birmingham residents and scholars worry that the 
portrayal of the trials as benevolent state actions masks the complicity of law enforcement 
and other officials in the non-prosecution of these crimes for over forty years.  Others 
wondered if these were simply show trials, designed to close an embarrassing chapter in 
Birmingham’s history.  Some question the very possibility that justice can be served after 
such long delays, by trying men who committed these crimes as youths and who have lived 
long lives untouched by prosecution.  These dissenting voices point to the unsettled legacy of 
these cases for the affected communities and prompt the larger question: how far can a 
murder trial go toward addressing the uncertainties and injustices that surround such events?  
Birmingham residents’ basic inquiries—What happened?  Why?  Why did prosecution take 
so long?  Who is responsible?—can only be partially answered in a courtroom setting. 
 To grapple with the power of this bombing, this chapter approaches it as an act with 
consequences for the victims, the community at large, the offenders themselves, and the 
                                                
 4“Civil Rights Era Murder Cases Re-Examined,” Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 24 January 2007, 
http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070124/NEWS/70124047. For example, a grand 
jury recently failed to indict the last remaining suspect in the Emmett Till murder case. See Shaila Dewan, 
“After Inquiry, Grand Jury Refuses to Issue New Indictments in Till Case,” New York Times, 28 February 2007, 
A16. For an examination of the Emmett Till case in the context of restorative justice and critical race theory, see 
Margaret M. Russell, “Reopening the Emmett Till Case: Lessons and Challenges for Critical Race Practice,” 
Fordham Law Review 73 (2005): 2101.  As of February 2007, the FBI had over one hundred civil rights-era 
cases referred to it by local and state authorities for review.  FBI National Press Office, Press Release, 
“Partnerships Established with NAACP, the National Urban League, and The Southern Poverty Law Center,” 
22 February 2007, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/coldcase022707.htm. 
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relationships among all three, instead of understanding the crime in traditional terms as an 
abstract harm against the state.  This concept of the expanded consequences of crime comes 
from restorative justice theory, a reform movement within the criminal justice system.  
Reconceptualizing the effects of crime, the goal of restorative justice is to implement 
processes, considered fair by all involved, to repair the relationships damaged by crime.  This 
paradigm shift in our understanding of criminal law, away from retributive, punishment-
based methods to reparative and reintegrative methods, still maintains offender acceptance of 
responsibility as its central tenant.5  Redefining the crime as expanded in this way helps us to 
understand the power of its memory. 
 While the trial process itself loomed large in many residents’ conception of an 
adequate resolution to the crime, the broad harms radiating from the long-unsolved bombing 
provoked damage beyond what a guilty verdict could repair.  To understand why residents 
continue to struggle with the memory of this bombing, even after the trials, we must look to 
the reverberations of this crime in victims’ lives, in the city’s self-image, and in its national 
reputation.  The lasting power of this bombing meant that access to the criminal justice 
system on its own could not provide relief.  Community reactions to the recent trials 
illustrated the need for a broader reconceptualization of the system of justice itself. 
 
                                                
5A surprisingly widespread reform, some type of restorative justice process is used with both juvenile 
and adult offenders in many states throughout the U.S., most often in the form of victim-offender mediation.  
This area of legal theory subsumes some varieties of mediation and can assume several names, including 
“transformative justice,” “relational justice,” “restorative community justice,” and bleeds into other reform 
concepts such as restitution for historical injustices and truth and reconciliation commissions.  For an 
introduction to restorative justice theory, see Gerry Johnstone, ed., A Restorative Justice Reader (Portland, OR: 
Willan Publishing, 2003); Daniel W. Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice (Cincinnati, OH: 
Anderson Publishing, 2002); and Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1995). 
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  2001 and 2002: The Blanton and Cherry Trials 
 The final bombing trials resulted from a meeting in 1993 called by Rob Langford, the 
newly appointed Special Agent in Charge of the FBI office in Birmingham.  Agent Langford 
was determined to address the Birmingham black community’s long-standing distrust of the 
FBI, so when he took over the office he invited a group of local African-American leaders to 
share their concerns with him.  Among that group was Reverend Abraham Woods, 
Birmingham-area president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, who expressed 
the sense that the federal government had done little to protect the interests of black citizens 
during the civil rights era.6  Woods pointed specifically to the FBI’s neglect of the Sixteenth 
Street Baptist Church bombing.7  Langford promised to review the Bureau’s files on the 
bombing, and through the contributions of many individuals, including activists and 
journalists, eight years later the trials began.8 
 The defendants, Thomas E. Blanton and Bobby Frank Cherry had been among the 
FBI’s initial suspects.9  A fourth original suspect, Herman Frank Cash, died in 1994 without 
                                                
6Founded in 1957, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (“SCLC”), first headed by Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., played an active role in the Birmingham and in the national movement in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  Glenn T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil Rights 
Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 26. SCLC continues this activism today. 
 
 7Reverend Abraham Woods, interview by author, digital recording, Birmingham, Ala., 30 March 2007, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Jay Reeves, “Meeting in ’93 was 
Prelude to Bombing Investigation,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 19 May 2000, A4  See also Frank Sikora, Until 
Justice Rolls Down: The Birmingham Church Bombing Case (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 
168, regarding the role that the FBI’s investigation of Birmingham’s first black mayor, Richard Arrington, 
played in the black community’s distrust.  
 
 8Steve Reeves, “Federal-State Cooperation Tight,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 18 May 2000, A6. 
 
 9Adam Goldman, “Complex Chain of Events Delayed Blanton’s Trial Date Until Today,” Birmingham 
News, 24 April 2001, 7A; Kevin Sack, “Ex-Klansman Is Found Guilty in ’63 Bombing,” New York Times,  2 
May 2001, A1.  By the time of the trials, Cherry had retired and was living in Texas.  Local officials were able 
to extradict him using charges by his former stepdaughter of sexual abuse in the early 1970s in Shelby County, 
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standing trial10  In 1963, when Blanton was twenty-five years old, he and his father Thomas 
“Pops” Blanton, Sr. broke from the Eastview Ku Klux Klan and, along with Robert 
Chambliss, founded the more militant Klavern later known as the “Cahaba River Boys.”11  
Cherry openly admitted his Klan membership to law enforcement officers and, according to 
investigative notes, displayed violent segregationist attitudes.  He also served as Blanton’s 
first alibi for the Friday night before the bombing.12  And although these men were suspects 
within days, after the FBI closed the case in 1968, thirty-five years would pass before they 
were tried.  When William J. “Bill” Baxley, then attorney general, reinvestigated the case in 
the mid-1970s, residual FBI suspicion of local authorities due to corruption in the 1960s 
meant that his investigators were granted limited access to federal files.  In 1977, Baxley was 
not aware two sets of surveillance tapes existed.  It is possible that his FBI handlers were 
similarly uninformed about this crucial evidence.13  And despite two brief revivals of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Alabama.  AP, “Suspect in 1963 Bombing Arrestsed on Sex Charges,” New York Times, 27 April 2000, no pp.  
Many family members have accused these Klansmen of domestic and sexual abuse.  See id; Petric J. 
Smith/Elizabeth H. Cobbs, Long Time Coming: An Insider’s Story of the Birmingham Church Bombing that 
Rocked the World (Birmingham: Crane Publishers, 1994); and Barry Yeoman, “A Hideous Hate Crime: It’s My 
Family’s Secret No Longer,” Glamour (August 2000): 224-27, 251.  
 
10John Archibald and Jeff Hansen, “Death Spares Scrutiny of Cash in Bomb Probe,” Birmingham 
News, 7 September 1997.  
 
11Blanton Profile, no date, Birmingham, Ala., Police Department Surveillance Files, 1947-80, 
1125.3.3, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Birmingham Public Library (hereafter cited as Police 
Surveillance Files).   
 
12Cherry Profile, no date, Police Surveillance Files, 1125.3.3. 
 
13Bill Baxley, “Why Did the F.B.I. Hold Back Evidence?” New York Times, 3 May 2001, A25.  FBI 
Director Louis Freeh subsequently testified before Congress that this case was “a disgrace to the FBI” that 
should have been prosecuted in 1964. Mary Orndorff and Adam Goldman, “Freeh Says Bombing Case Delay A 
Disgrace,” Birmingham News, 18 May 2001.  
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case, once after a Justice Department study of the investigation and the other after a false ex-
Klansman deathbed confession, these tapes remained hidden.14 
 Recorded in 1964 and 1965, these tapes would prove instrumental in both the Cherry 
and Blanton trials.  The first set was discovered in a locked file cabinet at the Birmingham 
Jail.  Recorded over a period of months with the cooperation of Klansman-turned-informant 
Mitchell A. Burns, these tapes captured Blanton bragging about bombing the church as he 
and Burns drove around at night drinking.15  Blanton would drive Burns’s car, usually past 
Sixteenth Street Baptist, while the tape recorder hidden under the spare tire recorded him 
explaining, “They ain’t going to catch me when I bomb my next church” and singing 
“Boomingham, Boomingham, that’s my kind of town.”16  The second set of tapes, found in a 
neglected evidence box at the FBI building in Birmingham, contained recordings from a 
wiretap in Blanton’s kitchen.17  In them Blanton’s wife quizzes him on why he stood her up 
the Friday before the bombing.  In the midst of picking out which shirt to wear, he casually 
replies, “Oh, we were making the bomb.”18 
                                                
14Carol Robinson, “Church Bomb Probe More Than a Rehash,” Birmingham News, 31 August 1997, 
1A.  
 
15Sikora, Until Justice Rolls Down, 184-86.  
 
16Ibid., 202, 204. 
 
17Ibid., 187-88.  Placed against the baseboard of the wall between Blanton’s kitchen and an apartment 
rented by an undercover FBI agent, the microphone recorded through a pre-existing hole.  Before the Supreme 
Court’s landmark Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 (1967), Fourth Amendment illegal search and seizure of 
speech by electronic surveillance was measured by a “trespass standard,” meaning an unauthorized physical 
encroachment on a constitutionally-protected area – here, the home.  However, Katz applied only to surveillance 
conducted after 1967.  The Court of Criminal Appeals found no trespass here.  Blanton v. Alabama, 886 So.2d 
850 (2003), cert. denied 543 U.S. 878 (2004). 
 
18Sikora, Long Time Coming, 209.  
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 The cases also hinged on witnesses who had previously been unwilling to testify.19  
Several eye-witnesses, including James Lay, a former civil defense leader who often guarded 
civil rights activists from night riders, gave grand jury testimony about seeing four men in a 
car, with two men matching the descriptions of Blanton and Cherry, outside the church the 
night before the bomb exploded.  Lay had a stroke before the Blanton trial began, but his 
testimony was read into evidence by local radio celebrity Shelley Stewart, adding to the 
trial’s drama.20  Condemned as “a coward” by Baxley because he would not testify in 1977, 
Lay contended that he was in constant danger throughout his life because of what he knew.21  
Many of the other new witnesses were friends and acquaintances of the defendants; some 
were Klan FBI informants.22  
 Neither Blanton nor Cherry’s exact role in the bombing has ever been established 
conclusively. Contradicting Blanton’s proffered alibi, an eyewitness placed him by the steps 
of the church the night before the bombing.23  Blanton is sometimes characterized as driving 
                                                
  
 19Sikora, Until Justice Rolls Down, 185-88; Goldman, “Complex Chain of Events,” 7A.  
 
20Sikora, Until Justice Rolls Down, 196-97.   
 
21Patricia Dedrick, “Church Guard Still Mum on Bombing,” Birmingham News, 27 July 1997, 1A.  
 
22For the FBI’s infiltration counterattack against hate groups and the New Left in the 1960s, termed 
COINTELPRO, see David Cunningham, There’s Something Happening Here: the New Left, the Klan, and FBI 
Counter Intelligence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) and John Drabble, “COINTELPRO-
White Hate, the FBI, and the Cold War Political Consensus” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 
1997) and “The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE, and the Decline of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in 
Alabama, 1964-1971,” Alabama Review, 61 (January 2008): 3-47.  For more on female family members 
informing against Klansmen, see Chapter Three. 
 
 23William C. Singleton, III, “Witness: Blanton Seen Near Church,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 27 April 
2001, A17; Chanda Temple, “Case Tries to Undermine Alibis,”  Birmingham News, 27 April 2001, 10A. 
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to the church.24  A friend of Cherry’s son testified that during his childhood he overheard 
Cherry and three other men talking about a “bomb” and “Sixteenth Street.”25  Cherry’s 
estranged relatives described his role alternatively as building the bomb, lighting the fuse, or 
placing it inside or outside of the church.26  
 Witnesses’ testimony produced a strange vision of the Klan in the 1960s.  On the one 
hand, violent segregationists like Cherry and Blanton harassed African Americans for sport 
and boasted of their involvement in the church bombing, while some former members 
characterized joining the Klan as “a lark” and asserted to trial spectators, “I’ve never been a 
racist.”27  When asked to explain their Klan membership years later, many Klansmen and 
women downplay ideology, reconciling their participation then with social mores that 
condemn overt segregationist attitudes now.28  This revised portrait of the Klan was 
reinforced by other testimony: former girlfriends described Klan Christmas parties; ex-
Klansmen explained that joining the Klan was just something everyone did because all your 
relatives and friends were members; and informant Mitchell A. Burns narrated how he 
burned a cross in an old black woman’s front yard, not because he was a racist, but because 
                                                
24For example, James Lay is said to have identified Blanton as outside the car that night, while others 
believe Blanton drove.  See Dedrick, “Church Guard Still Mum,” and Sara Foss, “Author: ‘I Think Blanton 
Drove the Car and Cherry Put the Bomb Down,’” Birmingham News, 17 April 2001, 8A.  
 
 25Jamie Kizzire, “Damaging Testimony?,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 22 May 2002, A1. 
 
 26Ibid., A4. 
 
27Author’s notes from Blanton trial, 28 April 2001, in author’s possession; Sikora, Until Justice Rolls 
Down, 204-05.  
 
28For example, see Kathleen Blee, “Evidence, Empathy, and Ethics: Lessons from Oral Histories of the 
Klan,” Journal of American History, 80, 2 (September 1993): 596-606. 
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she was selling boot-leg whiskey to minors and performing abortions.29  Burns claimed that 
seeing the autopsy photographs of the four girls prompted him to renounce the Klan and 
become an informant, stating, “I told [the FBI] that I would do all I could to help.”30  During 
the trial, the defendants became symbols of the worst kind of racism present in Birmingham 
in the 1960s, allowing even those individuals undeniably affiliated with this racist political 
group to disassociate themselves from the violence of that time.  That trick of memory lent 
the trial a revisionist air and contributed to the sense of renouncing the past that permeated 
the whole event. 
 When the judge allowed the noisy, static-filled car tapes, muffled and in many places 
unintelligible, to be played in the courtroom, and the words “church blew up” and “bomb” 
came over the speakers, reporters and spectators literally stood up and craned their necks to 
catch the phrase that would pin these men to the worst act in the city’s history.31  The way 
that this talk of bombing flitted casually through domestic bickering and night-on-the-town 
bravado told more about the atmosphere of violence at that time than any witnesses’ revised 
recollections could.  These voices from long ago made that kind of hatred, now denied, real. 
 The defense attorneys insisted that these forty-year old cases left too much room for 
reasonable doubt and that the state just wanted to close an embarrassing unsolved 
                                                
 
29Author’s notes from Blanton trial, 28 April 2001, in author’s possession; Sikora, Until Justice Rolls 
Down, 197-99.  When asked how he knew about the woman’s activities, Burns explained that he bought 
whiskey from her. Author’s notes, 28 April 2001. 
 
30Author’s notes from Blanton trial, 28 April 2001, in author’s possession.  Mitch Burns died 19 
November 2002 at the age of seventy-five.  Chanda Temple, “Bombing Informant Mitchell Burns Dies,” 
Birmingham News, 22 November 2002.  
 
31See Sikora, Long Time Coming, 232, for this discussion between Burns, Blanton, and Cherry; 
Author’s notes from Blanton trial, 26 April 2001, in author’s possession.  
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investigation.  Thomas Blanton’s attorney, John Robbins, insisted to the jury: “This case is 
not about making you, everybody here, Birmingham feel good about itself.”32  Yet a heavy 
symbolic weight hung over both these trials—and neither prosecutors nor the defense could 
fully remove the sense of history-in-the-making.33  Blanton’s trial lasted a week, and the jury 
deliberated for only two and a half hours before rendering a guilty verdict on all four counts 
of first-degree murder.34  Cherry’s trial, delayed a year for competency hearings, concluded 
similarly and also resulted in a speedy conviction.35  
 As many of the same witnesses repeated, almost word for word, testimony from 1977 
or stories familiar from local and FBI investigative files on the bombing, the trials took on a 
scripted, eerie quality.  The black and white crime scene photos and pictures of the girls, 
frozen at that now-iconic moment in time, contrasted sharply with the paunchy old Klansmen 
on trial.  This disconnect contributed to the sense that the past—that moment of the city’s 
history and all that led up to it—was on trial, not just the particular crime. 
 The response to the guilty verdict in the 2001-2002 bombing trials was 
overwhelmingly positive.  Both Birmingham residents and the victims’ families heralded it 
as a welcome relief.36  Demonstrations and vigils surrounding the trials indicated the 
                                                
 
32Author’s notes from Blanton trial, 24 April 2001, in author’s possession.   
 
 33The phrase “history-in-the-making” comes from William C. Singleton, III, “Family Presence Strong 
in Spirit,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 25 April 2001, A1. 
 
 34Marlon Manuel, “1963 Birmingham Church Bombing; Guilty on All Counts,” Atlanta-Journal 
Constitution, 2 May 2001, A1; Blanton v. Alabama, 886 So.2d 850 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). 
 
 35See Jamie Kizzire, “Beginning Strategies,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 15 May 2002, A1; Rick Bragg, 
“38 Years Later, Last of Suspects Is Convicted in Church Bombing,” New York Times, 22 May 2002, A1. 
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continuing resonance of the bombing memory for residents.  Yet the sense of partial justice 
lingered.  One observer commented, “It was too-long delayed . . . Cherry met his judgment 
day. He did not meet justice.”37  This dissonance arose from the widespread sense that 
Cherry’s guilty verdict did little to address the broad harm that resulted from the crime.  Too 
many unresolved questions lingered, including what these trials might mean for the city and 
whether, after nearly forty years, the memory of the bombing could be put to rest. 
 
 “History in the Making”: Interpretation and Critique of the Recent Trials 
 A sense of incomplete or partial justice runs through the contemporary and current 
writing on the several stages of the bombing trials.  Many articles suggest that the 
prosecutions were designed to “dig up” and correct the past, or somehow rewrite history, thus 
burnishing the reputations of Southern cities and states.38  In contrast to this criticism, both 
prosecutors and politicians proudly proclaimed that these trials demonstrate how far legal 
systems in the South have come toward the goal of equal justice for all races.39  The 
successful prosecution of any murder case forty years after the fact is praiseworthy.  In every 
respect the trials are laudable accomplishments, reflecting the work of huge numbers of 
                                                                                                                                                  
 36See Bright, “Tears of Joy, Pain Follow Verdict,” A1 
 
 37Ibid., A3 (internal quotations omitted).  
 
 38Recent examples include Lara Jakes Jordan, “FBI Reopens 100 Civil Rights-Era Cases,” Associated 
Press, 27 February 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2007/02/27/national/ 
a123352S99.DTL and Dewan, “Grand Jury Refuses New Indictments,” A16.  
 
 39See Doug Jones, interview by author, digital recording, Birmingham, Ala., 29 March 2007, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
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people, including local activists, prosecutors, FBI agents, and investigative journalists.40 Yet 
these trials also have led many observers to question whether bringing a criminal to justice 
and providing a symbol of judicial evolution is an adequate resolution for a crime of this 
kind.  
 “Narratives of redemption,” as one scholar has dubbed the news media and 
prosecutors’ portrayals of the trials, have been criticized for focusing narrowly on the white 
legal teams, while neglecting the contributions of black activists.41  Additionally, some 
observers worry that the importance placed on current convictions obscures official 
complicity in the long non-prosecution and may discourage white communities and Southern 
cities from recognizing the continuity of racism in the region.42  Such “redemptions” 
overlooked the decades in which the crimes remained unsolved.  Critics believe that 
laudatory articles mask the history of racialized power structures, while failing to 
acknowledge that serious structural problems in the justice system persisted long after the 
civil rights era.  One observer has asserted that the trials actually serve an anti-restorative 
                                                
40The most prominent investigative journalist associated with the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church 
bombing case, as well as many of the other reopened cases, is Jerry Mitchell of the Jackson Clarion-Ledger.  
He has been recognized by the American Bar Association for his work in uncovering facts leading to multiple 
convictions, including Bobby Frank Cherry in the Sixteenth Street bombing and Byron de la Beckwith for the 
murder of Medger Evers. Mitchell’s role in the Beckwith case was dramatized in the movie Ghosts of 
Mississippi. R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., “Jerry Mitchell: Crusading for Justice Long Overdue,” ABA Human Rights 
Magazine (Fall 2000), http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/fall00/johnson.html.  
 
 41See Renee C. Romano, “Narratives of Redemption: The Birmingham Church Bombing Trials and the 
Construction of Civil Rights Memory,” in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. 
Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 96-133. 
 
 42See ibid.; S. Willoughby Anderson, “‘Against the Peace and Dignity of the State of Alabama’: The 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church Bombing Trial and the Remaking of Birmingham” (senior honors thesis, 
Harvard College, 2000); See also S. Willoughby Anderson, “‘Against the Peace and Dignity of the State of 
Alabama’: The 1977 Sixteenth Street Baptist Church Bombing Trial and the Remaking of Birmingham” 
(master’s thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2004).  
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function: “by holding a handful of individuals responsible, they do nothing to force other 
whites to come to terms with their own complicity with the racist practices of the past.”43 
 Yet the crime’s broad harms meant that redemption could reach beyond those with 
some complicity in the racial status quo.  The city’s static reputation for racial violence 
affected all residents, including members of the black community, many of whom hoped to 
throw off this image.  After the Cherry trial in Birmingham, former and current African-
American politicians were optimistic that the trials would resuscitate the city’s reputation in 
the eyes of the nation.44  As Mayor Kincaid stated, “All of us in the city, I hope we can 
breathe a sigh of relief.”45 
 The final Birmingham trials were certainly a process of “history making,” a way to 
wrestle with the image of 1963; however, and as at many earlier moments in the city’s 
history before them, the discussions sparked by the trials also necessarily addressed the 
current state of race relations.  The trials could not fully revise or redeem the past because the 
harms caused by the crime reached forward into the present.  
 When examining the story of Birmingham’s past and present self as presented in the 
trials, we must ask: How much cultural, historical, or restorative work can one long-delayed 
                                                
 
 43See Romano, 124. 
 
44Ryan Gravatt et al., “Friend Recalls Loss of Denise,” Birmingham Post-Herald, 18 May 2000, D2 
(then-Mayor Kincaid explained, “everywhere he traveled, people still link the city’s name to the bombings [and 
he would] like to get past that.”); Chris Scribner and Sherrel Wheeler Stewart, “Mood: Calm Satisfaction,” 
Birmingham News, 2 May 2001, 6A (“Richard Arrington, who won the first of his five terms as mayor in 1979, 
said the verdict will be good for the city’s image.”).  
 
45Scribner and Stewart, “Mood: Calm Satisfaction,” 6A. 
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trial realistically accomplish?46  Constrained by rules of evidence, a trial necessarily covers a 
scripted narrative terrain.  As journalist Tina Rosenberg succinctly put it, “[t]rials, in the end, 
are ill suited to deal with the subtleties of facing the past.”47  In discussing cases of genocide 
and war-crimes trials like those held at Nuremberg, Professor Martha Minow answers this 
question by asserting: “Even when marred by problems of retroactive application of norms, 
political influence, and selective prosecution . . . trials can air issues, create an aura of 
fairness, establish a public record, and produce some sense of accountability.”48  Those who 
analyze large-scale historical atrocities acknowledge that trials are limited in their ability to 
find the whole truth, punish all perpetrators, or address the full harms of crimes.  In many 
ways, historical truth about individual crimes and collective atrocities can only be found in 
extra-judicial story telling, not in testimony bounded by the rules of evidence.  When 
evaluating a trial, Minow explains, “[t]he challenge is to combine honest modesty about the 
promise of trials with a willingness to be inspired—and to combine inspiration with the hard, 
grubby work of gathering evidence and weaving legal sources into judgments.”49  However, 
Minow cautions against asking too much of these kinds of trials: “to find the trial process 
                                                
46Although I draw on restorative justice-inspired theory for this section, the field of rhetoric has 
produced interesting scholarship on the way that popular and political trials contribute to and are shaped by 
public conceptions of justice and fairness, as well as the way that the language of the trial itself creates a certain 
history and influences memory.  See, for example, Robert Hariman, Popular Trials: Rhetoric, Mass Media, and 
the Law (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990) and Marouf A. Hasian, Jr., Rhetorical Vectors of 
Memory in National and International Holocaust Trials (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2006).  
  
 47Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 51.  
 
 48Ibid., 50.  
 
 49Ibid., 51. 
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wanting against the aspiration of truly dealing with the complex past is not to find it 
worthless as a response to atrocity.”50 
 Minow thus acknowledges that it is unlikely that legal institutions can ever fully 
reveal the truth of past events or even bring real closure.  Yet she emphasizes the need for 
legal institutions to speak in the face of violence.51  In a forward to a Michigan Law Review 
colloquium on civil rights-era trials throughout the South, Professor Minow outlines three 
main objections to contemporary legal proceedings on past crimes: first, “[w]hy open old 
wounds;” second, the evidence is old and faulty; and third (although not always expressed 
explicitly), “exposing some gross and unremedied racial injustices from the past will reveal 
the scale of imperfections in the systems of justice and government and thereby undermine 
the legitimacy of those systems.”52  As for opening old wounds, Minow suggests that legal 
action can trigger discussion and debate about the past that may help repair community 
relationships, even in the absence of formalized structures such as South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.53  Furthermore, trials can serve the evidentiary function of 
“[d]etermining what happened.”54  Finally, while some may worry that revelation of 
                                                
 
 50Ibid. 
 
 51Ibid., 4-5. 
 
 52Martha Minow, “Foreward: Why Retry? Reviving Dormant Racial Justice Claims,” Michigan Law 
Review 101 (2003): 1133.  
 
 53Ibid., 1136-37. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, founded as part of the 
transition from Apartheid to a democratic South Africa, served as a forum to collect victims’ and, in exchange 
for amnesty, perpetrators’ stories of human rights abuses, to promote inter-racial healing, and to expose the 
truth of violence under the previous regime. Margaret M. Russell, “Cleansing Moments and Retrospective 
Justice,” Michigan Law Review 101 (2003): 1263-64.  
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historical legal inequities by the trials will undermine confidence in the justice system, 
Minow maintains that by formally recognizing claims that have been silenced and 
communities that have been disenfranchised, courts can begin the process of renewing faith 
in the system.55  
 Because Birmingham’s negative image resulted in large part from state complicity in 
the violence of the early 1960s and the crime’s unsolved status, the official action of a trial 
was a vital step in shoring up the “image of reform” sought by city leaders since 1963.  
Throughout Birmingham’s history the events of 1963 have surfaced in public discourse as 
competing narratives of a static city, either wholly regressive or progressive.  Yet, by 
resurrecting discussions of “Bombingham” and drawing into focus the long delay in 
prosecution, the trials brought into question whether and how to finally put those competing 
images to rest.  Hoped to be the ultimate sign of closure on the case, these trials instead 
confronted residents’ differing conceptions of justice, their memories of that time, and their 
present identities.  
 
 “The Crime was Against Us:” The Broad Harms of the Crime 
 The local media reported that the bombing trials left observers with a sense both of 
relief and of incompleteness.  To understand the continuing power of this memory, we should 
expand the concept of the bombing’s harms to embrace all the foreseen and unforeseen 
effects of the crime, as well as the damage wrought by the long delay in prosecution.56  This 
                                                                                                                                                  
 54Minow, “Why Retry,” 1139. 
 
 55Ibid., 1139-40. 
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expansion of the concept of harm also requires a similarly expanded definition of those 
touched by the crime.57  Lingering questions and dissatisfaction with the trials point to the 
need for something more if Birmingham residents are ever to truly heal and to lay the 
memory of the bombing to rest.  Broadening our understanding of the bombing and its lasting 
legacy might allow a truth and reconciliation-type event to come to fruition in Birmingham 
by convincing those resistant to addressing this memory that they have a stake in the hard 
work of racial healing.   
 The bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church has been described as a crime 
against everyone in Birmingham and against the nation as a whole.58  By contrast, the legal 
arguments espoused at the trials presented the bombing as a crime against a limited and 
abstract state interest.  By definition our criminal law system rectifies individual harms by 
folding them into the state’s prosecutorial apparatus.  And while the individual victim, to 
varying degrees, may continue to be involved, by the trial the crime is conceptualized as 
having been committed against the state and the rule of law generally.  The gulf between 
these two formulations lies at the heart of the dissatisfaction with the legal responses to the 
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long-unprosecuted crime.  It also goes far toward explaining the power of this bombing in 
memory.  
 Comparing the bombing and other acts of racial violence in the 1960s with hate 
crimes today, Professor Margaret Russell sees these murders as single pieces of “a larger 
mosaic of violent acts against blacks, Jews, and others who threatened” white supremacy.59  
Russell also emphasizes that such violence was intended to create wide-reaching harms.  She 
describes the context of civil rights-era racial violence: “the racial climate in which the 
killings . . . occurred was one in which each murder bore a distinct, contextual message: 
hatred of black progress and defense of racial hierarchy.”60  The bombing’s symbolic weight, 
its design to derail school desegregation, must be added to the harms calculus.  The 
prominence of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in the civil rights movement media 
narrative further guaranteed that this message would be heard nationally. 
 It was widely believed in Birmingham that state and federal authorities knew who the 
perpetrators were in the 1960s and had let them get away with their crimes for almost forty 
years.  Official inaction thus constituted a continuing harm to a wide range of individuals that 
stretched through all the years separating the crime from its prosecution.  This feeling of “too 
little, too late” ran through comments from members of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church 
congregation, who suggested that the crime remained unsolved because of the race of the 
victims.  The Associated Press cited the congregation’s assessment that there would not have 
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been such a delay if the victims had been white.61  Local civil rights leader Reverend Fred 
Shuttlesworth echoed this sentiment: “Justice in any situation should be done at the time . . . . 
If you delay justice, you deny justice. Thirty-seven years is too long to talk about justice in a 
situation like this.”62  Similarly, some of the victims’ families and friends found that, in the 
end, victory was “bittersweet” because of the long delay.63  
 Acknowledgment of how widely the bombing’s harms were felt, expressed both at 
the time of the incident and also during the recent trials, links directly to an expanded 
understanding of responsibility for the bombing that extends beyond the individual 
perpetrators.  While the bombing itself may have been an isolated act, inaction by state and 
local law enforcement officials was widely interpreted as an attempt to maintain the racial 
status quo.64  This leap to official complicity is not a difficult one. Images of official city 
resistance to desegregation, beamed across the nation in the form of Bull Connor’s dogs and 
fire hoses, combined with the now-acknowledged links between vigilante violence and the 
local power structure, have shadowed Birmingham’s reputation since.  The city’s on-going 
struggle with police brutality continued the alliance of state power and violence against 
African Americans.  During the Blanton trial, Birmingham mayor Bernard Kincaid explained 
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that “everywhere he traveled, people still link the city’s name to the bombings [and that he 
would] like to get past that.”65  
 The most striking aspect of the media and residents’ discussion of complicity and 
reputation is how it anthropomorphizes the city.  Ignoring racial differences among residents 
or distinctions between past and present governments, speakers assume that the city has 
feelings, responsibilities, and a character to impinge.  This understanding of the city springs 
directly from an unarticulated expanded harm concept.  The harm was widespread and its 
perpetrators were, in the widest sense, everyone who supported, even by omission, the 
maintenance of segregation.  Since our culture relies on story telling and narrative to make 
sense of harm and because the bombers remained unapprehended, observers created a locus 
for the perpetrator of the harm: the city itself.  Observers’ comments that the city was 
“haunted” by the unsolved status of the crime echo this anthropomorphized sense of the city-
at-large’s guilt.66  
 Such anthropomorphizing in the context of criminal justice is standard, however.  In 
any criminal trial, the government’s role as prosecutor transforms an individual harm into a 
crime against the state.  The recent bombing trials were no exceptions to this pattern. But the 
state’s dilatory prosecution of the crime created fresh harms that went unvindicated by the 
long-delayed trials.  In 1963 when Mayor Albert Boutwell said in response to the bombing, 
“[w]e are all victims, and some of us are innocent victims,” he was expressing the classic 
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understanding of crime as perpetrated against the state by a defined set of guilty persons.67  
Yet this one-dimensional framing of the city as a victim rang false because it failed to reflect 
that the city was both a victim and a perpetrator of the crime.  
 This theoretical understanding of crime as a crime against the state, subsuming the 
individual harm, lies at the heart of our criminal law system.  Yet it is not how most 
individuals conceptualize crime, harm, and victimhood.  Most of us understand crime on a 
personal level as a wrong committed against the individual and often as also something that 
extends beyond the victim to the broader community.  This response is seen not only among 
the immediate family of the victims, but also in the continuing effect of the bombing on the 
lives of all Birminghamians.  Frank Sikora, a retired Birmingham News reporter who has 
written extensively on the bombing trials, explains:  
It’s not something people think about all the time, but it’s out 
there. I don’t know that I think about the bombing every day, 
but I think about it a lot. I remember when it happened. . . . I 
remember hearing the report that four kids had been killed. It 
floored me. I think I thought, like a lot of people around the 
country, about if it had been my own child.68   
 
The widespread effect of the bombing limited the ability of the trial mechanism to remedy all 
the harms.  Ultimately in the course of a prosecution the personal harms beyond those of the 
victims are glossed over.  Yet even direct victims of the bombing may not have their harms 
addressed by the prosecution in a satisfying way.  Sarah Collins Rudolph, sister of the 
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murdered Addie Mae Collins, believed that the recent trials would do little good to give her 
personal closure or to bring justice to the victims’ families.  Physically scarred by the 
explosion herself, Mrs. Rudolph continues to suffer from trauma, nightmares, and pain.  As 
she told one New York Times reporter, “There will never be any closure for me. . . . Every 
time I go to the bathroom and put my makeup on, it always comes back to me. The scars on . 
. . my legs and my face will always remind me.”69  Prosecutors never pursued her injuries; 
the courts never took up Rudolph’s direct harms. 
 Because this harm was so widespread it touched many lives, drawing attention back 
to the memory of the bombing.  In many ways, the local media also expanded the memory of 
the bombing by the sheer volume of attention it paid to the 2001 and 2002 trials,70 making 
the crime once again a part of the civic narrative—a city issue.  The media narratives of 
redemption, memory, and history, although criticized by some as simplistic, appealed to a 
broad audience and dominated local newspapers during the three years of recent trial 
proceedings.71  This media attention likely brought the bombing and trials into the lives of 
many people in Birmingham who knew little of the crime or had few reasons to feel 
connected to it.  
 Broad continuing identification with the bombing memory is also illustrated by the 
number of people who participated in demonstrations and vigils held in conjunction with the 
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trials.72  Following his indictment, Cherry’s lawyers argued that he was not competent to 
stand trial because of dementia and advanced age.  The judge ordered further psychiatric tests 
and postponed the trial.73  This ruling sparked demonstrations.  Approximately fifty people 
gathered outside of the courthouse when the competency ruling came down and protests 
continued sporadically for the next two weeks.  Eventually over two hundred and fifty people 
marched from downtown Birmingham to the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, where national 
civil rights leaders joined the crowd in calling for Cherry to be confined until he was found 
fit to stand trial.74  Protests were led by long-time local civil rights leader Reverend Abraham 
Woods, who told the press: “The world’s spotlight was going to be on Birmingham and 
Alabama—some of us was hoping we were ready to join the 21st century. . . . But this verdict 
makes the statement loud and clear that the justice system is not blind, that there isn’t always 
justice for black folks.”75  Additionally, hundreds of people attended vigils and unity 
ceremonies after each verdict.76  This spontaneous outpouring of sentiment—driven by initial 
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outrage at the lack of accountability, followed by relief at the verdicts—as well as the sheer 
number of people involved, underscores the continuing power of this memory.  
  Yet the bombing’s harms were not restricted to one side of the equation.  Thomas 
Cherry, estranged son of the bomber, described how his childhood was blighted by the crime, 
forcing his family to relocate to Texas and providing the subject of conversation at every 
family reunion.77  The son was subpoenaed to testify in front of the grand jury, and the 
newspapers described him as “anguished over his father but . . . also haunted by the 
bombing.”78  After the verdict, Thomas Cherry tried to explain how the crime cast a long 
shadow: “It leaves . . . an awful empty feeling in you [to] know that your father is going to 
the penitentiary for the rest of his life.”79  Cherry’s trial also featured conflicting testimony 
from ex-wives and a loyal grandson as to his character, the meaning of his Klan membership, 
and his motives for racial violence.80  After the verdict, the Birmingham Post-Herald ran a 
large picture of Cherry’s daughter Karen Suderland sitting on the ground weeping.81  The 
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bombing’s far-reaching consequences meant that its effects lingered, bringing its harms 
directly into the lives of many Birmingham residents, while the lack of official resolution 
cemented its broad, unshakable memory.  
 
 Justice Delayed: Reaction to the Trials  
 The disparate voices of the protestors and Cherry’s family remind us of the impact 
and powerfully expressive qualities of the criminal law.  As legal theorist Lode Walgrave 
notes, “[i]n principal, penal law is proactive. . . . Penal law holds itself out as the defender of 
fundamental values of society. . . . By criminalizing certain acts, organized society as such 
shows itself to be a concerned party.”82  But in the case of the Birmingham bombing, the 
penal law’s inaction showed it to be a defender of the values of white supremacy and 
segregation rather than equal justice under the law.  Without prosecution of the Birmingham 
bombing, no formal acknowledgment of the victims or others affected was possible.  Yet 
under the circumstances the justness of the remedy offered by the long-delayed trials 
remained the subject of debate.  
 Many residents expressed frustration at the Birmingham trials.  A frequent complaint 
was that the offenders never accepted responsibility.  At the end of Cherry’s trial, questions 
of competency melted away as he stood to address the court after his sentencing.  Pointing at 
the prosecution, he said, “This whole bunch lied all the way through this thing. . . . I told the 
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truth. I don’t know why I am going to jail for nothing.”83  In fact, none of those convicted 
ever accepted responsibility for the crime—the original suspect Chambliss died defiant to the 
end and Cherry, before his death in prison in 2004, called himself a political prisoner.84  Yet 
this denial of accountability illustrates just one of the limits of the current criminal justice 
system.  While few may really have expected these men to accept responsibility or ask for 
forgiveness, their defiance helped convince some observers that the defendants were 
sacrificed to salve the collective conscience, rather than justly punished for a heinous 
crime.85  Although the convictions formally allocated blame to each defendant, the current 
criminal justice system does not encourage individuals to take personal responsibility for 
their crimes.  The not-guilty plea itself is often used, as it was in the Birmingham trials, to 
gain a favorable outcome, and may not represent a truly felt statement of non-culpability on 
the part of the defendant.  
 Yet some in Birmingham’s black community believed that only the prosecution of 
every remaining suspect could offer an adequate remedy, as it would force the same justice 
system responsible for the earlier non-prosecution to now repair that harm.  During the 
competency demonstrations Reverend Woods called Judge James Garrett, the presiding 
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judge, “a good man who is part of a bad system.”86  His statement captured the hope that 
although courts continued to practice racial injustice, the system yet could be redeemed with 
this trial.  Even though some observers predicted a furor if either of the men was acquitted, 
some members of the church community simply expressed relief that any official proceeding 
was going forward at all: “No matter what the outcome, at least we can say it is over. . . . 
Those were terrible times, but we have overcome.”87   Reverend Christopher Hamlin, pastor 
of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, reiterated the sense that a fair trial represented the best 
resolution: “If there’s a conviction, then justice has been served. And if there’s an acquittal, 
at least an effort has been made.”88  
 Observers saw the trials as remedies with enormous extralegal consequences.  Some 
feared that the trials would dredge up Birmingham’s shameful past in a way that would 
simply confirm the city’s negative national reputation.89  Others persisted in 
anthropomorphizing the city and considered the first guilty verdict to be “conscience-
salving” for Birmingham.90  It was not just the trials, but guilty verdicts, that came to 
represent the city’s progress in race relations.  United States Attorney Doug Jones said after 
the Blanton verdict, “I was real concerned that people would say, ‘O.K. this is Birmingham 
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and Birmingham hasn’t changed’ . . . . So when the guilty verdict came back, it was such a 
relief.”91 
 Additionally and echoing themes in place since 1963, the Birmingham News editors 
hoped that the trials would spark discussion and lead to concrete repair of race relations.  The 
newspapers largely portrayed the Blanton verdict as an “indictment on racism in general” and 
hoped that the trial would serve as a “building block” for the improvement of race relations 
in Birmingham.92  This particular article was followed by a feature on two women, one black 
and one white, who were individually moved by the verdict to go to the church and pray; 
upon meeting each other, they decided to pray together.93  While the main Birmingham News 
editorial after the Blanton verdict rejected the trial as a litmus test for Birmingham’s racial 
progress, many in the city embraced just this symbolic aspect.94  
 The trials were also heralded as signals that “the civil rights struggle, resolved or not, 
[was] receding into history.”95  Some greeted the proceedings as a chance to clarify history 
and reveal new facts.  One commentator hoped, “if there is a trial, then some old secrets, at 
least, might see the light,” while a survivor of the blast explained, “[i]t was very important to 
be here [at the Blanton trial] to hear all these things. . . . I really didn’t hear it the first time 
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(in the Chambliss trial).”96  This understanding of the trial as history-in-the-making also 
weighed heavily on the jury—one juror described coming to the final verdict as 
“agonizing.”97 
 Many in the city questioned whether the remedy offered by these trials could 
adequately address the full harm created by the crime and long-deferred prosecution.  One 
elderly African American man outside the courthouse during the Blanton trial explained, 
“We might as well let him go.  His best days are over with.  There should have been a trial a 
long time ago—not some 37 years later. Whatever they do now is not going to bring these 
little girls back.”98  In a statement to the Associated Press, the congregation of the Sixteenth 
Street Baptist Church echoed this sentiment, suggesting that a trial would be unlikely to 
contribute to healing after the crime.99  Another member of the Birmingham black 
community expressed the belief that no justice could ever be meted out in this case because 
despite the punishment of the individual bombers, the intent to maintain segregation had been 
condoned by the wider white community: “I don’t care what kind of punishment these men 
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get, no justice will be served for those little girls . . . . How can they hold these men 
responsible when the whole state of Alabama encouraged it?100 
 Many observers felt that the remedy was neither adequate nor fair.  Some expressed 
the opinion that the prosecutors were just trying to close the case.101  Others felt that the 
pressure on the government to finalize the case meant that the suspects were not necessarily 
guilty, and furthermore that pressure from the black community would make jurors convict 
regardless of the evidence.102  This sense of the trials as an inadequate remedy led to fear of 
unjust procedures: that the prosecutors were just trying to remedy the mistakes of their 
predecessors or that the jury would disregard reasonable doubt in favor of closing a chapter 
of history.103  These suspicions underscore the significance of the trials’ outcomes for the 
community, as well as the fact that no trial can address all of the lingering harms experienced 
even by those who are unsympathetic to the specific victims.  In essence, these two trials 
raised difficult questions about Birmingham’s past and present that did not find answers 
within the restricted framework of the trial setting.  As was the case in 1977, some 
individuals, particularly in the white community, felt that the best way to deal with this 
negative memory was to try to forget. 
 While the prosecutors involved championed the essential justness of the trial 
procedure itself, vocal leaders of one segment of the black community valued the outcome 
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over the process.  Prosecutor Doug Jones, repeating themes from the first trial in 1977, often 
asserted, “justice delayed doesn’t have to be justice denied.”104  Yet for others, the chance for 
a trial was a symbolic event that might partially redeem a justice system that was then and 
has remained fundamentally flawed in its treatment of African Americans.  
 The conflicting concept of justice manifested in the Cherry competency protests 
illustrates this point well.  The civil rights demonstrators saw the competency ruling as an 
affront, a clear denial of justice in a system that historically discriminated against black 
defendants.  Despite their best efforts to bring Cherry to trial, the prosecutors were stymied 
by statutory definitions and evidentiary standards that required additional mental health 
evaluations of the defendant.105  In this competency ruling civil rights activists saw yet 
another facially race-neutral way for justice to be denied while the legal advocates, similarly 
frustrated with the procedural gamesmanship, accepted the legal ground rules of the trial 
itself.106  These conflicting views pitted the Bar’s understanding of justice against the larger 
community’s sense of fairness, and affected the personal relationships between civil rights 
supporters and the prosecution as the demonstrations went forward.  Even five years later, the 
protests and competency controversy evoked an emotional reaction: hurt and betrayal at the 
response of the other side over what had been presumed to be a common goal.107  Ultimately 
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the protesters were concerned about something beyond fair trial process.  Their expanded 
vision of harm—embracing government complicity, institutional corruption, the effect on the 
entire black community and the city’s reputation—demanded more than merely a conviction.  
The limitations of a trial as a sole remedy became only too clear when the system that finally 
seemed to be working in their favor suddenly appeared to have once more let them down.  
Simple access to the justice system could not result in the acknowledgment of large-scale 
harms or produce the kind of expansive remedies that reached beyond existing legal 
structures.  As was too often evidenced in the civil context, the movement’s goal of inclusion 
could not, on its on, create broad structural change. 
 Even after the final bombing trials attempted to lay to rest the memory of this 
bombing, questions and contestations over the meaning of events in the 1960s and the legacy 
of the civil rights movement linger.  Although many commentators at the time and some 
since have seen these trials as redeeming the city’s national reputation, the story of the 
bombing forty years later and residents’ reactions are more complicated than that.  Again and 
again throughout the city’s history, leaders and the media have attempted to reform the city’s 
image by manipulating the memories of 1963 into a progress narrative that encompasses 
various moments along the way—the first and second set of bombing trials, the Civil Rights 
Institute.  But again and again individuals contest this prescribed memory, expressing its 
dissonance with their own identities and understandings of the past.  By expanding our 
understanding of the harm created by this crime, we can see how even an official reckoning 
with the past—these state prosecutions—was limited in its ability to address all the ways that 
this memory continued to affect individuals’ lives.  So how, if at all, can the city put this 
troubled history to rest?  
55 
 
 Remaking Birmingham 
 Birmingham’s history of racial injustice is very palpable in its present.  The protests, 
demonstrations, marches, and vigils held in the wake of the Birmingham bombing verdicts 
suggest that the victims and stakeholders harmed by the crime—the young girls, their 
families, the church community, and indeed the larger Birmingham community—were 
calling out for a remedy beyond that which a trial alone could provide.108  
 Trials such as those in Birmingham are valuable because they help to address hard 
issues and prompt difficult questions.  Margaret Russell pinpoints another goal of these 
recent trials: “racial healing.”109  According to Russell’s theory, racial healing requires an 
appreciation that racially motivated murders damage an entire community.110  Looking to the 
African concept of ubuntu or “humane interconnectedness” adopted by the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Russell suggests that trials can begin community and 
individual healing as a restorative response to mass atrocities.111  Russell suggests, however, 
that racial healing cannot be achieved through the adversarial process alone.  Instead a truth 
commission in conjunction with current legal proceedings would best facilitate this 
process.112  In imagining American or southern truth commissions, she points to the 
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narrative, history-writing, and the personal, story-telling aspects of these commissions as 
restorative processes for individuals and as prerequisites for reconciliation on a large scale.113  
In fact, since the nineteenth century, southern culture has harbored concepts of participatory 
and communal justice.114 
 The idea of a truth and reconciliation-style event in Birmingham is not new.  The 
Birmingham Civil Rights Institute hosted a conference on the topic in 1992 at which Bishop 
Desmond Tutu spoke.115  Additionally, many in Birmingham specifically called for some 
kind of organized effort to expose past and current racial injustices during the Blanton and 
Cherry trials.116  If a truth and reconciliation commission were to be established in 
Birmingham, hard questions about the boundaries of harm, the scope of victims and 
offenders, and possible or meaningful remedies might finally be addressed. 
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 The need for deeper and more lasting healing continues to haunt the city.  Some 
Birmingham residents and family members take comfort in a belief in God’s judgment upon 
the perpetrators after death or from their own consciences during life.117  Others have called 
for a full accounting of the violence of the 1960s in Birmingham.  Reverend Fred 
Shuttlesworth, the city’s most prominent civil rights leader of that time, expressed the 
conviction that true healing could not occur until individuals fully comprehend the extent of 
government complicity in that violence.118  Dr. Horace Huntley, director of the Birmingham 
Civil Rights Institute’s Oral History Project, explains: “It’s time to simply tell the truth” and 
to encourage dialogue about race relations past and present to facilitate change.119  
 Attempts at community dialogue have already been organized, as residents continue 
to search for new answers to the questions raised by the bombing and the trials.  In February 
2004, Birmingham Southern College hosted a symposium entitled, “The Gathering: Civil 
Rights Justice Remembered,” in which victims’ families, journalists, attorneys, and law 
enforcement agents participated.120  Attended by over one thousand two hundred people, this 
conference focused on civil rights-era trials throughout the South, with an emphasis on the 
Birmingham bombing trials.121  Participants spanned a broad range and included many of the 
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victims’ family members, politicians, and students from Miles College and Birmingham-
Southern College.  Prominent local companies acted as sponsors.122   U.S. Attorney Doug 
Jones conceived of and helped to organize the event. Looking back, he remembers it as 
“incredibly emotional.”123  While participants, including Jones, described this conference as 
helping to achieve some personal closure and as serving a healing function, another said that 
it provided additional information on the crimes, fulfilling a truth-finding purpose as well.124  
Jones also asserted that this conference made a statement in the national media and helped to 
repair Birmingham’s image: “I think a part of this is a statement to the world. You know, 
‘Look folks, Birmingham is changed, do not think of us simply as black and white, of fire 
hoses and dogs. We are a city of living color in which we do the right thing.’ And this proves 
it.”125  Jones suggested that additional conferences be held to examine other famous civil 
rights-era atrocities, including the 1964 murder of the three civil rights workers, James 
Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman, in Mississippi.126  
 Yet responses to the event were not unanimously positive.  Although he attended the 
conference, Reverend Abraham Woods felt that the contributions of his organization, in 
prompting the reopening of the case and with the competency ruling demonstrations, were 
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not adequately acknowledged.127  Although mostly a reaction to the slight he felt during the 
bombing trials, Woods’s response points to the difficulty of balancing various constituencies 
in such communal efforts.  Any orchestrated attempt to engage the city in dialogue must 
contend with the complex reality of many political groups who claim some stake in this civil 
rights memory.  
 In a recent interview, I asked Dr. Horace Huntley if the Civil Rights Institute had ever 
considered sponsoring a truth and reconciliation, restorative justice-inspired event in 
Birmingham.  He agreed that some sort of dialogue was critical for both Birmingham and the 
nation as a whole, but reminded me that the Institute is not itself an advocacy organization.128  
When I asked Reverend Woods about the same possibility, he was not optimistic and pointed 
to most Americans’ resistance to official apologies for slavery or the consideration of any 
kind of reparations. He also noted a lack of leaders to spearhead this kind of project.129  Yet 
various groups in Birmingham have promoted dialogue to attempt racial reconciliation 
throughout the years since the 1960s.  In fact, one of the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute’s 
stated goals is reconciliation and its prominent position within the city—as a tourist attraction 
and location of cultural events—serves as a symbolic locus for on-going discussions of race 
relations.  One local attorney drafted and publicized “The Birmingham Pledge,” now signed 
by over 114,000 people who commit themselves to consciously avoid racism in their lives.130  
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Additionally, long-standing community groups such as Operation New Birmingham work to 
foster dialogue and eliminate racial disparities in the city.131  
 Some might argue that rather than discussing historic racial injustice, a better path to 
re-establishing community relationships would be to forget the past.  Reconciliation work, 
whether daylong symposia or commissions sponsored by municipal governments, is costly 
and requires the kind of time and energy that many cities, including Birmingham, may need 
to channel toward other priorities.  Additionally, as Reverend Wood suggests, dialogue on 
race relations may have little benefit for those unwilling to participate or who do not envision 
themselves as touched by race at all.  And what of the offenders and offenders’ families: can 
they be reincorporated into the community through processes such as these, particularly if the 
offenders never accept responsibility for past actions?   
 Yet, even among individuals who feel themselves to be very far removed from these 
trials or Birmingham’s past and present race relations, the city’s reputation for racial violence 
lingers.  Odessa Woolfolk, president emerita of the Civil Rights Institute, often encounters 
visitors who arrive with a mental picture of the city as “Bombingham”: “So I tell people, 
Birmingham [today] is like the rest of America. Forty years ago we were an anomaly, but we 
are like the rest of America. We’re progressive, we’re struggling.”132  Despite the efforts of 
some to ignore it, the effect of historical injustice on current race relations is to create an on-
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going mediation in which we are all stakeholders.  Current questions about the past and its 
relationship to present inequities keep the memory of the civil rights movement alive in 
Birmingham.  Because Birmingham residents must live with the city’s past in the form of the 
city’s present reputation, they may feel some greater stake in the process of resolution. 
 Looking beyond the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing, Birmingham activists 
and civic organizations could consider a community dialogue centered on other unsolved 
crimes of the 1950s and 1960s.133  This would facilitate the exploration of individual harms 
while addressing the larger harm of institutionalized racism within the government and law 
enforcement.  This process could shed light on largely forgotten events by drawing on 
personal, story-telling, and history-writing narratives to offer recognition of individual 
suffering.  The community reaction to the bombing trials also reminds us that official city 
sponsorship of any large-scale restorative process must address governmental involvement 
and complicity in the violence.  An event organized around individual testimony about these 
less well-known crimes could bring us closer to a full accounting and may lead to renewed 
faith in current systems of justice by frankly acknowledging the failings of the past.  
 Similarly, the key to public acceptance of a restorative process would be expanding 
the understanding of harm to involve those who would ordinarily consider themselves 
unaffected by historical racial injustice.  The efficient mobilization of the media might be the 
best way to generate such critical public engagement.  While it may prove difficult to 
overcome the resistance of large sectors of the community to involvement, media coverage of 
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the events at least could help to educate such individuals.  An event of this sort would attract 
national media attention, replacing images of police dogs and fire hoses and with the picture 
of a city striving to improve race relations. 
 Defining the scope of the remedy would be the most important part of designing a 
process to address unsolved crimes against the black community during the 1950s and 1960s 
in Birmingham.  Any event, whether a one day conference organized by an academic 
institution or a multiyear commission developed in league with the municipal authorities, 
must emphasize that its overarching goal is the restoration of relationships among all parts of 
the community and putting the memory of these images of violence to rest.  Some specific 
remedies may need to wait on further developments.  While some during the bombing trials 
called for further punitive measures, as Reverend Woods explained, any discussion of 
compensation or reparations is likely to alienate many potential stakeholders before any real 
work of racial reconciliation can be achieved.134  Because most of the fifty or more 
residential and church bombings during the post-war period were never investigated, the 
likelihood of bringing specific offenders to trial is also slim.135  But there are a host of 
collective remedies short of such measures that could help restore relationships among 
Birmingham’s citizens, communities, law enforcement, and local government.  Maybe one of 
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these offers Birmingham, at long last, the opportunity to follow Dr. Huntley’s advice and 
“simply tell the truth.”136 
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Chapter Two 
 
“All of Us Are Victims, and Most of Us Are Innocent Victims”: Birmingham, 1963 
 
“[Denise] was a Southern American, a citizen of Birmingham. I haven’t forgotten that 
and I don’t intend to forget. No matter who else does.”1 
 -Chris McNair, father of Denise McNair, killed in the bombing 
 
 
By the fall of 1963, Birmingham had already been the site of one of the hardest 
fought battles of the civil rights movement.  Decades of local organizing and the notorious 
intransigence of municipal leaders convinced Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to join Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth and other 
Birmingham residents in protest against segregation.2  Selective buying campaigns timed to 
the Easter season, as well as sit-ins and protests, began in April 1963.3  As the jails filled and 
bail money ran short, civil rights organizers recruited eager elementary and high school 
students to maintain the demonstrations’ momentum.4  When Eugene “Bull” Connor, 
commissioner of public safety, ordered firemen to turn hoses on the young demonstrators, the
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media coverage sent shockwaves through the nation.5  Photographs of young men being 
bitten by police dogs earned Birmingham infamy as the “most thoroughly segregated city in 
America” as well as segregation’s most violent defender.6  Forward-looking white leadership 
in Birmingham scrambled to distance themselves from these violent tactics and the 
unflattering media coverage.7  
The old bulwarks that had maintained segregation for so long in Birmingham—
specifically violent police suppression and the seeming immutability of the Jim Crow 
system—were breaking down in the spring of 1963.  As a member of the three-man 
commission system of city governance, Bull Connor controlled public safety and represented 
the official defense of the racial status quo.  The local white power structure long tolerated 
Connor as a useful tool, but his repeated association with embarrassing international 
headlines-making violence, beginning with the Freedom Riders beating in 1961, increasingly 
made him a liability. 
An integrated group of activists, the Freedom Riders traveled across the South by bus 
in defiance of Jim Crow.8  Firebombed by Klansmen near Anniston, a town about an hour 
inside the state line, they arrived in Birmingham on Mother’s Day, 1961.  A mob of Ku Klux 
Klan members and thugs were waiting.  One witness reports that earlier in the afternoon, the 
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mob had moved from the Greyhound Bus Station to the Trailways Station after receiving a 
tip that the Freedom Riders changed routes.  The mob beat the activists for fifteen minutes 
before the police arrived.  In response to allegations that the police were purposefully absent, 
Connor explained that the men were all out visiting their mothers.9  A Birmingham Post-
Herald reporter’s photographs of the beatings made headlines in Japan, where a group of 
visiting Birmingham businessmen were shocked and deeply embarrassed to be confronted 
with such images of their city.  The businessmen returned home determined to oust Connor, 
who was becoming synonymous in the national media with Birmingham and violent 
racism.10  In fact, a Senate Intelligence hearing in 1976 confirmed that Connor knew of the 
impending attack, tipped off the Klan to the Riders’ changed route, and purposely delayed 
police arrival.11  Connor not only symbolized violent defense of segregation, he embodied 
the links between the Klan and official tactics of desegregation resistance. 
 In an attempt to construct a more positive reputation for the city while maintaining 
local control over desegregation, prominent realtor Sid Smyer, other leading white 
businessmen, and young lawyers organized a coup to overthrow Connor.  The businessmen 
arranged the overhaul by a referendum: Birmingham residents could vote to change their 
form of government from the three-man commissioner system to a mayor-council system, 
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thereby removing the current commissioners from office before the end of their terms.  
Under the commissioner system, as one of only three men, Connor had substantial influence 
in the city.  A mayor-council system distributed power among ten, and although Connor 
could run for mayor under the new government, the businessmen hoped that voters would be 
too embarrassed to elect him.12  
 The referendum passed by citywide ballot, with black voters helping to push a victory.  
On April 2, 1963, Albert Boutwell defeated Connor for mayor.  Although Fred 
Shuttlesworth, a local civil rights leader, denounced Boutwell as “just a dignified Bull 
Connor,” the Birmingham News heralded the election with the headline, “New Day Dawns 
for Birmingham.”  The businessmen’s coup succeeded in presenting a more moderate version 
of the city to a national audience.  When civil rights activists began demonstrations the next 
day, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy criticized the “ill-timed” protests, coming as 
they did when Birmingham had shown by its change of government that it was trying to 
reform.13 
Boutwell and the new council were sworn in on April 15, 1963, but Connor and his 
fellow commissioners literally refused to leave.  Art Hanes, Sr., the former mayor, occupied 
one office; Boutwell used another down the hall.  For over a month, Birmingham had two 
separate municipal governments often meeting right after each other in the same room of 
City Hall.14   
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Media attention again focused on Birmingham as the economic boycott and civil 
rights demonstrations continued throughout April.  Although both the Birmingham News and 
the Birmingham Post-Herald editors initially limited coverage of the spring demonstrations, 
national media images of the children’s crusade and police dogs attacking bystanders brought 
Birmingham’s racial upheaval to the world.15  When Connor, despite having been voted out 
of office, responded to the activists with the usual display of violence—shotgun-armed police 
escorting his white tank as it rolled through city streets—the spectacle of massive resistance 
threatened the businessmen’s carefully constructed moderate image.  Neither municipal 
government would officially acknowledge the demonstrators’ demands, prompting 
businessmen such as Smyer, as well as young white lawyers David Vann and Charles 
Morgan, Jr., to negotiate secretly with King and Shuttlesworth to try to restore calm.16  
Concern over the street demonstrations and the potential for unrest led President John F. 
Kennedy to send members of the Justice Department to secretly assist in the mediations and 
avoid the need for a militarized federal presence in the city.17  
On May 10, the agreement was announced.  The end of the internationally publicized 
demonstrations would be met with desegregation of facilities and hiring of blacks in 
downtown department stores; the release of the jailed protesters, including hundreds of 
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school children; and the creation of a biracial committee to oversee the end of segregation in 
the city.  Shuttlesworth read the accords aloud in front of the Gaston Motel.18  The agreement 
stated: “The city of Birmingham has reached an accord with its conscience.  The acceptance 
of responsibility by local white and Negro leadership offers an example of a free people 
united to meet and solve their problems.”19  In fact, black and white leadership did not agree 
among themselves or with one another about the extent and implementation of the accords, 
and the businessmen quietly and systematically negated the promised reforms.20  The 
accords’ architects pushed for one African-American clerk in every downtown store, while 
the businessmen insisted that they had agreed to hire only one.21  Both municipal 
governments denounced the accords outright; the former mayor Hanes categorized them as 
“selling the white folks down the river.”22  
The white businessmen could not persuade Boutwell and the government they had 
installed to honor the agreement.  Parks and other outdoor municipal facilities remained 
closed and segregated.  Segregation ordinances stayed on the books until July 1963.  The 
biracial committee designed to further reforms in the city was not convened until October, 
and then only with an advisory status.  It proved to be so ineffective that Boutwell eliminated 
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it entirely in 1964.23  As it turned out, the businessmen’s agreement did little to change the 
realities of racial violence or segregation in Birmingham.  It did, however, create a promise 
of reform designed to erase the city’s reputation for violence. 
The businessmen’s goal was to project what historian Glenn Eskew calls “an image 
of reform.”24  Designed as a continuation of the voting referendum, with this reform image 
local leaders and businessmen hoped to maintain their power and ability to control the pace 
of desegregation by assuring the president that no federal intervention was needed at that 
moment.25  Keenly aware of the media presence and their city’s reputation, leaders presented 
a conciliatory image that they hoped would be accepted by a national audience and local 
people alike.  In his statement announcing the accords, Dr. King expressed the hope that the 
city “was on its way to the creation of a new kind of community—not simply a new image, 
but a new reality.”26  In fact, the violence continued in Birmingham.  
The night after the publicly announced accords, a bomb went off at King’s brother’s 
house as well as outside the movement leader’s room at the A. G. Gaston Motel, sparking a 
riot in which approximately 2,500 people participated.27  City blocks burned as President 
Kennedy prepared to send in troops.  To this first contradiction of the “image of reform,” 
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Smyer responded with what would become city leaders’ best defense against continuing 
vigilante violence.  He blamed the outsider: “I believe the community and the country are 
shocked that, after trying to work this matter out peacefully, a bunch of hoodlums came in 
here and stirred up more hate.”28  Severing this violence from official resistance to 
desegregation, Smyer presented the bombing as an isolated terrorist event, perpetrated by 
outsiders to the community who “came in” to cause trouble.   
Although Martin Luther King, Jr., agreed, stating, “I do not think the bombings were 
perpetrated or even sanctioned by the majority of the white people in Birmingham,”29 the city 
had a long history of tacitly accepting violence as used to enforce class and race divisions in 
the segregated system.30  By the spring of 1963, both black and white residents challenged 
the top-down assurances of “reform,” expressing their discontent through bombs and riots, as 
well as in the threat of renewed protests.  Fissures had developed in the newly constructed 
image of Birmingham, which, while seemingly reformed, remained undergirded by old 
modes of obstruction and resistance.   
 
School Desegregation, Fall 1963 
The summer of relative peace in Birmingham after the spring civil rights 
demonstrations came to an end with the bombing of attorney Arthur Shores’s house on 
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August 20, 1963.31  Although a peripheral figure in the spring protests, Shores was a long-
time civil rights lawyer in the city.32  Acutely aware of national media attention and unable to 
deny the on-going violence, local leaders, in an unprecedented move, quickly established a 
bomb reward fund to assist in capturing the bombers.33  Mobilized behind a denunciation of 
the continuing violence, local white leaders reasserted the “image of reform,” presenting the 
city as reluctantly but peacefully compliant with the federally mandated school desegregation 
set to begin in early September.34   
Other voices immediately challenged the spirit underlying this image of reform.  The 
Birmingham World, the city’s bi-weekly African-American owned newspaper, warned: 
“Birmingham will be an unsafe city in which to live so long as the long string of racial 
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bombings remain unsolved.”35  The World editor, Emory O. Jackson, had made a career out 
of reporting issues not covered by the white-owned News, like the bombing of black 
churches and homes.36  Jackson wondered why solving the many other bombings remained 
“beyond the skill, the will, and the ability of law enforcement.”37  Pressing on the question of 
whether local leaders would go further than the establishment of rewards toward ending 
violence in the city, Jackson explained, “Beyond the bomb reward fund lies the future of this 
city.”38   
The question of how Birmingham’s various factions would respond to the 
desegregation order, and how city leaders could hold those groups in check, hung over that 
fall.  Expecting additional Klan activity, police and civil defense volunteers patrolled the 
schools to be desegregated, watchful for vigilante activity, catching two young men on 
Friday night at West End High attempting to hang a “Negro dummy in effigy.”39  Almost all 
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Birmingham public schools received police attention in the days leading up to desegregation.  
Thirteen extra police cars monitored the schools the night before their opening.40  Already 
described as a “crisis” and “one of Birmingham’s greatest challenges,” school desegregation, 
even in the token form in which it was going forward, prompted the police chief to ask black 
and white ministers to preach the Sunday before the opening of schools for “order and peace 
this week.”41  The religious leaders took up the call, emphasizing the danger to 
schoolchildren that large protests or outright resistance could pose.  One Lutheran leader 
prayed, “As our children begin and continue their studies at our schools, we ask for Thy hand 
of protection over them.”42  Another pastor asked, “May violence be stayed from our 
children, for the welfare of our city and schools.”43  Police Chief Jamie Moore warned both 
civil rights supporters and resisters not to conduct demonstrations.44   
Mayor Albert Boutwell himself issued a televised statement at the beginning of the 
week calling for residents to observe “law and order” as school officials carried out “the 
distasteful and agonizing duty imposed upon them by the court.”45  Explaining that the 
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enrollment of these three children “would be better than to have federal troops force us to our 
knees,” Councilman George Seibels echoed Boutwell’s call for the schools to “remain open 
without incident,”46 allowing for continued local control over the pace of desegregation.  Yet 
the constant calls for peace betrayed the fear that Birmingham’s residents would not “face the 
inevitable and distasteful task before [them] with calm and self restraint [sic].”47   
While crying out against violence, white civic leaders made their personal and official 
opposition to desegregation clear.  In a lead editorial entitled, “Keep the Peace with Open 
Schools,” the Birmingham News editors explained:  
Elected leaders of Birmingham, mayor and council, school board, school board 
attorneys, the Community Affairs Committee, PTA leadership, Birmingham school 
superintendent, chief of police, sheriff of Jefferson County—All of these individuals, 
none of whom favors desegregation, have spelled out the Birmingham school facts 
for you people…. For nine years, longer than any other major southern city, 
Birmingham managed to stave off the order.48   
 
Birmingham schools superintendent Theo Wright explained that, “a federal judge—not the 
school board members—ordered the enrollment of the five Negro students Wednesday.  
‘Please understand the difference.’”49  Mayor Boutwell reiterated that the school board 
“made the best out of that bitter choice.  They carried out the court order—hateful as it was 
to them and hateful as it is to us.”50   
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Many prominent residents, including the News editors, called for a “realistic” 
assessment of the situation, emphasizing the harm schoolchildren would face if the public 
schools were closed in defiance of the segregation order.51  On a television broadcast just 
before the opening of schools, the President of the Birmingham League of Women Voters, a 
self-described “working mother,” spoke as a representative of those white parents who could 
not afford private school tuition and wanted the schools to remain open: “I do not think we 
can condemn the childhood of Birmingham to ignorance or to a life of common labor. I 
honestly think most of Birmingham believes this, and is going to face this situation with 
calm, intelligence and dignity.”52  On the same show, a member of the school board and 
chairman of the city council’s committee on community relations emphasized the long-term 
economic effects that continued racial unrest would have on the city.53  Levels of support for 
compliance with school desegregation among average white residents in Birmingham 
remains difficult to gauge; however, many white leaders supported keeping the schools open, 
at least until alternative solutions could be found.54   
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Alternately, others worked against school desegregation.  A group of women 
presented petitions to the Birmingham School Board to close the schools and organized white 
parents to voluntarily transfer their children in an attempt to circumvent mandated 
integration.55  Local women, in particular mothers, actively participated in the larger 
segregationist groups and their demonstrations.56  Additionally, the furor attracted organized 
hate groups from around the region.  The National States’ Rights Party, an Atlanta-based 
organization, as well as the United Americans for Conservative Government and others, 
gathered in Birmingham in advance of the opening of schools.  Claiming to have twelve 
thousand signatures, these groups attempted to present school closure petitions to Mayor 
Albert Boutwell.57  National States’ Rights Party officials had already visited Governor 
Wallace to present similar petitions, supported by supposedly thirty thousand signatures.58  
Adopting some of the tactics of civil rights activists, segregationist groups advocated 
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economic boycotts and voter registration.59  The Ku Klux Klan held well-attended public 
speeches and rallies in the area.60  On the Monday night before the schools opened 
Wednesday, approximately one thousand people gathered near the Graymont National Guard 
Armory to listen to Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton brag that he would defy local law 
enforcement and appear in Birmingham during the first days of school desegregation.61   
Adding to the confusion, Governor George Wallace capitalized on the violence of the 
spring by choosing Birmingham as one of the battlegrounds in his latest showdown on state’s 
rights.62  Around eighty of his troopers entered Birmingham on Tuesday, the day before 
schools opened.63  In stump speeches across the state, Wallace addressed Labor Day 
gatherings, preaching his militant resistance to desegregation couched in terms of federalism.  
In Birmingham, he announced: “We are in battle.  We are not fighting against the Negro 
people . . . we want local government to prevail and we want the Constitution of the United 
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States to prevail.  We are fighting for local government and states rights.”64  An indignant 
Birmingham City Council issued a resolution asking Wallace not to enter the city and to 
allow the local school board to proceed with desegregation as planned.65  Wallace’s show of 
force represents one prominent end of the spectrum of political constituencies engaged in this 
tug-of-war over school desegregation and the best way to minimize its impact.  His entrance 
also underlines how the local power structure was losing control of the situation, both in 
terms of the media image of reform and peaceful, controlled desegregation, as well as in 
physical terms, as the situation became more militarized and chaotic. 
 On Wednesday, September 4, two black students, Dwight and Floyd Armstrong, 
began school at Graymont Elementary in a previously all-white neighborhood.  They entered 
the school by a side door, accompanied by their father, attorneys, and Reverend Fred 
Shuttlesworth.  Ten minutes after enrolling in the principal’s office, they left unnoticed by 
the crowd of two hundred white protestors gathered out front.66  Despite heavy rains that day, 
demonstrators had gathered at the three schools to be desegregated, waving Confederate flags 
and throwing rocks.67  Five white men were arrested for attacking police.68  Ramsey High 
and West End High did not open on Wednesday, delaying the enrollment of all students, 
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including the three new black students.69  Protestors fought each other and the police in what 
was described as a “melee” by the newspapers.70 
That night a bomb damaged the home of attorney Arthur Shores, the second such 
attack in two weeks, sparking a riot by neighborhood residents in which police killed one 
black man, and twenty-one other persons were wounded.71  After an all-night meeting, the 
school board closed all three of the public schools to be desegregated, including Graymont.  
Although officials insisted that the closing was “only temporary,” they declined to give an 
exact reopening schedule, insisting only, “We hope that the schools will be reopened 
Monday.”72  Although school board members denied that pressure from the governor 
influenced their decision, Wallace issued an early-morning press release proclaiming that the 
school board, “has acceded to my request and the schools will be closed tomorrow.”73  All 
city public schools remained closed that week.   
As NAACP lawyers continued, motion-by-motion, to pry the schools open via the 
federal courts, some parents in Birmingham called upon the school board to reopen the 
schools.74  Resentment against Wallace’s stand increased.  The Birmingham News editors 
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questioned his legal authority to intervene in local affairs, and a group of progressive young 
white lawyers and businessmen accused him of encouraging violence resistance.75  The 
Alabama Baptist, a statewide church newspaper, echoed these concerns, warning, “If leaders 
continue to encourage people to violate laws, they create a spirit of anarchy which hardens 
the situation rather than softens it up.”76 
The fear that national attention would again fix on Birmingham because of violent 
resistance to integration drove local officials to denounce Wallace’s intervention in 
Birmingham.  Many felt that Wallace was exploiting Birmingham’s reputation for violent 
resistance by making the city one of the locations of his power struggle with the federal 
government.  Explicitly understanding the handling of school desegregation as a potential 
challenge to the “image of reform,” one councilman stressed, “A great deal has been said in 
recent times about the ‘good name’ of Birmingham … the eyes of the nation and much of the 
world will focus attention on us to see what happens here Wednesday.”77  
Many residents, regardless of their stance on desegregation, echoed the refrain, “We 
must redeem our city in the eyes of our country and the world.”78  One concerned resident 
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wondered, “Why have Birmingham and Alabama become the whipping-boys for the rest of 
the nation?  There have recently been some very violent doings in other places … Yet 
Alabama has become the national symbol of race disorders.”79  As during the spring civil 
rights demonstrations, leading residents worried about the economic effect of the continuing 
disorders in the city.  The News editorialized, “No one counsels ‘liking’ desegregation. We 
don’t.”  However, it continued, “[d]eliberately provoked disruption within Birmingham will 
further harm [the] economic stability of the community.”80  
In response to the violence following the first day of school desegregation on 
Wednesday, September 4, the city council issued a statement: “The principal victims of this 
violence are the people of Birmingham.  This is another of the contemptible blows to the 
reputation of this city, its people and our law enforcement.”  The council then went on to 
bemoan “the troubles which have been heaped upon the decent citizens of Birmingham since 
April 2.”81  City leaders placed the beginning of the desegregation crisis at the start of civil 
rights demonstrations the previous spring—directly after the mayoral election on April 2—
and in so doing implied that civil rights activists had brought not only a change in the racial 
status quo, but violence and national approbation to Birmingham.  Defensive voices such as 
these also resented the fact that Governor Wallace allowed desegregation to go forward 
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unchallenged in Huntsville while state troopers ringed Mobile, Tuskegee, and Birmingham 
schools.82  However, in Huntsville the schools remained open despite Wallace’s posturing; 
parents and students broke through the ranks of state troopers surrounding their schools and 
desegregated classes went forward.83  Although leaders could portray the city as victimized 
by demonstrations and desegregation, bombing continued, further undermining the image of 
peaceful, local control.  The violence that had long been a tolerated tool in the maintenance 
of segregation continued, unsolved and unabated.  Meanwhile white leaders reiterated their 
fundamental opposition to desegregation.84   
On a Sunday night television broadcast, Wallace announced that Monday morning 
schools would be reopened in Birmingham and other Alabama cities on a segregated basis.  
Urging against violence but speaking resistance, Wallace reiterated, “We cannot win this 
fight if we resort to violence, if we resort to bombings, if we resort to harming the hair on a 
single person’s head in this state.”85  That night, a firebomb exploded at the Birmingham 
home of prominent businessman A.G. Gaston, a self-made millionaire and member of the 
conservative black leadership class in the city.86  While the effect of continuing violence on 
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the city’s reputation was undeniable—the News reported Gaston as saying that “He 
considered the attack on his home a reflection on Birmingham”—Gaston was himself 
invested in the “image of reform.”  Like other local leaders, Gaston blamed this bombing and 
the use of violence to resist desegregation on a small group of extremists: “Gaston said the 
bombing ‘certainly doesn’t represent the majority of the citizens of the community.  I believe 
it was representative of a very small minority of the community.’”87  As was not the case in 
the scores of previous bombings, local officials felt confident about catching these suspects, 
citing a matchbook found on the scene.  Sheriff Bailey explained, “This is the first time 
we’ve really found evidence we can work with on these bombings.”88 
On Monday, Wallace’s state troopers and then the Alabama National Guard turned 
away five black children attempting to attend the formerly all-white schools as the legal 
dance continued in the courts.89  With the exception of many elementary students at 
Graymont, most Birmingham children reported to the reopened schools.90  White protests 
were minimal.91  Desegregation went forward in Birmingham the next day after Kennedy 
federalized and withdrew the National Guard from schools in Tuskegee, Mobile, and 
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Birmingham.92  While the five black pupils attended school—Dwight and Floyd Armstrong 
at Graymont Elementary, Patricia Marcus and Josephine A. Powell at West End High School, 
and Richard A. Walker at Ramsay High—the only major confrontation involved white 
protestors at West End High.93  There, one thousand students boycotted classes, and, along 
with nearly two hundred adults, mostly members of the National States’ Right Party, staged a 
loud demonstration that ended in nine arrests.94  Attendance remained low that day at 
Graymont Elementary, but Ramsey High School saw above expected figures for yearly 
enrollment.95    
Throughout the week, noisy caravans of demonstrators drove from high school to 
high school in the city trying to tempt white students into a boycott.  In some instances, as at 
Woodlawn High School, white students organized against the demonstrators, blocking access 
to the schools and making sure other students did not join in.96  Prominent students like 
football players received phone calls from segregationist women trying to intimidate them 
                                                
 
92“Negroes Admitted to Nine Schools,” Birmingham News, 10 September 1963, 1.  Department of 
Justice official Burke Marshall and Attorney General Robert Kennedy were in contact with Birmingham Police 
Chief Jamie Moore during the federalizing of the National Guard, inquiring as to the level of protests around the 
schools and the ability of local police to maintain control of the situation. “Birmingham Police Department 
Inter-Office Communication, Re: Telephone Conversation between Chief Jamie Moore & Burke Marshall & 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy,” 10 September 1963, Boutwell Papers, 20.38. 
 
93“Identification Given of Five Negro Enrollees,” Birmingham News, 10 September 1963, 5.  
 
94“West End Mixing Protested: 1,000 Skip Classes; Nine Adults Arrested,” Birmingham News, 10 
September 1963, 1.  
 
95“Negroes Admitted to Nine Schools,” 5.  
 
96“Memorandum from Detective M.A. Jones,” police surveillance report, undated, Boutwell Papers, 
20.38. 
 86 
into not attending school.97  Police vigilance kept Birmingham schools functioning fairly 
normally for the rest of the week.  
That Friday, despite a week of desegregation, Wallace announced: “We’ve just begun 
to fight.”98  Yet school attendance climbed steadily.  That same day, a dedicated group of 
high school demonstrators mobbed Mayor Boutwell’s office, waving Confederate flags and 
climbing onto his desk to demand a return to whites-only schools.99  A known Klansman in 
the area, Jack Cash, was arrested late in the week while attending a demonstration.  Cash was 
armed with a small arsenal that included a straight razor and a meat hook.100  Of course, the 
majority of white school children in Alabama would not even experience desegregated 
schools that year: in these two weeks, twenty-four black children had entered nine schools 
across the state.101 
In a stump speech for his newly launched presidential campaign, Wallace wondered, 
“it looks mighty funny to me that there have been forty-seven such bombings in Birmingham 
in last ten or fifteen years and yet no one has been hurt . . . And these bombings have led to 
the raising of millions of dollars for civil rights causes.”102  Local Birmingham leaders also 
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disavowed the violence and disruption in the city, blaming Wallace or outside elements.  
While the efficacy of state-sponsored private schools was debated, there was no end in sight 
to the desegregation conflict.   
As the school year got underway, the Birmingham World continued its call for 
investigations into the spate of bombings.  Although a federal grand jury had been assembled 
to investigate obstruction of school desegregation in the city, local officials had not brought 
any of the suspected bombers to light.103  The Birmingham News continued to report on the 
growth of the bomb reward fund and the contributions of leading white residents to the 
cause.104  The World editors voiced the hope “that the bombings will halt and the guilty will 
be caught.”  They continued, “Beyond the bomb reward fund lies something which should 
burn the conscience of decent men.  The whole community needs to help clear up these 
shameful bombings. . . . No community can long live in safety which allows its neighbors to 
live in danger, its seems to us.”105  Beyond the bomb reward fund lay an official tolerance of 
violence in defense of segregation that belied the local leaders’ “image of reform” as 
completely as did their loss of control during the school desegregation crisis.  Nineteen sixty-
three continued to be a contested time in the city.  And no bombers were brought to trial that 
late summer or early fall. 
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The Sixteenth Street Baptist Church Bombing 
At 10:22 AM on Sunday morning, September 15, 1963, twenty sticks of dynamite 
blew in a sidewall of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.106  The bomb went off during 
Sunday school, while much of the congregation, including some of the girls’ parents, sat 
upstairs or in other parts of the building.107  Addie Mae Collins, Carole Robertson, Cynthia 
Wesley, all fourteen years old, and Denise McNair, eleven, were killed while in the basement 
preparing for Youth Day.  Sarah Collins, sister of Addie Mae, also in the basement at the 
time of the blast, survived but lost her right eye.  Twenty-two other members of the 
congregation were wounded.108  The force of the explosion crushed parked cars.  As news of 
the bombing spread, riots that pitted angry blacks against whites and the police broke out 
across the city.  Later that afternoon, two more black children were killed.  A policeman shot 
James Robinson, sixteen, in the back.109  On his way home from a segregationist rally, a 
sixteen-year-old Eagle Scout shot Virgil Ware, thirteen, twice in the head.  Virgil and his 
brother were riding a bicycle near their home.110 
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The Sixteenth Street Baptist Church served as the symbolic center of the civil rights 
movement in Birmingham, the organizational backbone and site of mass demonstrations.111 
Other key locations of the movement—activists’ homes, even churches—had also been 
bombed, but this public, vicious act of terrorism literally exploded white city leaders’ posture 
of peaceful desegregation and control.112  The Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing was 
not the inevitable result of the atmosphere of racial violence tolerated by the city, but it was 
the product of it.  A defiant gesture by a small group of segregationists, the bombing also 
represented a twisted extension of the rhetoric of resistance and an awful reminder of 
Birmingham’s long and uneasy relationship with vigilante violence in the defense of the 
racial status quo. 
The city responded with shock and horror.  Editorials and city leaders expressed their 
grief; the paper reported that Mayor Boutwell wept.113  Recommending the death penalty for 
those responsible, Governor George Wallace called the bombing “the most dastardly crime 
ever committed in Alabama,” and local white ministers asked everyone to pray in 
remembrance.114   The city council quickly extended the reward fund, and Wallace 
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personally pledged $5,000 to bring the bombers to justice.115  Although the Birmingham 
News quoted Reverend John H. Cross, the pastor of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, as 
expecting that eventually the church would be bombed, each of its newspaper articles 
wondered how this kind of violence could happen in Birmingham.116  As the city promised a 
relentless search for “what must be a small band of men,” it began explaining away yet 
another national-headlines making example of violent resistance.117 
Rather than acknowledging the continuing violence, politicians and the media treated 
the bombing, like the spring demonstrations, as an isolated event perpetrated by outsiders.  
That night Mayor Boutwell told the city, “All of us are victims, and most of us are innocent 
victims.”118  With the spring accords, Birmingham had attempted to remake its national 
reputation, presenting itself as working peacefully with civil rights leaders to integrate, while 
at the same time preserving the segregated system of racial dominance.119  But continuing 
violence and official obstruction of desegregation disrupted that image of reform.  While 
Birmingham residents certainly suffered from the bombing in ways that would reverberate 
through the city’s history going forward, this official proclamation of the city as a wholly 
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innocent victim immediately rang false.  Yet politicians and the local white media worked 
very hard to present the bombing as unconnected to larger patterns of desegregation 
resistance.  
The day after the bombing, the Birmingham News reported that the young girls’ 
deaths, “marked the first time anyone has died in a bombing itself during the more than 40 
that have perplexed the city in recent years.”120  City leaders and the media accused George 
Wallace, outside agitators, and the black community in an attempt to deflect attention from 
the continuing atmosphere of violent resistance.  If the News mentioned the connection of the 
church bombing to school desegregation, it attributed white resistance to “the vehement 
objections of the governor and segregation organizations.”121  While Wallace’s defiance 
undoubtedly encouraged the violence, homegrown resisters called in bomb threats at five 
Birmingham schools the day after the bombing.122 
 Betraying a deep resentment of the spring demonstrations and the accompanying 
national attention, Birmingham’s white media portrayed the marches and protests as the true 
root of the violence.  The day after the bombing, the lead editorial in the Birmingham News 
expressed grief over the four girls’ deaths, then said, “The Negro community has affronted 
the white community in past weeks with open law violating street demonstrations—seeking 
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their ends outside the courts which alone can bring them their goals.”123  Civil rights activists 
had held no large-scale demonstrations since the spring, yet “in past weeks” made it appear 
as if the protests occurred in the weeks leading up to the bombing, instead of four months 
earlier.  This subtle aligning of the bombing and the demonstrations had two functions: it 
served to characterize the city as victimized by civil rights activity, while at the same time 
blaming the black community for white resistance.  The editors suggested that the 
demonstrations were an “affront” to a white community anxious to allow the courts to settle 
the matter, when, in fact, Birmingham had just witnessed two weeks of boycotts, protests, 
bombing, and riots sparked by token desegregation.   
Even as the News explained away white resistance, asserting, “citizens of another race 
naturally enough try to cling to what they have always known,”124 a prominent Atlanta editor 
lamented, “Only we can trace the truth, Southerner, you and I. We broke those children’s 
bodies.”125  Another Alabama newspaper asked its readers to consider, “Could my own 
expressed attitudes of racial prejudice ever have contributed to the insane hatred that 
unleashed itself in the bombing.”126  Yet, equating the bombing with the anger of blacks in its 
aftermath, the Birmingham News stated: 
[O]ur people must learn to live without allowing anyone, white or Negro, to 
resort to violence – be it the extreme of dynamiting a house of God when 
occupied, or the always dangerously provocative menace of Negroes throwing 
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rocks at innocent whites or, more brainless, at police who earnestly try to 
protect human life.127  
 
This editorial denounced the bombing, but ultimately focused on blaming the “dangerously 
provocative menace” of black residents themselves.  While the police acted heroically, 
“earnestly try[ing] to protect human life,” in this editorial, the murder of four children 
became analogous to rock throwing.  
 A separate article reported that the four girls had not taken part in the schoolchildren’s 
demonstrations that spring.  Yet the reporter included, “[o]n the other hand one of the girls, 
Carole Robertson, was a granddaughter of Mrs. Sallie M. Anderson who is a member of the 
Citizens Community Affairs Committee.”128  Here, then, even the murdered girls were 
accused of somehow provoking their own deaths.  Just attending Sunday school at the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, symbolic center of the demonstrations in Birmingham, 
compromised their innocence.  
Although the white media and politicians tried to explain away the bombing or fold it 
into an image of reform, many other residents explicitly linked official and vigilante 
violence.  Charles Morgan, Jr., a young white lawyer who had worked as a liaison between 
the city’s white businessmen and civil rights leaders during the spring negotiations, delivered 
a speech to the Young Men’s Business Club blaming the silent white majority and 
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condemning the city at large.129  Echoing King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” in a 
sweeping indictment of local leaders, ministers, police, and ordinary residents, Morgan 
declared, “Every last one of us is condemned for that crime and the bombing before it and the 
ones last month, last year, and a decade ago.”130  By placing the responsibility on white 
Birmingham, Morgan exposed the “indifference to violence” that local leaders wanted to 
bury under the new stance of token accommodation.131  
Looking back, Charles Morgan described the way that white leadership in 
Birmingham began quickly crafting the response that a single individual, an outsider, was 
responsible.  Morgan explained the well-known alliance of extralegal violence and the white 
power structure’s maintenance of segregation.  Describing the many previous bombings of 
black churches and homes, he said:  
When you have that many unsolved bombings then you know it’s a community rather 
than a single set of citizens’ acts. It’s community approval. I mean, all the Bourbons 
used to talk badly about the Klan, but the Klan was just the shock troopers, the 
guerilla warriors for the preservation of the order. That allowed for the leading 
citizens who were segregationists to condemn the acts and the others to perform the 
natural result of their philosophy.132 
 
Pointing to Wallace’s use of state troopers to override local attempts at desegregation, 
Morgan described the bombing as “a natural kind of conclusion to what was going on for the 
fifteen days before that.”133  He continued, “I was of the belief then and I am of the belief 
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now that that bombing was as natural an event in the history of that city . . . as any other 
event in American history.  You see, there are times when communities and nations and 
people are guilty.”134  Morgan’s frank declaration earned him harassment, death threats, and 
prompted his move out of Birmingham soon after.135  
Civil rights leaders also drew connections between official resistance to desegregation 
and the bombing.  Local leaders speculated that Wallace’s state troopers were directly 
involved, while Fred Shuttlesworth reiterated that desegregation of city facilities and hiring 
had stalled.136  In his funeral speech memorializing the girls, Martin Luther King denounced 
the silent white moderates, especially the white clergy, race-baiting leaders (although he did 
not name Wallace specifically), the lack of action on the part of the federal government, and 
blacks who had not begun to fight against segregation.137  Beyond these individual actors, 
however, King put the blame squarely on the system of segregation and the 
interconnectedness of white official resistance, inertia, and violent resistance: “We must be 
concerned not merely with finding those who murdered [the children] but about the system, 
the philosophy and the way of life which produced the murderer.”138   
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While some prominent white religious leaders publicly denounced the bombing and 
showed their support for the victims’ families, no official representative of the city 
government attended either funeral service.139  The national media noted this general failure 
of local leadership throughout the desegregation crisis;140 individual residents’ expressions of 
fear that the violence would continue echoed this sense.  Outside the funeral of the three 
girls, one black man was reported as asking, “Where are we safe? Not in our homes, not in 
school, now not even in church.”141  The sheer horror of the act itself prompted even a 
politically well-connected white churchwoman to write to Mayor Boutwell: “If it could 
happen at the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, it could happen to any of our churches and to 
any of our children—or grandchildren.”142  
 Following the bombing, Birmingham officials pledged to bring the vigilantes to justice.  
The city council issued a statement calling the investigations “not simply a legal or political 
question but an issue which must strike at the heart and conscience of every person in this 
state.”143  Mayor Boutwell promised that the city police would “put all else aside until we 
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have found and made certain the punishment of those responsible.”144  Yet bombings 
continued in the city.  Ten days after the church bombing, a small explosion drew police to a 
residential neighborhood, after which a shrapnel bomb detonated nearby, designed to inflict 
injury on spectators and others congregated at the initial bombsite.145  
While the FBI took the lead in the church bombing investigations, in a move that 
surprised local and federal agencies, the Alabama State Police arrested the FBI’s three main 
suspects only two weeks later on an unrelated dynamite possession charge.  Fined $1000, the 
men successfully appealed their six-month sentences.146  One source speculates that the arrest 
and subsequent trial of these men were engineered to frustrate a federal indictment and 
obscure local police corruption by keeping their files away from the FBI.147  The other law 
enforcement groups involved in the case worried about the effect of these arrests, calling 
them “premature.”148  Fred Shuttlesworth described the move as a “sham on the part of law 
agencies, in an effort to soothe the National conscience and placate the Negro” and asked: “Is 
this the best the Nation can expect of the combined efficient forces of the Federal, State and 
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Local Law Agencies? Will there be a white wash of this heinous crime, leaving a blacker 
mark on the American system of justice and equal protection of the law?”149 
This arrest would prove to be the only official action on the case in the 1960s.150  By 
the second anniversary of the bombing, Chris McNair, whose daughter was killed, explained: 
“This city just wants to forget the bombing. . . . Do you know, until this day, not a single 
representative from any law agency—city, state, or federal—has come to tell me what’s 
happening in the investigation?”151  After five years of investigations, the statute of 
limitations on civil right violations expired.  The FBI had made no arrests, and the Justice 
Department decided to close the case, convinced that a successful prosecution could not be 
obtained in Birmingham at that time.152  Despite local leaders’ assurances and the growing 
bomb reward fund, the lack of a prosecution implicated city officials and law enforcement as 
tolerating, if not outright approving of, the crime.  Frustrated with this lack of action, McNair 
concluded, “As a Christian, I realize that no one is without sin and maybe I could forgive the 
bombers—but not a society that permits it.”153   
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As city leaders mailed back reward fund contributions dollar by dollar,154 the 
publicity surrounding the bombing died.  National and international donations helped the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church to renovate and rebuild by June 1964.155  Although bombings 
continued on “Dynamite Hill” and in other black neighborhoods, Birmingham moved 
forward.   Reform was, in part, realized as segregation ordinances were repealed and Jim 
Crow signs removed.156  National gains in civil rights—the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965—enfranchised and empowered Birmingham’s black population.  
Desegregation of public accommodations resulted in no major incidents in the city.157  By 
1965, African Americans had won appointments to several prominent municipal boards, 
including the Housing Authority.158  By March 1967, black attorney Arthur Shores had won a 
seat on the city council.  Impressed by these accomplishments, Look magazine voted 
Birmingham an “All-American City” in 1971.  In 1973, Chris McNair, who entered local 
politics after his daughter’s death, was elected to the Alabama House of Representatives.159 
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By the mid 1970s, politicians and other publicists were pointing to an African-
American councilman or representative as proof of black gains.  Equating integration with 
racial equity, however, ignores the ideological framework of white supremacy that remained 
substantially in tact as desegregation proceeded.  Although Birmingham made great strides, 
its narrative of “All-American” improvements in race relations obscured alternate stories of 
continuing injustice.  School desegregation, for example, stalled—of 70,274 total school-
aged students, only 60 black students attended formerly all-white schools in 1965.160  In this 
context, the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing case stood as a reminder of the 
continuing struggle to equalize African-American standing under the law and in society.  
Seldom reappearing in public discussion as the city charged forward, the bombing remained 
in individuals’ memories and lives. 
Like so many other civil rights-era atrocities, the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church 
bombing might have lingered, unprosecutable during the 1960s and later forgotten.  Instead it 
was resurrected in 1977 by a young, politically ambitious attorney general.  When Robert E. 
Chambliss, one of the original five suspects, faced trial for murder in the Sixteenth Street 
Baptist Church bombing, he was already seventy-three years old.161  The well-publicized, 
quick conviction of Chambliss prompted Birmingham residents and the media to reflect on 
the city’s history of violence.  Within a changed economic and social landscape, a version of 
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the events of 1963 emerged, presenting a familiar refrain of progress and blame that 
smoothed the edges of an unsettled time.   
 Chapter Three 
 
“The Crime Was Against Us, Against the People of Birmingham”:  
The Sixteenth Street Baptist Church Bombing Trial, 1977 
 
 
The fourteen years that elapsed between the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing 
and the Chambliss trial set the stage for reflections by the media, city leaders, and residents 
on the events of 1963 and their meaning for Birmingham.  William J. “Bill” Baxley, the 
attorney general who tried the Chambliss case, recalled, “People today who didn’t live 
through it can’t imagine what it was like [in the early 1960s].  And the ones that can imagine 
want to forget it.”1  A significant number of residents and municipal leaders, including 
Baxley, worked hard to improve the city, in part by promoting an image of progress.  By the 
early 1970s, even the national media recognized “at least some motion towards real change” 
in Birmingham.2  
Concerns over the city’s reputation for racial strife and ability to attract new business 
worried black and white leaders, while the need for federal funds to direct Birmingham’s 
economy away from heavy industry and the equal employment requirements that 
accompanied that money moved the pace of integration forward.  At the same time white 
flight, combined with on-going legal battles and civil rights activism, greatly expanded 
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African American political clout in Birmingham, while urban renewal eroded the tax base. 3  
In the wake of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, expanding civil and social 
guarantees confronted an economic reality rewritten in the class-based ruts laid down by 
segregation laws in the early history of the city.4  It was within this context of economic and 
political transition that the civil rights demonstrations and white resistance of 1963 would be 
remembered and disputed in 1977. 
 
The Economics of Integration and African-American Political Mobilization  
The economic downturn of the late 1960s and 1970s justified the businessmen’s fears 
of urban decline.  As manufacturing and mills abandoned the city, Birmingham failed to 
attract other industries.  In 1963, city leaders, convinced that the medical service industry 
could replace steel, developed expansion plans for the University Hospital, already a large 
employer in the downtown area.5  The University Hospital slowly grew into the University of 
Alabama Medical College and later the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB), a 
graduate and professional degree-granting institution.6  By the Chambliss trial, UAB was the 
largest employer in Birmingham.7    
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UAB may have increased opportunities in the 1970s, but the city’s economy still 
stagnated.  Although Birmingham added 60,000 jobs between 1965 and 1973, a third of these 
were the result of a Census Bureau expansion of metropolitan boundaries; in the same period 
booming Atlanta registered 245,000 new employment opportunities.  New jobs in the 
Birmingham suburbs in the 1970s topped 80,000.8  This lagging downtown economy helped 
to encourage municipal reliance on federal funds, which, by extension, required equal hiring 
and access.  In the 1970s, UAB received most of its funding from federal sources, the highest 
proportion of any medical school in the country.9  
 Urban renewal contributed to black economic hardship and to the creation of the 
Birmingham “inner city.”  Municipal records show that city leaders used federally funded 
highway construction in the 1960s to divide black and white neighborhoods for the purposes 
of de facto school segregation.10  The planning committee ran the interstate through 
traditionally black neighborhoods despite the warnings of one of the chief engineers that this 
would “create slum areas for the entire length of the Interstate System throughout the City of 
Birmingham.”11  In addition to the destruction of black homes by the interstate system, the 
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expansion of UAB displaced nearly ten percent of the city’s total residents, which included 
twenty percent of its black residents.12  The economic slump of the 1970s hit Birmingham’s 
African-American residents hardest, with the loss of manufacturing and steel work 
compounded by the fact that at UAB as of 1970, blacks still held proportionally fewer 
professional and managerial level jobs than whites, while they made up three-fourths of the 
service positions.13   
As business leaders worked to revitalize downtown, the white flight that began in the 
early 1950s escalated.  In the 1960s, ten thousand blacks and thirty thousand whites left the 
economically depressed downtown area, with most whites settling “over the mountain” in the 
emerging planned suburbs of Vestavia, Mountain Brook, and Homewood.14  Attempts by 
forward-looking politicians to annex adjacent suburbs met defeat throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, due in large part to resistance to school desegregation.15  The city’s black population 
rose by twenty-five percent by 1970, while its white population decreased twenty-eight 
percent.  This gap only increased through the seventies, with the result that “blacks and 
whites were more residentially segregated in 1977 than 1970.”16  By the 1970s, surrounding 
                                                                                                                                                  
11Quoted in Maxwell, “Remaking Jim Crow,” 435. 
 
12Scribner, Renewing Birmingham, 123.   
 
13Ibid., 136. 
 
14Ibid., 133-34. 
 
15J. Mills Thornton, III, Dividing Lines: Municipal Politics and the Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002), 365-68.    
 
 
106 
Jefferson County had a larger total population than the city of Birmingham itself, and the 
majority black population that remained suffered what was evaluated in a federal study as the 
second-lowest standard of living of the sixty-five largest cities in the nation.17  This pattern of 
de facto segregation repeated itself in cities throughout the South and the nation, particularly 
in places where heavy industry had dominated the local economy.18 
While some African Americans’ economic situations deteriorated in the years after 
1963, black political power generally grew, in large measure because of the same 
contributing factors.  White flight and urban renewal, along with the growing metropolitan 
black population, gave African-American voters in Birmingham political leverage they had 
not enjoyed before.19  Although the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandated the elimination of 
the poll tax, literacy requirements, and other discriminatory measures, Birmingham moved 
slowly toward black voter registration.  The widespread use of delaying tactics, such as 
opening centers at odd hours or only during weekdays when most working people could not 
visit, prompted the deployment of federal voting examiners in 1966.20  The number of black 
                                                                                                                                                  
16Bobby M. Wilson, “Racial Segregation Trends in Birmingham, Alabama,” Southeastern Geographer 
25 (May 1985): 33; Jerry W. Fly and George R. Reinhart, “Racial Separation During the 1970s: The Case of 
Birmingham,” Social Forces 58 (June 1980): 1255. 
 
17Scribner, Renewing Birmingham, 134, 138. See also Maxwell, “Remaking Jim Crow,” 444.  For a 
detailed look at the intricacies and wide-reaching effects of white flight, see Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: 
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
 
18For treatments of this trend in the North, see especially Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban 
Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and Douglas S. 
Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
 
19Maxwell, “Remaking Jim Crow,” 442-43.  
 
20Thornton, Dividing Lines, 374-75. See also Maxwell, “Remaking Jim Crow,” 423-24. 
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voters rose nevertheless, reinforcing the gains already made by black moderates in their 
alliance with white progressives after 1963.21  
After 1963 a few members of Birmingham’s conservative black leadership gained 
appointments to city boards.  By 1965, well-known leaders such as Arthur Shores served on 
the House Authority Board and other positions of symbolic or strategic importance.22  
Integration requirements attached to War on Poverty programs and federal funding continued 
to open up municipal opportunities.23  African American political participation accelerated 
during the late 1960s.24  Also, in response to concerns about police brutality, Mayor George 
Seibels renewed the lapsed bi-racial discussion group, the Community Affairs Committee.25  
A sincere effort at inter-racial discussion of the city’s problems, the Community Affairs 
Committee became a part of Operation New Birmingham, a civic booster organization 
headed, for the most part, by business leaders and designed to change the city’s negative race 
relations image.26   
                                                
 
21Thornton, Dividing Lines, 377-79.  By 1979, Birmingham had almost reached an African-American 
majority population and electorate.  Edward S. LaMonte, Politics and Welfare in Birmingham 1900-1975 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995), 240. 
 
22Thornton, Dividing Lines, 372.   
 
23LaMonte, Politics and Welfare in Birmingham, 204-11; Thornton, Dividing Lines, 372-73. 
 
24Thornton, Dividing Lines, 378; LaMonte, Politics and Welfare in Birmingham, 193-95. 
 
25Thornton, Dividing Lines, 378. 
 
26Richard Arrington, interview by Jack Bass, tape recording, 18 July 1974, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
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More than an important symbol of change, the Community Affairs Committee also 
served as the springboard for many African Americans into elected office in the late 1960s 
and 1970s.27  Arthur Shores was appointed to the city council in 1969.28  In 1971, Richard 
Arrington joined and Bessie Sears Estelle began her tenure as the third African American to 
serve on the city council in 1975.29  Then, in 1979, as Birmingham’s African-American 
population had almost achieved a voting majority, Richard Arrington became the city’s first 
black mayor.30 
The key to Arthur Shores’s successful bid for a city council seat rested in the 
coalition between the Birmingham Urban League and twenty other African-American local 
groups that pressed for his appointment to an unexpectedly vacant seat.31  Black political 
machines had a long history in the city.  The Jefferson County Progressive Democratic 
Council, for example, was founded in the 1930s and worked to register voters and promote 
the most racially moderate white candidates.32  After the Voting Rights Act, the Council 
                                                
 
27Thornton, Dividing Lines, 378. 
 
28Jimmie Lewis Franklin, Back to Birmingham: Richard Arrington, Jr., and His Times (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1989), 56. 
 
29Thornton, Dividing Lines, 378, 516. 
 
30Franklin, Back to Birmingham, 169-70. 
 
31No author, “Move to Get Negro on Council Pushed,” Birmingham News, 18 November 1968, 
Birmingham, Ala., Police Surveillance Files 1947-80, 1125.2.10, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, 
Birmingham Public Library (hereafter cited as Police Surveillance Files). 
 
32Franklin, Back to Birmingham, 229.  The Council would be officially recognized by the Democratic 
Party and honored with two seats at the National Convention in 1956. Ibid. 
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expanded into the main black political organization in Birmingham, hosting rallies, 
organizing voters, and widely distributing sample ballot voting slates.33  Criticized by some, 
most notably Birmingham World editor Emory O. Jackson as being too conservative and 
representative of the older, moneyed black elite, the Council nevertheless continued as a 
player in Birmingham politics throughout the 1960s and 1970s.34 
Black voting numbers expanded to the point that an ambitious Richard Arrington 
would go on to found his own political mobilization group, the Birmingham-Jefferson 
County Citizens Coalition, in 1977.35  Identifying the need to reach those voters unaffiliated 
with the traditional black middle class, Arrington would use the Coalition to propel himself 
to power, becoming mayor of Birmingham in 1979 and remaining mayor for the next twenty 
years.36  
Just as political networks, both long-established and newly developed, contributed to 
a rising tide of African-American influence in the city, civil rights groups like the Alabama 
Christian Movement for Human Rights and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
continued working through activism and legal channels to affect policy in the city.37  
                                                
 
33Ibid., 229-31.  
 
34Ibid., 230-31, 233.  
 
35Ibid., 232-233.  
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meetings in Birmingham at least through 1969.  See Birmingham Police Department, Inter-Office 
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Birmingham’s need for federal funding pushed the city to open employment opportunity and 
advancement in some areas,38 but these examples of change existed alongside continuing 
resistance to racial equality.  In the late 1960s, for example, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development did not approve a Model Cities Program grant to Birmingham in part 
because the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People refused to endorse 
the project.  Despite some reform efforts, the NAACP objected to what it saw as a lack of 
meaningful black political opportunity in the city.39  Gains co-existed alongside vestiges of 
Jim Crow such as the white and colored water fountain signs that lingered at one 
Birmingham area business through 196940 and continuing state-level maneuvering against 
federally mandated school integration.41 
                                                                                                                                                  
Communication: “Church Meeting,” from Detectives E.V. Sharit and J.C. Wilson, 25 March 1969, 
Birmingham, Ala., Law Department Civil Rights Files and Related Materials, 987.1.28, Department of Archives 
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active political presence in the city, particularly in the fight against police brutality. 
 
38Federal funds contributed almost eight million dollars to the medical center, as well as to 
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operating costs came from federal assistance, up from ten percent in 1965.  Scribner, Renewing Birmingham, 
123, 126, 133, 143, 145. 
 
39Scribner, Renewing Birmingham, 133. 
 
40Milton B. Rubin to Mayor George Seibels, 6 November 1969, George C. Seibels, Jr., Papers, 1963-
1975, 263.20.25, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Birmingham Public Library (hereafter cited as 
Seibels Papers).  Seibels seemed unconcerned about the illegal signage in a cordial letter written to the business 
owner: “I don’t imagine that you have had any complaints from your employees about this and actually if I 
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Evans, 12 November 1969, Seibels Papers, 263.20.25.  
 
41No author, “Teacher Choice Law Challenged in District Court,” Birmingham News, 2 September 
1968, Police Surveillance Files, 1125.2.10.  
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 The first major wave of mass civil rights protests following 1963 came on the heels 
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.42  The NAACP, through the courts, and Reverend Fred 
Shuttlesworth and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in street demonstrations, sought to enforce 
good faith compliance with voter registration requirements.43  This push to increase 
registration hours and locations led to the introduction of federal voting examiners and a 
dramatic increase in the number of black voters–from 42,000 registered in January, 1966, to 
63,000 registered in March, 1967.44  Local Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
officials also joined the national movement for economic justice, leading multiple marches 
and protests in 1968 and 1969, specifically targeting welfare relief and food stamp 
distribution.45  Periodic police brutality protests flared throughout the 1960s and 1970s.46  
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Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth’s group, the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights, 
continued to agitate for the hiring of black police officers and for some official action in the 
Sixteenth Street Bombing case.47  In a wreath-laying ceremony at City Hall in 1968, the 
victims’ families and civil rights leaders protested the lack of prosecutions in the case and 
asserted: “this is where the guilt lies.”48 
Civil rights activism, voter registration drives, and the entrance of established black 
leaders into municipal positions increased African-American political clout in the 1960s and 
1970s.  White flight and deindustrialization reworked downtown Birmingham; however, 
much of the legacy of segregation’s economics remained.  In 1977, the resurfacing of an 
iconic case prompted politicians, the media, and residents to reflect on the tumultuous early 
1960s and the progress of change in the city. 
 
State of Alabama v. Robert E. Chambliss 
“All those instances of violence would make me angry . . . But that one, instead of 
making me angry, it made me sad. . . . That one affected me differently from the others,” 
remembers Bill Baxley, who first learned of the Sixteenth Street Church bombing as a 
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University of Alabama law student.49  Twenty-eight when elected attorney general in 1970, 
and with aspirations for the governorship, Baxley made pursuit of the Sixteenth Street Baptist 
Church bombing case a personal goal.50  Racial justice was a top priority of his tenure.  He 
reopened the Sixteenth Street investigation, as well as several other bombings and murders, 
in 1971.51  Driven by a desire to see Alabama prosecute its race-related crimes, Baxley also 
saw a redemptive value in putting to rest what still symbolized for many the most brutal 
white resistance from the 1960s.  The Atlanta Constitution reported that Baxley “considers 
his crusade against the ‘bombers of Birmingham’ as a means to cleanse a black mark from 
his state’s history.”52  
Although officials had evidence on all four remaining original suspects, the 
prosecution focused on Robert Chambliss.  Chambliss had a long reputation for violence and 
was considered to be the ringleader.  With limited information on the other three, Baxley’s 
office made the decision not to indict them along with Chambliss.  Alabama’s severance laws 
at the time would have allowed each defendant to request a separate trial, and the attorney 
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general’s team might have had to go before a jury with the weakest case first, possibly 
preventing successful prosecution in every case.53  
  The trial began on November 14, 1977.  During jury selection every potential juror 
had heard of the bombing.54  The first witness, former police sergeant Earnest Cantrell, 
testified that the police knew the defendant, Robert Chambliss, as “Dynamite Bob.”  Next 
Reverend John Haywood Cross, then pastor of Sixteenth Street, described the bombing:  
“It sounded like the whole world was shaking.”55  Cross recounted finding the bodies of the 
girls.56  Sarah Collins Riley was also in the basement and described lying blinded in the 
rubble, calling out for her sister.57  Chris McNair, father of one of the victims, gave similarly 
wrenching testimony about seeing his daughter for the last time as she was getting ready for 
Sunday school.58   
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Yet many of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses balked at appearing in court, even 
fourteen years later.  Former civil defense captain James Lay could place Chambliss at the 
church on the night of the bombing; however, he refused to testify, claiming that he had 
amnesia about those events.  Another man who corroborated Lay’s testimony failed to show 
up at court and was nowhere to be found.59  A former girlfriend of Chambliss’s Klan 
confederate was also hostile and afraid, but after being threatened with a subpoena came to 
court and described seeing what appeared to be oversized brown firecrackers in a closet in 
Chambliss’s home.60  Another witness wore a large hat and dark sunglasses while testifying 
in fear of being recognized, despite the fact that she lived in Detroit.61  It was alleged that 
during the grand jury proceedings known Klansman Hubert Allen Page intimidated a 
potential witness outside the courtroom.  That witness took the fifth, declining to testify, and 
the charge against Page was dismissed.62  Although the defense questioned each witness’s 
ability to remember conversations and details fourteen years after the fact, this evidence, 
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along with technical testimony regarding the type of blast and injuries of the victims, began 
to build the case to a crescendo.63 
The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of Elizabeth Cobbs, Chambliss’s 
niece.64  Stepping forward as a surprise witness, Cobbs broke the silence of the many female 
family members of Klansmen who served as FBI informants in the 1960s in the South.65  An 
Episcopal minister at the time of the trial, she quoted what the defense would call “big talk,” 
the threats many segregationists hurled against blacks in 1963.66  Detailing Chambliss’s 
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violent nature and history, Cobbs remembered her uncle railing against the “niggers,” stating 
that he had been “fighting a one-man war since 1942.”67  The week before the Sixteenth 
Street Baptist Church bombing, Chambliss told his niece that he had “enough stuff put away 
to flatten half of Birmingham,” and assured her, “You just wait until after Sunday morning, 
and they will beg us to let them segregate.”68  Other witnesses saw dynamite in the 
Chambliss house or placed him at the scene of the crime, but most damning were his own 
words.69  
The defense team’s strategy consisted of admitting that Chambliss was racist, hateful, 
and sometimes even violent, but denying that he had committed this heinous crime.70  
Defense attorney Arthur Hanes, Jr., working with his father, former mayor of Birmingham 
Arthur Hanes, Sr., called a few character witnesses, then announced that Chambliss would 
take the stand in his own defense.71  Chambliss refused, shaking his head “no” and 
“torpedoing his own defense,” as Hanes later described the scene.  His defense attorney 
realized only then that Chambliss was guilty.72 
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In one of the most riveting moments of the trial, Elizabeth Cobbs described 
Chambliss watching a news report of the bombing, then stating, “It wasn’t meant to hurt 
anybody. It didn’t go off when it was supposed to.”73  These words were an unpleasant 
reminder of the atmosphere of violence tolerated by the city, in which multiple bombings of 
black homes and churches were never investigated.  The jury returned a guilty verdict within 
hours in a trial that lasted less than a week.74 
 
Putting the Past on Trial 
Heralded as “one of the biggest trials ever in Jefferson County,” the Sixteenth Street 
bombing case represented a confrontation with Birmingham’s past, a moment when an 
economically depressed city struggling under the weight of national infamy and failing 
desegregation could try to remake itself.  But as the trial coverage simplified the past, an 
image of 1963 as the moment of the city’s awakening to racial justice issues emerged.  
Furthermore, this narrative attempted to fix civil rights activism and racial prejudice as a 
thing of the past.  The Birmingham News, for example, claimed, “Baxley was aided by the 
new climate in Birmingham, where civil-rights crimes are no longer condoned.”75  From the 
editors’ point of view, the city’s ability to face its history illustrated a change in attitudes; a 
new political playing field in which African-American and liberal white voices held 
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influence also made this conversation possible.  While the trial–the first in which a racial 
killing was successfully prosecuted as murder in Alabama–did represent a historic step 
forward, this sense of false closure obscured on-going civil rights issues and activism in the 
city, as well as continuing questions of racial justice.76 
The jury’s response to Chambliss reflected the desire of many in Birmingham to 
condemn the racist past he symbolized.  Chambliss’s segregationist stance reflected extreme, 
but in some circles socially acceptable, sentiments in 1963; by 1977, however, they were a 
bad memory to most of black and white Birmingham.  His militant racist attitude was now 
taboo.  Yet residue of the past remained, even in the courthouse hallways during the trial, as 
all-white and all-black groups clustered together in discussion and a known Klansman 
recently accused of intimidating a witness lurked.77  And while the bombing represented “a 
symbol of the violent and bitter era,” in media coverage Chambliss himself came to 
symbolize the white racism of the past in a simplistic, concrete way that belied the multiple 
facets of segregationist thought and violence in support of the racial status quo that persisted 
well into the 1970s.78  
After his conviction, Robert Chambliss turned to his lawyers and said, “It’s a shame 
to put all this on a seventy-three-year-old man.”79  Chambliss symbolized the “small band of 
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men” blamed by most white leaders for the bombing in 1963.80  Despised by the affluent, 
more sophisticated, but not necessarily less racist white majority, Chambliss typified the 
“poor white trash” politicians often accused of inciting the violence of the 1950s and 1960s.  
Poorly educated and an ardent segregationist, Chambliss lived in one of the formerly all-
white working-class areas near downtown most affected by desegregation and the African-
American housing expansion.  Active in the Ku Klux Klan since at least 1946, Chambliss 
was implicated in or associated with many of the residential bombings in Fountain Heights.81  
Known as “Dynamite Bob” to the police, Chambliss had been arrested for “flogging a black 
man while wearing a hood,” but never for any bombings, although he had a suspected role in 
dozens in residential areas since the 1950s.82  Chambliss had been on the city payroll at one 
point, with suspicious ties to Bull Connor that went beyond his duties as a municipal 
mechanic.83  Chambliss was eventually fired from his job with the city for engaging in well-
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publicized acts of violence.84  After testifying before the grand jury regarding the Sixteenth 
Street bombing in 1977, Chambliss attacked a black television cameraman, although the 
victim did not press charges.85   Representing in 1977 what one editorial writer called “a part 
of our past which many people would just as soon not remember,” this old man came to 
symbolize an outmoded form of racism as the media put Birmingham’s past on trial.86  
Klan-police collusion would become the dominant trope of the 1977 trial.  As 
Baxley’s investigations into the Sixteenth Street bombing came to a head, allegations of Klan 
involvement with the Birmingham police department during the 1960s sparked an 
investigation by the city.  In December 1975, Gary Thomas Rowe, an FBI informant, 
testified before a Senate Intelligence Committee about violent Klan activity during the early 
1960s.87  In his Senate testimony, Rowe stated that the Birmingham police had an agreement 
with the Ku Klux Klan on Mother’s Day, 1961, and deliberately did not respond to the report 
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of violence against the Freedom Riders at the Trailways Bus Terminal until fifteen minutes 
later–the prearranged length of time.88  In response to these accusations, then mayor David 
Vann began investigations of the police department, but was stalled because of incomplete 
city records and requested the FBI’s files from this period.89  These events renewed public 
interest in the Sixteenth Street bombing case, and Mayor Vann asserted that the “FBI files 
could be the key in unlocking some of the continuing mysteries remaining from 
Birmingham’s racial strife of the early 1960s.”90  This earnest attempt by Vann to examine 
the police corruption of the past set the tone for the narrative of civic progress that would 
emerge from the bombing trial. 
In fact, speculation swirled during the trial that Chambliss might implicate the police 
department and in particular Bull Connor in the vigilante violence of that period.91  
Conflicting accounts suggest that Chambliss’s nephew, Floyd Garrett, a Birmingham Police 
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Officer, was either involved directly in the bombing or knew of his uncle’s participation.92  
While no definitive proof of police-bomber conspiracy surfaced during the Chambliss trial, 
early 1960s police-Klan cooperation had become a kind of acknowledged fact by 1977.  This 
once unspeakable critique of the power structure became so widely known that by 1983 
Birmingham native and New York Times reporter Howell Raines freely characterized the city 
as having “a police tradition of tolerance for the Klan,” where Chambliss and the other most 
violent Klansmen “were well known to the police through all the years of ‘unsolved’ 
bombings leading up to 16th Street.  FBI records show that the bureau took police-Klan 
collusion as an accepted fact during those years.”93   
Newspaper coverage of the trial blamed the police department for the unsolved case 
in the 1960s, while congratulating present-day Birmingham on bringing the case to trial.  By 
pointed its finger at the 1963 police department and Bull Connor, the media also effectively 
transferred blame to an older, “more racist” version of Birmingham.  Connor, like Chambliss, 
was a symbol of the most violent kind of resistance to desegregation, easily dismissed as the 
exception.  When the trial provoked questions of blame, the already tarnished reputation of 
the police department was easily targeted.   
The police of 1963 symbolized Birmingham’s racism and provided a concrete 
measure of how much the city had changed.  This examination of past police corruption 
pushed the focus off controversies over current police brutality and black police hiring.  
Charges of police brutality and insufficient disciplinary action against perpetrating officers 
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persisted throughout the late 1970s, although black officers had been allowed to join the 
police force in fairly substantial numbers after 1972.94  City Councilman Richard Arrington 
based much of his successful 1979 mayoral campaign on outrage over the continuing police 
violence.95  Although in 1977 news reports could celebrate the conviction of Chambliss, 
“aided by the new climate in Birmingham,” the focus on an older, more racist Birmingham in 
public discussions helped to gloss over continuing instances of violence perpetrated against 
the black community by or with the tacit approval of law enforcement.  While the police of 
the 1960s were blamed as corrupt or complicit in the closed investigation, the 1977 police 
were reported as cooperating fully with Baxley’s investigation and received a commendation 
from the mayor and city council for their work.96 
But the question remained: who was to blame for the delay in prosecution?  When 
Baxley and his investigators took up the bombing case, it had lain officially dormant for only 
three years.  The FBI ended its work on September 15, 1968, at the expiration of the federal 
statute of limitations.  Someone close to the case speculated that the FBI believed a 
conviction could not be obtained in Birmingham in the mid-1960s.97  In contrast, a 1980 
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Department of Justice Report maintained that while the local FBI agents felt confident about 
the case, including a near certainty that a white jury would find guilt because of the heinous 
nature of the crime, Hoover personally blocked prosecution and intentionally kept 
information about the case from the Justice Department.98  Former local FBI agent Melton L. 
Alexander disputed the assertion that Hoover somehow stopped the prosecution.  Rather, he 
says, key informants were unwilling to come forward and therefore the case could not go to 
trial.99  Another individual close to the case agreed that, despite the desire to close the case, 
the need to protect witnesses and confidentiality agreements hamstrung the prosecution.100  
Most likely a decision from the FBI’s top brass delayed the investigation due to evidentiary 
issues including uncooperative witnesses, dubious wiretaps, unsavory informants, and local 
police corruption.  
The attorney general’s office faced a case in which key pieces of physical evidence 
had gone missing as they passed through the hands of both the FBI and local law 
enforcement offices.101  Concerns regarding Alabama and Birmingham police corruption 
during the original investigation surfaced.102  Although Baxley, with his usual bravado, 
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declared, “We know who did it,” when the investigation became public in 1976, it had taken 
years to piece together a case for prosecution.103  Gaining access to the FBI’s files proved to 
be the most difficult part of the process.  Interdepartmental jealousies, a long-standing 
suspicion of Klan involvement in local law enforcement, and potentially illegal or poorly 
judged tactics within the federal investigation prompted stonewalling on the part of the FBI.  
Only after years of intense pressure did the bureau release the files, and Baxley’s office never 
had access to all of them.104   
FBI inaction on the case provided a convenient explanation for the long delay.  The 
News reported that Baxley’s team had been “stymied” by the Justice Department and the 
FBI.105  When Bill Baxley revealed that, throughout the early 1970s, the FBI had been 
unwilling to release its files on key suspects, the newspapers began to lay blame on the 
federal agency as well.  Explaining the FBI’s four-year hesitation, Baxley suggests,  “[t]hey 
had some justifiable fears about coordinating with Alabama authorities on racial cases, 
because Alabama authorities had thrown up roadblocks in the past.“106  Retired Police 
Captain Maurice House, however, openly condemned the FBI for the delay, stating, “[t]he 
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FBI certainty withheld information from the Birmingham Police Department, . . . I learned of 
those witnesses for the first time this week reading newspaper stories about the trial.”107  
Even as individuals and the newspapers attempted to blame an outside agency, charges of 
FBI stonewalling always led back to concerns about local Klan-police involvement.  Bob 
Eddy, an investigator for Baxley, explained that at that time in Birmingham there had been 
an atmosphere of fear so pervasive that some witnesses were still afraid to testify in 1977.108  
Directly condemning the former police force, Eddy stated, “[t]here were known Klansmen 
and Klan sympathizers in the Birmingham Police Department.  People were afraid of 
reprisals.”109   
 While the narrative surrounding the trial candidly engaged questions of past police 
corruption, the unsettled and contested events of 1963 emerged as a simplified moment of 
progress and the beginning of reform.  While other News articles positioned the bombing as 
the finale to “a time of increasing racial unrest, . . . what came to be known as Birmingham’s 
longest and hottest summer,” the main editorial on the verdict carefully avoided discussing 
the atmosphere of violence surrounding desegregation in the early 1960s, instead 
emphasizing the effect of the bombing on the community as a whole:  
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The first-degree murder conviction of Robert E. Chambliss for the 1963 
bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church which took the lives of four 
young black girls brings with it an unashamed sense of relief.  
It is a feeling of justice long overdue, not a feeling of vindication for a proud 
city or retribution for its citizens. 
It is not a triumph over the evil of one man or the sorrow over his misfortune, 
but the easing of a nagging civic frustration which makes the verdict 
important.110 
 
Creating an image of all of Birmingham waiting anxiously for the verdict, this editorial 
echoes other characterizations of “the bombing and deaths” as having “haunted the city for 
the past fourteen years.”111  The editorial’s denial that this trial could be “retribution for its 
citizens,” points to the perception of the bombing as a crime perpetrated by a few militants 
against a blameless larger community.112  
 Although the editorial attempted not to explicitly engage race or the context of 
desegregation and resistance in which the bombing occurred, the stilted language and race-
neutral phrasing belies this stance.  The “nagging civic frustration,” a strangely neutral and 
emotionless phrase, was not the unsolved murder and terror bombing, but rather the effect of 
that unsolved status on the “proud city” and the image that its leaders had been fighting to re-
enervate since 1963.  In this way, the pinpointing of blame could bring an “unashamed sense 
of relief” that cryptically ignored fourteen years of delay.  Emphasizing the validity of the 
State’s case, the editorial saw the verdict handed down “perhaps in a more relaxed and 
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objective environment than would have been possible fourteen years-ago.”113  The editors’ 
choice of “relaxed” and “objective” without explicitly mentioning school desegregation 
minimizes the white resistance that produced the bombing.  Talking around but never about 
the integration crisis allowed city leaders to construct this trial as a singular moment of 
recompense for an isolated crime, removed from the desegregation conflicts that remained 
unresolved through the 1970s.  Rather than examining the atmosphere of racial injustice in 
1963 or the uneven process of racial equity, local newspapers shifted attention to readily 
available symbols of past racism.  
When forced to engage race, the editorial framed the bombing as a moment of change 
in the attitudes of the (assumed white) community, asserting, “Not one trial or a dozen will 
make up for the death of four innocent children who died in the bombing.  But out of the 
terrible tragedy of 1963 was born a new appreciation for the value of human life.”114  This 
reference to white resistance allowed the editorial to position the bombing as a wake-up call 
for white Birmingham, not only in the sense of the standard trope of the bombing as the 
catalyst for the civil rights movement, but seemingly as a more basic realization of the value 
of black life and the unacceptable nature of violence in defense of the racial status quo.  
Another News editorial after the bombing characterized the crime as having “stained 
Birmingham’s conscience ever since.”115  Yet the “darkest chapter in this city’s history,” 
would “finally galvanize[] the good people of this community into taking back their city from 
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a small band of terrorists.”116  And the verdict in this case signaled the continuing progress of 
the city: “In a way the verdict restored Birmingham’s reputa[t]ion.  Chambliss would not 
have been convicted in the days of naked bigotry.”117   
 In fact, media coverage of the trial presented the events of the early 1960s in 
Birmingham as the image of racial progress that the leaders in 1963 struggled to project.  
Describing the change of government as prompted by white voters’ change of heart regarding 
the current city commission’s militant stance on desegregation, one News article 
characterizes the new government as “more moderate” and as “correcting many of the 
problems blacks found in Birmingham,” implying a more accelerated time table on 
desegregation than was evidenced in 1963.118  Acknowledging continued bombing in the late 
summer and the disagreements between civil rights and local leaders, the article then depicts 
Birmingham as attempting to peacefully integrate its schools while being thwarted by 
Wallace and National States’ Rights Party members.119  While the context of white resistance 
is front and center, the article focuses that resistance onto the most outspoken 
segregationists–Wallace, Connor, Lingo–reiterating city leaders’ position at the time while 
obscuring wider resistance and community culpability. 
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News coverage emphasized the validity of the city’s progressive image by making the 
trial itself and public discussions surrounding it proof of that progress.  This image of the 
city’s past on trial allowed for some frank analysis of the politics of the 1960s.  However, it 
also narrowed the discourse on race relations and legal equity to those years only, ultimately 
succeeding in reaffirming the current justice system without really addressing the fourteen-
year delay in the Sixteenth Street bombing case. 
Acutely aware that “virtually world attention [would] be focused” on Birmingham, 
reporters consistently contrasted current trial publicity to the national horror at the bombing 
fourteen years earlier.120  In fact, the Birmingham News reported that many of the over thirty 
national reporters at the trial had previously reported on the events of the early 1960s.121  
Calling the bombing “one of the country’s major unsolved crimes,” the media emphasized 
the importance of the bombing trial for Birmingham’s national reputation.122  One Associated 
Press report began, “‘So much depends on the outcome of this trial,’” quoting a retired 
teacher who attended the event, “‘Birmingham is so vulnerable now.  We’ve come so far 
since the 1960s.  Now the whole world is watching.’”123  Arriving in the wake of the Rowe 
Senate testimony and subsequent police corruption investigation, national attention could 
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serve as just another episode of bad publicity or as a signal of Birmingham’s progress, proof 
of its ability to renew its reputation and qualify to join the New South. 
Still, the local paper heralded the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing trial as 
“restor[ing] Birmingham’s reputation.”124  Despite Baxley’s insistence that his office would 
pursue other suspects in this and other unsolved racially motivated bombings, his conviction 
of Chambliss would be the final word on the bombing until 2001.125  With this assertion of 
closure Birmingham leaders could reposition the city within the national narrative of the civil 
rights movement.  While Birmingham had always been recognized as one of the key sites of 
the movement, white resistance dominated its national reputation.  Commentators at the time 
often characterized the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing as “a symbol of the violent 
and bitter era,” with “[the] national outrage it sparked contribut[ing] to the congressional 
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”126  By embracing the bombing trial, Birmingham 
could effectively try its own past, and finding its older self guilty, point to progress made and 
position itself as successfully fulfilling the promises of equality, if a little late.   
After a span of fourteen years, whites and blacks in Birmingham remembered the 
early 1960s as the beginning of welcome changes in the city.  The civil rights demonstrations 
of 1963 were described as “blacks who were insisting on their rights” rather than an “affront 
to the white community” as originally depicted.127  Now an “All-American City,” 
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Birmingham had learned the lessons of a violent past it could no longer deny.  The bombing 
stood as a turning point in the city’s history, a horrific act that shocked Birmingham into 
desegregation.  Because of the trial, in 1977 the Birmingham News could look back at the 
half-hearted attempts to desegregate in 1963 and proclaim that “after the new government 
took office on May 15, [1963] … [it] began correcting many of the problems blacks found in 
Birmingham,”128 emphasizing symbolic moments of renewal and assertions of change over 
an acknowledgment of current racial justice concerns.  While many in the city did begin 
slowly to push desegregation into motion after 1963, this optimistic characterization rings 
somewhat false.  Media characterizations and residents’ hopes that this trial could close the 
door on that period or somehow exonerate the city seemed unrealistic.  Bending the 1960s 
and 1970s into an unbroken success story of progress in race relations necessarily denied on-
going civil rights challenges and activists’ work, while trying to force closure on a crime and 
a time period that would not simply remain in the past.   
Birmingham residents contested the crafted media narrative, questioning specifically 
the long delay in prosecution and the trial’s cultural function as a symbol of progress.  Mrs. 
Alvin Robertson, mother of one of the girls killed, rejoiced, concluding that the verdict, “kind 
of renews my faith in people and in Birmingham.”129  Reverend John Cross, minister at the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in 1963, said, “I breathed a sigh of relief that after fourteen 
years, someone has finally been convicted.”  Expressing a belief held by many African 
Americans in Birmingham that no one would ever be prosecuted, he continued, “I thought I’d 
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be ready to go on to glory when that happened, but now, I’m just ready for somebody to dig 
up some more dirt.”130  Addressing the intervening fourteen years, Reverend James Crutcher, 
the current Sixteenth Street minister, said, “It makes us feel afraid when our justice 
departments don’t follow through quickly.”131  For those individuals directly affected by the 
tragedy, the unsolved crime symbolized a long-standing denial of legal justice to African 
Americans in Birmingham.  Furthermore, the refusal of city leaders to honestly engage the 
reasons for the fourteen-year delay and the lack of prosecution in the many other bombing 
cases remained a source of hurt and confusion.  
Many white residents resented the renewed publicity surrounding the case.  They 
believed that drawing attention to the long delay reflected badly on Birmingham’s civic 
image and accused Baxley of unearthing the case solely for personal political gain.132  In fact, 
Baxley believed the Chambliss trial contributed to his defeat in the gubernatorial election just 
after the trial.133  He recalled the chilly reception he received from some whites while 
campaigning: “Every day, every town, every plant gate, a dozen people a day, at least, would 
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not shake hands or would say, ‘I would have voted for you, I liked you, I thought you were 
my kind, but you put that old man in jail.’”134   
Many whites, including some of his friends, condemned Baxley for promoting a 
reexamination of Birmingham’s negative past, afraid that he was rekindling the racial 
animosity of that time.  Baxley remembered many whites asking him, “Why are you doing 
this civil rights case? Why are you dragging this up?”135  Trying to frame the case as a matter 
of simple justice, he answered, “Look, if four little white girls were picked up and murdered, 
then you would want that case pursued to the ends of the earth so you could find a murderer 
that killed those little girls.  Now why can’t you feel that way about this murder?  What is it 
about good people like you?”136  This was more than just a murder case, however; freighted 
with symbolism from a dramatic and contested time, this trial’s long-delay pointed to 
uncomfortable realities about the level of acceptable violence in support of the racial status 
quo in 1963 and the justice system’s continuing inequalities in the interim. The long-delay 
necessarily called into account the fourteen years that had passed and questioned the 
assurances of progress and change in the city.  
Others saw the conviction not as actual redemption of the city’s reputation, but rather 
as an attempt by current prosecutors and politicians to rid the city of an embarrassing high-
profile unsolved case.  After the verdict, defense attorney Art Hanes, Jr., said, “I hope the 
verdict was reached for the right reason. . . . People wanted to believe there was a new case.  
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They wanted and hoped it would be solved.”137  On appeal Hanes asserted that Chambliss 
represented “a scapegoat to purge the collective consciousness of the people.”138  
Chambliss’s defense attorney was not the only one to question the strength of the state’s 
evidence and the motivations of the jury.  Another article reported that Macon Weaver, 
former Birmingham-based U.S. attorney, “thinks part of the reason the jury found Chambliss 
guilty is that it shared a common feeling that the notorious case should be dealt with and the 
situation laid to rest.”139  To acknowledge this kind of need for resolution draws the 
intervening years into focus.  Yet, despite these lingering doubts, media coverage did not 
often question Chambliss’s guilt or his function as a symbol of the racist past.140 
In the Chambliss trial closing statement, Baxley emphasized the effect of the 
bombing, “When that blast went off . . . it was truly a bomb heard round the world.  The 
crime was against us, against the people of Birmingham and the state of Alabama.”141  
Echoing Mayor Boutwell’s immediate response to the bombing, “We are all victims, and 
most of us innocent victims,” even Baxley tried to work within the framework of civic 
progress, portraying the entire city, not just the four girls killed, as the victim of the crime.142  
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In many ways, the city did suffer under the weight of a national reputation for segregationist 
violence because of this unsolved bombing, despite the efforts of some to implement 
desegregation and greater equality.  Many of Birmingham’s residents, both black and white, 
were tired of living under the shadow of a violent reputation.  For some, the trial and 
subsequent public discussion represented progress and would help push the city forward; for 
others, particularly in the white community, silence, an old mode of resistance, promised 
peace if nothing else.   
By reexamining the past and assigning culpability to symbols of an older, now 
defunct racism, Birmingham newspapers, residents, and politicians consciously engaged a 
painful part of their history in a way that should not be discounted.  The economic realities of 
integration, on-going civil rights struggles, and lingering questions over the fourteen-year 
delay, however, defied attempts to designate the civil rights movement as something merely 
in the past.  By 1977, Birmingham had become “All American,” joining cities throughout the 
nation as new urban landscapes of race codified through white flight and deindustrialization 
developed.  While the service industry centered on the University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Medical Center flourished, few blue-collar jobs replaced the almost completely defunct steel 
mills, leaving a large majority of blacks without the resources to enjoy the expansion of 
opportunities promised in the civil rights legislation of the 1960s.  As Chris McNair, then 
active in local politics, characterized this quandary: “You can sit down and buy a meal 
anywhere you want–if you can afford a meal.”143  The structures of discrimination in 
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Birmingham, freighted with the legacies of steel economics and reshaped to a new social 
order that remained predicated on race, belied the sense of closure surrounding the trial. 
Chapter Four 
 
“The Healing of a City By Design”: The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute  
 
In 1998 the family of Addie Mae Collins, one of the victims of the Sixteenth Street 
Baptist Church bombing, discovered that her body was not underneath her headstone in 
Birmingham’s Greenwood Cemetery.1  Greenwood, also called Woodlawn, is one of the 
oldest black cemeteries in Birmingham and contains the graves of many prominent residents, 
including three of the four girls killed in the bombing.  Portions of the site were condemned 
for airport expansion in the early 1970s and ownership questions left it abandoned and in 
disrepair in the 1980s.2  Volunteer groups attempted to maintain the site and involve the city 
and the public, but little was accomplished.  By the mid-1990s, even the most dedicated 
concerned individuals abandoned their attempts due to the atrocious conditions that included 
illegal burials and open graves.3  Although in 1995 the City Council spent $60,000 for clean-
up, spurred on by comments from Fred Shuttlesworth and others during the National Baptist 
Convention’s meeting in the city, vandalism and the quick work of nature continued to batter 
                                                
1Chanda Temple, “Headstone of Girl Killed in 63 Bombing Marks An Empty Plot,” Birmingham 
News, 13 January 1998, 1B.   
 
2Val Walton, “Open Graves and Apathy: Abandoned Cemetery A Historical Eyesore,” Birmingham 
News, 19 April 1994, 1.   Denise McNair is buried in Shadowlawn Cemetery in Birmingham. Carla Caldwell, 
“Weeds Covering Graves of Church-Bombing Victims,” Birmingham News, 18 September 1994, 13. 
 
 
3Carla Caldwell, “Weeds Grow Over Neglected Graves: Greenwood/Woodlawn Cemetery Remains a 
Mess Despite Cleanup,” Birmingham News, 26 September 1996, 1B.   
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the cemetery.4  When the Collins family attempted to move Addie Mae’s remains to another 
cemetery in town, they found that her headstone marked only an empty grave.5  All funeral 
home records had been lost in a fire, and so despite multiple attempts, including the use of a 
radar expert, Addie Mae’s body has not yet been located.6 
At periodic anniversaries of the bombing or when the case returned to public 
discussion—such as the arrival of Spike Lee to film a documentary in 1996—attention 
focused on the overgrown state of the cemetery.  One local woman attending a remembrance 
service for the bombing commented, “It seems like nobody even knows this place is here.  
It’s forgotten.  That seems to say to me that these girls died for nothing in one aspect.”7  The 
subsequent year, around the anniversary of the bombing, another native Birminghamian felt 
moved to write a newspaper editorial about his father and brother’s work tending the three 
girls’ graves one Sunday in September, describing it as an act of penance and explaining his 
                                                
 
 
4Caldwell, “Weeds Grow Over Neglected Graves,” 1B; Joe Nabbefeld, “Mayor, Council Start Effort 
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own “scar of grief” from the tragedy.8  The Collins family, through their attorney, expressed 
the sentiment that the city should join with the family in establishing some sort of permanent 
memorial for Addie Mae.  Her older sister, Janie Gaines, explained, “We don’t want her to be 
forgotten.”9   
In the late 1970s politicians in Birmingham began working to establish a civil rights 
memorial but for years funding issues, lack of public support, and eventually a major 
contracting scandal threatened to derail the project.  By the late 1990s, however, Birmingham 
had dedicated its Civil Rights Institute, a multi-million dollar facility devoted to showcasing 
the city’s civil rights past.  Located at the corner of Sixteenth Street and Sixth Avenue North, 
across from the rebuilt church and the park that staged the mass demonstrations of 1963, the 
Institute presented a dramatic narrative of the civil rights story with Birmingham at its center 
and represented, by its very presence on the downtown landscape, a shifting of political 
power and priorities.  The Institute presented one version of Birmingham’s civil rights past, a 
simplified narrative of reform echoing themes first promulgated by politicians in 1963 and 
revised in the 1977 bombing trial.  Yet because of the crime’s unsolved status, 
memorialization of the bombing and its victims remained a contested part of the city’s 
history.   Wilhelmenia Anchrum, who led the effort to preserve and restore Greenwood 
Cemetery, wondered how Birmingham could spend millions to create the Civil Rights 
Institute but resist taking on upkeep of the graves of the girls.10 
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The image of these overgrown graves in an abandoned cemetery struck a cord with a 
wide swath of residents.  Memorials—here the most basic, a tended grave—have the power 
to reflect our appreciation of the past and our priorities in the present.  Especially after the 
creation of the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute, the neglect of the graves of these three 
girls seemed shameful, as if the city itself had failed somehow in safeguarding their memory.  
Linked to this seeming public dereliction of duty was the unresolved status of the bombing 
case itself—how could this crime, like ownership of the graveyard, have fallen through the 
cracks?  Even after the 1992 opening of the Institute, heralded as “The Healing of a City By 
Design,”11 questions continued to bubble up regarding the unsolved status of the bombing 
case, memorialization and its goals, and the interaction of individual identity and collective 
memory. 
 
To Tell Its Own Story: Creating a Civil Rights Museum in Birmingham  
The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute took thirteen years to complete.12  David 
Vann, a key negotiator of the agreement between civil rights leaders and the white business 
community in spring 1963, served as mayor in the late 1970s.  He originated the idea for a 
civil rights museum in Birmingham.  Dr. Edward LaMonte, Birmingham-Southern professor 
and member of the original Institute task force, remembers: “David Vann had made the 
comment at least in 1978 . . . that the sidewalks from Sixteenth Street Baptist Church to 
Birmingham City Hall are, roughly his words were, as sacred to this country as the 
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battlefields of Gettysburg and Valley Forge.”13  Inspired by a trip to Yad Vashem, Israel’s 
Holocaust memorial, Vann thought that a civil rights museum would benefit the city in terms 
of racial reconciliation as well as tourist dollars.14  A hard-fought mayoral election and lack 
of funds tabled the project for several years.  And although in 1981 Richard Arrington 
appointed a study committee to assist in the creation and design of the museum, historian 
Glenn Eskew characterizes the new mayor’s response to the idea as tepid at best, citing city 
council and civic group pressure as finally spurring the first steps.15  
Although charged with designing a “civil rights museum,” the initial planning 
taskforce instead developed the concept of a civil rights institute.  Leader in Institute 
planning and its first president Odessa Woolfolk recalls, “we decided that the word ‘institute’ 
would certainly clearly define how we envisioned this place.  ‘Institute’ suggests dynamism, 
learning.  ‘Museum’ suggests mausoleum.”16  Instead of a museum, the Institute was to be a 
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Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
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“learning institution” that would consist of the central displays as well as educational 
programming, school curriculum development, archives, cultural programming, an oral 
history project, a website, and on-going conferences and exhibits.  LaMonte described the 
Institute’s ambitious educational mission: “It will be a kind of community school or 
university where people can come and learn.”17  Woolfolk invoked this broad agenda, 
stating: “But we didn’t want to end our mission with merely telling the story of what 
happened in the past.  We wanted to see what lessons had been learned.  Therefore, we chose 
as our theme, our tag line, ‘Inspired by the Past, A Vision for the Future.’”18   
 The members of the task force designed the Institute to reframe the city’s civil rights 
history by reorienting it to a progressive present and showcasing local organizing and 
movement activity rather than violent white resistance.  Woolfolk emphasizes this as she 
detailed the exhibits: “Then we would go chronologically, the idea being that this was a 
victorious movement, that people’s efforts, struggles, and bravery made our community, and 
indeed the world, a better place.”  She continues, “Ultimately it was hope, and it was 
celebrating courageous people while showing warts and all in terms of the struggle, but 
showing basically in the end that courage paid off.”19  Redesigning the city’s civil rights 
history as a message of hope ratified the “image of reform” so eagerly sought by city leaders 
since the 1960s.   
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After the study committee’s initial report outlining design, financial, and legal 
considerations for what was now conceptualized as a multi-purpose educational institute, 
Arrington took no action on the project until 1985, after the biracial civic group Operation 
New Birmingham and the state legislature evidenced intense interest in the value of 
packaging and presenting the area’s civil rights past.20  Political motivations—the perceived 
animosity of key white voters to a civil rights museum project—likely helped to slow the 
pace.21  Wrangling over local control of planning and presentation of the exhibits contributed 
to the delay.22  And the problem of how to fund the twelve million dollars projected for the 
Institute also remained a problem.23  
Citywide vote defeated two bond proposals which included funding for the Institute, 
one in 1986 and another in 1989, attesting to a sustained lack of public support for the 
concept.24  However, the first bond proposal required a $5 million tax increase to fund the 
city’s bond initiative of $65 million, $10 million of which would go to the Institute with the 
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rest funding schools, parks, sidewalks, and sewers.25  While some residents came out against 
the idea of a civil rights museum, others attempted to torpedo the bond initiative because it 
required additional taxation.26  While defeat of the first bond proposal likely does indicate 
some negative attitudes toward the concept of a civil rights museum, the city’s strapped 
finances due to a downturn in federal government funding for cities, as well as general voter 
apathy, likely contributed.27  
Despite the long incubation period and questions by some about the mayor’s 
commitment to the Institute, Woolfolk remembers Arrington as “unstoppable” in his 
commitment to secure funding.28  In 1986, Arrington was able to use a “quasi-public entity,” 
the Historical Preservation Authority, to borrow on the city’s credit and then sold the old 
Social Security Administration building downtown to fund the exhibit design and 
construction.29  By this time the original task force had evolved into the first board of 
directors, headed by Odessa Woolfolk.30  The board worked with Joseph A. Wetzel and 
Associates to shape the exhibits designed by American History Workshop and to begin 
additional fundraising, even hiring professionals to solicit contributions.31  Boosterism by 
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Woolfolk in particular eventually persuaded one or two key white businessmen of the 
museum’s potential to enhance the city’s national reputation.  LaMonte describes the leading 
fundraiser, Herb Sklenar, CEO of Vulcan Materials, as “open to the possibility that the civil 
rights program could be more than a project of a black mayor for his black constituents, that 
it could really be an identifying project of Birmingham’s.”32  He credits Sklenar for 
recruiting corporate sponsorship and taking an active role in Institute planning, reviewing 
exhibit designs and helping to craft the mission statement.33  Although corporate sponsorship 
arrived too late to assist in the construction of the museum itself, it pushed the adjoining 
galleries and other parts of the Institute to completion.34   
Considering the business community’s historic investment in the image of reform, 
one might expect an enthusiastic response to an official representation of the city’s history 
underwritten by corporate sponsorship.  Yet some white businessmen resisted the idea of 
presenting what to them seemed only an embarrassing past.  Despite this initial reluctance, 
today LaMonte and Woolfolk assert the Institute is often used by local businesses as a 
recruiting tool, a way to show out-of-towners that the city of Birmingham is progressive and 
has changed.35 
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As construction began, city-hired minority contractors affiliated with the Institute 
embroiled Arrington in a U.S. Attorney General’s office and Internal Revenue Service 
investigation into embezzlement.36  This investigation would result in fines and federal 
prison time for one of the Institute consultants, with the mayor named as an unindicted co-
conspirator and eventually cleared of all charges.37  Some whites used the minority 
contracting scandal to challenge the idea of a civil rights museum as another special project 
of a corrupt mayor for his black constituents.  Woolfolk remembers: “Then you had on the 
side of naysayers a group in the town who felt that the Arrington administration and his staff 
were not good stewards of public taxes anyway, that their priorities weren’t the best priorities 
in the minds of the naysayers.  So let’s not entrust them with more money to do yet another 
‘wasteful’ project.”38  
At the heart of the stalemate over funding were questions of collective memory, 
identity, and power.  Woolfolk remembers various members of the black and white 
communities disagreeing with the plan for a museum at all.  Although she asserts in a recent 
interview that “the majority of the population was either silent or in favor of the project,” 
Woolfolk cited logistical concerns such as whether Birmingham had enough physical 
artifacts and documents to justify a civil rights museum separate from the public library 
archives and whether the city’s black residents would be better served by spending that 
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money on public services for poorer neighborhoods.  After the defeat of the first bond 
proposal, Woolfolk also noted opposition from some in the black community who “don’t 
want to remember what’s traumatic in their history.”39  Some whites also echoed this sense 
that a painful past is best left alone, focusing not on the lingering effects of trauma but rather 
on how a museum might reinvigorate the negative image of the city.  Woolfolk recalls: 
“Many voices said, ‘Look, why on earth would Birmingham, Alabama, perpetuate the thing 
about us that we’re trying to hide from?  The Yankee press, electronic and print, are forever 
telling us how awful we used to be, and by implication how awful we still are.  So why 
would we want to pay tribute to that?’”40  
The former director of the art museum, Richard Murray, admitted that the Institute 
“may be a controversial idea in Birmingham.”  However, from his new vantage point at the 
Smithsonian Institute archives in Washington, D.C., he believed that “outside of 
Birmingham, people would come to a civil rights museum there,” due to the symbolic power 
of that negative reputation in the national imagination.41  Opponents perceived that the 
solidification of the city’s still contentious civil rights history was really at stake.  With the 
election of Richard Arrington in 1979 many in the white community began to see the 
palpable effects of white flight and divestment in the city as black political power grew.  
Resistance from the white community shocked LaMonte during the Institute’s initial stages: 
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“I’ve been surprised by the vehemence of some whites in saying, ‘Don’t bring that up.’”42  
And looking back, he remembered: “It was almost unanimously opposed by the white 
business community and the white community.”43  This tension between remembering and 
forgetting, as well as the power structure’s inability to renew the city’s image remained a 
constant theme in Birmingham’s history from 1963 to the 1990s.  Yet David Vann, the 
originator of the museum idea, thought that a civil rights memorial could serve both as a 
reminder of the past and as a way to contain and control that past.  Vann maintained,  “the 
best way to get rid of bad history is to declare it history and put it in a museum.”44   
Yet the creation of the Institute did not close the chapter on the city’s civil rights 
history.  As former president Edward LaMonte said, “It is a physical reminder of our past and 
of the challenges that we continue to face.  It’s always there.  It doesn’t ever go away.”45  
Woolfolk envisioned the Institute as a new focal point for identity in the city and insisted 
residents hoped it would serve a reconciling function.46  The heavy symbolic weight of a civil 
rights museum on Birmingham’s civic landscape indicated a celebration of the civil rights 
struggle and a confirmation of the structural resistance the movement sought to overcome.  
Yet as initial reluctance among some residents and the varied reactions to the completed 
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Institute illustrate, even the fixing of an official version of the city’s civil rights past could 
not end the long-standing debates over its continued meaning. 
 
“Inspired by the Past, A Vision for the Future”: The Civil Rights Institute 
 
Looking back at its success, former president LaMonte explained, “I think the 
Institute has had the broadest appeal nationally and internationally [of Birmingham’s tourist 
attractions] because of the urgency of its theme.”47  By its third anniversary, over 300,000 
people had visited the Institute.48  The original task force closely controlled both the overall 
physical layout of the Institute and the history portrayed by its exhibits.49  Working to 
incorporate museum construction into a larger revitalization of the downtown historic black 
business area and to center memorialization where most of the large demonstrations took 
place, the city chose a site across from Kelly Ingram Park and the Sixteenth Street Baptist 
Church.50  The design firm used light yellow brick and featured a large dome entryway to 
complement and align the Institute with the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church’s color scheme 
and distinctive double-domed construction.51  Visitors feel the resonances of the connection 
between the history presented and the present.  One woman from New Jersey explained, “I 
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cried a lot.  I am one of those children who have reaped the ‘benefits’ from the movement. I 
was unaware of what our people had to endure.”52  A local woman wrote, “Every time I 
come, my eyes are filled with tears.”  Another said, “Overwhelming, chilling, very 
impressive.  I’ll come back.”53  Broad steps lead up to a green domed entryway, meant to 
invoke the feeling of walking into a sacred space.54  Similarities to the King Center in 
Atlanta, designed by the same architecture firm, can be felt in the long vistas and repeating 
patterns of windows and arches along the inner courtyard.55 
Visitors enter and exit onto the street across from Kelly Ingram Park, and the paving 
of the Institute’s floor design mirrors park paving.56  From the Institute one can look across at 
the pathways of the park’s “Freedom Walk” as it winds past sculptures of the iconic images 
of that time—jailed schoolchildren, police dogs attacking, fire hoses turned on marchers, 
ministers kneeling in prayer—drawing visitors into the center of the newly dubbed “Place of 
Revolution and Reconciliation.”57  The park anchors the new “Civil Rights District” which 
includes the historic Carver Theater now housing the Alabama Jazz Hall of Fame; the 
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Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, offering tours of the sanctuary and a basement area 
dedicated as a memorial to the bombing; and the Fourth Avenue North historic black 
business district that, despite boosters efforts, continues its steady economic decline.58  Also 
included in the downtown black heritage tour designed by the local tourist information office 
are the Alabama Penny Saving Bank, the first black-owned bank in Alabama, and the A.G. 
Gaston Motel, former headquarters for visiting civil rights leaders now converted into low-
income housing.59        
This reclamation of civic space represents a long-overdue imposition of new 
monuments and new players in the realm of official civic memorialization in Birmingham.  
Since before the Civil War, cultural strategists from the Daughters of the Confederacy to 
African-American fraternal organizations have done battle over the public history of southern 
localities by erecting statutes, staging parades, and by preserving some sites and deeming 
others blighted in order to shape the physical landscape into one that represents their version 
of the past.60  Current controversies over renaming central business avenues in honor of 
Martin Luther King illustrate the way that even seemingly mainstream civil rights symbols 
still have the power to provoke.61  As Fitzhugh Brundage notes, “The stakes are clear to large 
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numbers of southerners, white and black, who agree about perhaps only one thing: the 
continuing relevance of history for the contemporary South.”62  
In the long tradition of private business interests pushing the city toward change, the 
perceived economic boon of African-American and civil rights tourism convinced city 
leaders to support the Institute.  Historian Glenn Eskew maintains that Arrington put his 
weight behind the creation of the Institute once convinced of its tourist potential.63  And 
Institute boosters couched their outreach to Birmingham’s business community in terms of 
tourist dollars.64  The business community responded, filling the Birmingham News pullout 
section on the opening of the Institute with large ads congratulating its founders and the city 
itself on having the vision to create a memorial of this kind. 65  The Institute’s supporters 
hoped that it would attract 200,000 people its first year and ultimately be a bigger draw than 
the U.S. Space and Rocket Center in Huntsville.66  This potential for tourism and its 
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economic ripples would prompt large-scale corporate sponsorship for the Phase II 
educational galleries of the Institute itself.67 
Alabama as a state had already led the nation in capitalizing on this previously 
ignored sector of the tourism industry.68  George Wallace saw the potential business value to 
the state of promoting historic tourism across-the-board and in 1983 sponsored the creation 
of a state tourism booklet designed to bring visitors in to see the “darker side of Alabama’s 
past.”69  The mid-1980s also saw state legislature attempts to establish civil war and civil 
rights tourism centers in Birmingham.70  By the time the Institute opened in 1992, its 
founders had reason to believe that civil rights history could appeal to a wide swath of 
tourists, both white and black.  By 1996, when some of the Atlanta Olympic Games were 
staged in Birmingham, local media heralded the Institute for its ability to change visitors’ 
minds about the negative image of Birmingham: “No doubt you’ve heard about the fire hoses 
and the police dogs.  It’s been more than thirty years, but still that’s the first thing many out-
of-towners think of when they hear about Birmingham.  We’ve come a long way since then, 
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though.  Witness the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute. . . . and maybe your first impression 
of Birmingham won’t be your last.”71 
The museum design not only tells Birmingham’s civil rights history, but also seeks to 
create a more progressive present and future by giving the visitor a personal experience of 
the inequities of segregation and the drama of a victorious movement.  In an article 
examining recent civil rights memorialization across the South, Eskew describes these sites 
as having a “bifurcated existence as both an interpretive museum and an agent for social 
change.”72  In considering the version of Birmingham’s history presented by these displays, 
sociologist Barry Schwartz’s concept of the “dualism” of collective memory—the lamp and 
mirror—can help us to understand how this museum simultaneously represents both the past 
and the present.  According to Schwartz, collective memory has a “mirror-like (model of) 
aspect” as “a reflective symbol of present situations,” as well as a “lamp-like (model for) 
aspect” as “an orienting symbol—a light that helps us manage these situations by revealing 
where we are in relation to where we have been.”73  In Schwartz’s view, collective memory 
is most fully oriented to present ends and helps to clarify present identity by illuminating the 
past.  It points to the future, but can only shine a brief light on a past that is ultimately read 
through the present.    
 In the Institute’s displays, we see the “lamp-like” or “model for” aspect of collective 
memory most clearly via the positioning of the city’s civil rights struggles within a national 
narrative of the movement.  Both the choice of chronology depicted and the physical 
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emphases of the exhibits themselves orient the past—violence and mass demonstrations—as 
the catalyst for the Civil Rights Act.  This framing of the history shows Birmingham to have 
reformed in light of these events, while the existence of the Institute itself mirrors the city’s 
current progressive self-image.   
The exhibit narrative also literally represents the image of biracial engagement for a 
progressive Birmingham first promulgated during the 1963 demonstrations.  The choice of 
chronology and emphasis of the displays combine to present the city as redeemed by the 
struggle and accompanying violence.  Here the ideological and professional concerns of the 
original steering committee, composed of local activists, left-leaning academics, and one 
individual intimately involved with the 1963 negotiations, can be seen.74  The museum 
programming succeeds in solidifying the “image of reform” sought by politicians in 1963 
and embraced by the media during the Chambliss trial.  Yet individual reactions to the 
Institute, including the questioning of the bombing’s place within this schema of 
memorialization, indicated that this version of the past would not stand uncontested.  
The entrance to the Institute displays a large quote from Martin Luther King, Jr.:  
     I like to believe 
     that the negative extremes of Birmingham’s past 
     will resolve into the positive and utopian extreme of her future; 
     that the sins of a dark yesterday will 
     be redeemed in the achievements of a bright tomorrow.  
 
The Civil Rights Institute positions itself as one of those achievements.  After the quote from 
King, the museum begins with a short introductory video.  Tracing Birmingham’s foundation 
as a steel town just after the Civil War to the imposition of segregation, the film highlights 
African-American living conditions and contributions to the city.  This documentary honestly 
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embraces Birmingham’s history of discrimination and prejudice while painting a portrait of 
vibrant African-American culture and life.  The video ends with an image of life-size “white” 
and “colored” water fountains; then the screen rises up to reveal those same fountains as the 
first gallery exhibit.   
Visitors must pass the water fountains to enter the first exhibit, “Barriers,” designed 
to convey a sense of life in Birmingham under segregation.  “Separate but equal” classrooms, 
housing, and health care; a “whites only” soda fountain; and a black defendant confronted 
with the hopelessness of a white-controlled courtroom make systematic discrimination 
tangible.  While African-American cultural vibrancy is celebrated in the prominent display of 
the church in community life and the historic all-black Carver Theater, a display case houses 
advertisements and artifacts, including minstrel show posters using racist stereotypes, 
reminding the visitor of the pervasiveness of the more insidious cultural attitudes that helped 
sustain and then outlived Jim Crow.  
The “Confrontation” section attempts to exhibit the range of racial attitudes 
confronting civil rights organizers and to honestly portray white resistance.  Ten-foot figures 
etched onto glass panels loom while motion-triggered recordings play.  Meant to provoke, 
statements bombard the viewer.  Some express racist sentiments, from, “She was a 
grandmother by twenty-eight. Don’t these people ever learn?” to a child’s voice saying, “Put 
them on a boat and send them back to Africa.”  Others call out against the “Uncle Toms” or 
assert, “White man’s got nothing I want, except power.”  Liberal white sentiments chime in 
as well.75  This gallery ends with an eighteen-foot photograph of a Ku Klux Klan cross 
burning on the wall and a Klan robe, somewhat tucked to the side and mounted on the wall, 
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towers over the visitor.  The recorded voices trigger as one approaches the figures, pulling 
the visitor into a dialogue designed to elicit an emotional response.  The overall message is 
clear: vigilante violence always lurked behind and could give deadly expression to racist 
attitudes, passive and active, moderate and extreme.  This section creates a tense atmosphere 
out of which the next display’s literal whispering of civil rights organizing overheard through 
doors and windows creates a dramatic contrast.  It also encourages an understanding of the 
pervasive personal and cultural attitudes that supported the Jim Crow system.  The 
individualized and interactive focus of the exhibits fades into the background as the 
movement begins in the second half of the displays. 
The “Movement” section traces the major events of civil rights history, beginning 
with the Montgomery Bus Boycott and ending with the March on Washington and Selma-to-
Montgomery voting rights march.  Spanning the entire southeastern region, this section 
begins in 1954 with Brown and sit-ins throughout the South; the charred front of a 
Greyhound bus evokes the attacks on the Freedom Riders in Anniston, Alabama.76  Multi-
media displays and wall plaques vividly render Birmingham’s most infamous scenes of 
protest and resistance.  Police dogs attacking children play on film clips; fire hoses wash 
down a large glass wall in front of the visitor.  The central exhibit in this section, called 
“Birmingham: The World is Watching,” highlights the importance of the city in the trajectory 
of the national movement.  
Throughout the movement galleries, two-tiered timeline boards follow the displays 
along the walls.  These timelines contain vast amounts of information on the daily and 
monthly activities associated with the movement, tracking national events separate from local 
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ones.  Major events, such as escalation of the Vietnam War and the Kennedy assassination, 
are interspersed with the intricacies of local school desegregation and other topics not 
approached by the displays themselves.  These boards tell a complex and detailed, almost 
scatter-shot, version of the culmination of the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, and 
beyond.  They stand in sharp contrast to the story rendered in the physical exhibits of this 
section, in which the familiar tropes of Birmingham’s civil rights history play out.  
In the museum’s largest section, images of police dogs and demonstrators alternate 
with textual descriptions of progressive leaders united in biracial negotiations along with the 
usual symbols of resistance and violence—fire hoses, police dogs, and above all, Eugene 
“Bull” Connor—assuming their well-worn role as lode-bearers for broader white resistance.  
In the Institute’s text boards, Albert Boutwell is characterized as the “new, more moderate 
mayor,” in contrast to Connor, who “continued to wield tremendous power in the city.”  This 
characterization downplays the wide reach of structural racism and the silent white majority’s 
role in resisting civil rights, reminding visitors, “By 1963, racial and civil strife convinced a 
majority of Birmingham voters to change their form of government.”77  The May 
demonstrations in Birmingham end on the positive note of the agreements, and beyond one 
succinct wall date that notes only, “June 1964—Mayor’s Group Relations subcommittee 
members in Birmingham issue statement of ‘dismay’ about inactivity,” the displays don’t 
give the accords time to fall apart as they would later that summer nor do they explain that 
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SCLC considered renewing demonstrations that fall.78  Instead, the visitor quickly moves on 
to the March on Washington.   
 The final exhibit, “The March on Washington,” surrounds the visitor with a 
projection of King delivering his famous address.  One then proceeds from the dark video 
area into the last section, “The Processional.”  Life-sized statutes of marchers mark the end 
of the museum in a light-filled gallery with windows opening onto Kelly Ingram Park and the 
rebuilt Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.  After the often dark, windowless previous exhibits, 
the sudden rush of open space and light creates a positive, hopeful impression.  “Milestones,” 
the dates of more current “positive events resulting from the civil rights movement,” fill the 
exit.79  
This museum must be understood as “the present in the past.”80  The emphasis in the 
chronological physical displays and the narrative choices represent a very specific vision of 
present-day Birmingham.  The exhibits’ almost abrupt end can be understood through Barry 
Schwartz’s concept of the “frame image,” which describes “the way invocations of the past 
confer meaning on present experience.”81  Theorizing about collective memory, Schwartz 
explains: “Frame images are pictorial representations that organize understandings of present 
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events by aligning them with well-understood and affecting events of the past.”82  Most 
importantly, “frame images” are evocative and believable because of “their moral, not 
technical, relevance.”83  The emotional pull of the “I Have a Dream Speech” projected onto 
the circular room at the end of the museum, literally surrounding the visitor and including her 
in the crowd of supporters on the Mall that day, creates this moral resonance. This moment of 
national victory is used as a frame image to establish a certain feeling of progressive race 
relations in the final segment of the museum.  Martin Luther King’s authoritative, uplifting 
voice frames the experience of the museum displays, encouraging the visitor to walk away 
with a sense of the hopefulness that King as a symbol has come to represent in the national 
civil rights movement narrative. 
 The Institute concludes with a victorious portrayal of the civil rights movement, yet 
the galleries end at a large window looking out onto the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.  A 
small nook to the right of the window contains pictures of the bomb victims, of the partially 
destroyed church, and a brief historical note.  This is a fitting, sober memorial to the victims; 
however, its placement off to the side, after the last triumphant exhibit, removes the bombing 
from the official chronology of the civil rights movement espoused by the displays.  The 
unsolved nature of the bombing at the time the Institute was built made this event even 
harder to fit into a condensed, morally uplifting narrative with disposable symbols of racism 
such as Bull Connor.  The wall plaque commemorating the bombing concludes, “The deaths 
[of the four little girls] were an occasion for grief, reflection, and redirection in 
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Birmingham’s continuing struggle with race relations;” this points to an on-going civil rights 
struggle, a message consistent with the museum’s motto, “Inspired by the Past, A Vision for 
the Future.”  Yet this forward-looking, complicated exhibit is just one moment in the larger 
progress narrative of the Institute itself.84  In its physical location tucked away to the side, the 
bombing display makes the rebuilt Sixteenth Street Baptist Church the last image 
encountered by the visitor, reinforcing the museum’s narrative of redemption through 
violence and sacrifice.85  Constructing Birmingham as a united city, honestly engaging its 
history, the museum makes tangible and permanent the image of reform designed by city 
leaders in 1963 and by its presence on the downtown landscape announces the city’s present 
progressive posture.   
 After the chronological displays end, the visitor can then enter the International 
Human Rights Gallery, “Beyond Birmingham: Human Rights Around the World,” based 
upon the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.  This area includes a presentation of “The 
Birmingham Pledge,” designed by a local attorney to encourage individuals to dedicate 
themselves to practicing racial reconciliation in their lives.  The visitor then walks back 
toward the main domed entryway past the Richard Arrington, Jr. Resource Gallery 
showcasing the oral history program of the Institute.  This ending encourages visitors to 
locate the events of Birmingham as inspirational for the present-day international human 
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rights struggle.  While providing important contextualization, this gallery represents a 
somewhat disjointed ending to the exhibits, resulting in a less personal, immediate, and local 
focus than the previous displays. 
Glenn Eskew describes the exhibits as “a progressive view of history that concludes 
with the triumph of tolerance.”86  He further explains that the Institute presents “the 
Whiggish progressivism of the American master narrative, with a message that celebrates the 
moral righteousness of nonviolent protest, the potential of interracial unity, and the success 
of qualified integration.”87  Describing the exit from the March on Washington through the 
marcher statutes, Eskew concludes: “This clear message of African American assimilation 
into the white mainstream underscores the history of racial progress expressed throughout the 
exhibits.”88  The exhibits do present a narrative of hope within a very short chronological 
timeframe that discourages a close look at the complications of the long civil rights 
movement.  But as Fitzhugh Brundage suggested, the enshrinement of a progress narrative in 
this first wave of African-American history museums may be a necessary function of the 
history being conveyed.  He explains, “one wonders how many southerners, let alone others, 
would have the stamina for a candid history of blacks that did not offer some sort of uplifting 
resolution. . . . present-day museums of black history hold out the promise that the travails of 
history have had a purpose, one that we can achieve if we learn its lessons.”89  
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Despite the well-known fact that special interest groups drive and create public 
history, those monuments can come to represent the collective consciousness of a place.  In 
the face of residents’ inattention or even hostility, public memorials and museums are often 
interpreted as a place’s official self-representation.  Eskew sees the creation of civil rights 
museums and memorials across the South as the expression of a new “civic religion of 
toleration” that has come to replace the Lost Cause as the main message of public memory in 
the South.90  These memorials have an international orientation, linking the southern civil 
rights struggle to the worldwide human rights movement.91  Most importantly, these new 
civil rights museums and institutions serve to signpost the success of integration.92  Eskew 
also notes that the Institute, now the most visited historic tourism site in Alabama, has 
become “an important symbol for the new, racially tolerant Birmingham.”93   
But is this a “civil religion of toleration” or the heavily disputed accommodation of 
competing narratives wielded by new, now politically powerful constituencies?  Brundage 
makes the important point that civil rights museums are expected to do too much cultural and 
social work, serving “to revise misconceptions about the past, teach inspirational lessons, 
attract tourists, revive troubled neighborhoods, and spur political activism.”94  And in 
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Birmingham in particular the history portrayed in the Institute represents not just a “new 
ideology of tolerance,” as Eskew concludes, but also the institutionalization of the image of 
reform developed in 1963.  By 1992, the events of 1963 had taken on the weight of myth, 
told in a set sequence with familiar characters.  During the Chambliss trial in 1977, aspects of 
that story were still in flux, as the Klan and police department were reinterpreted to fit new 
political understandings.  The Institute helped to solidify a version of Birmingham, 1963, 
without the rough edges apparent to those who lived through those times.  
Although perhaps limited in its willingness or ability to embrace the messy 
implementation of integration, the Institute succeeds in one of the major goals of its founders.  
As the original Institute Mission Statement explained: “For the first time our community has 
an opportunity to tell its own story about the city’s past.”95  When Mayor Vann proposed the 
museum he hoped that it would tell the story both of civil rights demonstrations and of the 
cooperation between black and white leaders that followed those demonstrations.96  While 
highlighting grassroots black leadership, the Institute succeeds in enshrining the image of a 
progressive city so desired by those same Birmingham leaders.  These exhibits portray the 
“image of reform” leaders hoped to present to a shocked national audience in 1963 by 
projecting that same reform spirit onto the present-day city.  As the Mission Statement 
continues,  
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Therefore, it is extremely important to show not only the historical context in which 
the events here evolved, but also the success in race relations and the progress that 
has been made through interracial cooperation since then.  The ‘new’ Birmingham of 
the 1980s, which has emerged in a relatively short time, is the on-going example of 
this progress.  Thus, the Institute will be an important catalyst in Birmingham’s 
continuing efforts to heal the wounds of the past and to become a truly biracial 
community.97   
 
The Institute’s founders did succeed in allowing Birmingham to finally present its version of 
its history to the world.  And unlike the valid skepticism that greeted attempts to reshape 
Birmingham’s image in 1963, residents and the media embraced the portrait of a changed 
city offered by the Institute in 1992.  Newspaper coverage of the opening of the Institute 
accepted and repeated the long-established themes of the white power structure openly 
negotiating with civil rights leaders and the role of the bombing in turning the conscience of 
the nation.98  
 
The Healing of a City By Design: Reaction to the Institute 
The opening ceremonies for the Civil Rights Institute on Sunday, November 15, 
1992, prompted the Birmingham World, one of the city’s historic African-American owned 
and operated newspapers, to explain, “Birmingham, Alabama declares it is a city that has 
come to terms with its past.”99  Local media enthusiastically joined with the boosters, 
promoting the concept and substance of the new Civil Rights District, while fitting the 
Institute within the now long-worn tropes of Birmingham’s civil rights progress narrative 
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following from the ”image of reform” as first promulgated during the 1963 demonstrations.  
With the creation of the Institute, city boosters could, despite substantial initial hesitance, 
point to the concrete expression of the reform image they had been trying to create for almost 
thirty years.  For others in the community, however, the representation of the city’s history 
and their identification with that history—the way that they understood it to interact with 
their identity past and present—created dissonance, and they resisted this official version of 
Birmingham.    
Media coverage of the Institute’s opening closely tracked the exhibits’ themes and 
main message.  Local media, from the Birmingham Business Journal to the Birmingham 
News took up and discussed these themes in almost the same language.  Although hints of 
disagreement with this representation of Birmingham’s past surfaced, reception of the 
Institute in 1992 was far more unified than the thirteen years of struggle to fund the museum 
would have predicted. 
In the Birmingham News Sunday edition celebrating the opening, a paid 
advertisement by the city council and Mayor Arrington announced: “Why a Civil Rights 
Institute in Birmingham, Alabama?  Because what happened in Birmingham affected a 
nation.”100  By placing Birmingham’s events as nationally important, indeed the key to the 
success of the national civil rights movement, city boosters tried to reorient the reputation of 
the city.  The media embraced the Institute’s attempt to present the city’s own version of its 
past.  Arrington explained the impetus behind the Institute in those terms: “We hope we can 
try to tell our own story.  We want to help ourselves and others to understand what happened 
                                                
 
 
100“An Invitation from the City of Birmingham,” paid advertisement, Birmingham News, 15 November 
1992, 5P.    
 169 
here, why it happened, and how we overcame the violence through nonviolence and changed 
the nation.”101    
The Birmingham World quoted Mayor Arrington as saying, “The Institute will make 
people look at Birmingham in a new light, and it will surely lure people from around the 
world to see how our city has confronted and accepted its past.  And once here, they will find 
a forward-looking city with its people working toward the future in a great spirit of 
cooperation.”102  Although a violent, segregated past weighed heavily on the city, by creating 
this public monument, Birmingham presented itself to a local and national audience as 
changed, inviting visitors to forgive, if not forget.  In his study of how museums present and 
manipulate history, Steven C. Dubin writes, “Museums are important venues in which a 
society can define itself and present itself publicly.  Museums solidify culture, endow it with 
a tangibility, in a way few other things do.”103  Boosters hoped that visitors could now 
replace “The Johannesburg of the South” with the current Birmingham—a Birmingham 
progressive enough to create a museum of this nature.    
Beyond the historical narrative presented by the Institute, the media promulgated the 
conceit that the Institute represented the city’s present progress in race relations and would 
serve to activate a more progressive future.  The Birmingham News embraced the Institute as 
a symbol of “the healing and growth of a city still haunted by the ugly memories of a violent 
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and racist past.”104  Another article quoted a resident who compared the Institute to a 
phoenix: “out of the ashes of all of those things that happened, the Institute rises above the 
bad image that the city has felt for some thirty years.”105  Others greeted the opening of the 
Institute with exclamations that it represented the city’s “dedication to progress and unity” 
and “full and serious resolve to come to terms in a constructive fashion with its past.”106  An 
important factor in this image of the Institute as a symbol of present-day change in 
Birmingham was the perceived role of Arrington as “the chief engineer” of the project.107  
Despite the political realities of the long fight to create the Institute, the emergence of a civil 
rights museum stewarded by the city’s first black mayor carried important symbolism.  Local 
media whole-heartedly reiterated the concept of the Institute as forward-looking, active, not a 
museum as “mausoleum.”  The local business-oriented weekly held out the use of a joint 
contracting team comprised of one black-owned and one white-owned firm as further proof 
of the positive interracial cooperation forged by the Institute.108   
 In an article entitled, “Birmingham Embraces Its Past with Eye Toward Future,” the 
Birmingham World explained, “[t]he Birmingham Civil Rights Institute is more than a 
museum. . . . It is designed with the hope that in years to come it will become a cradle of 
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understanding that can act as a springboard for the study of tomorrow’s opportunities.”109  
Dedication ceremony coverage reiterated this theme of the Institute as a progressive gesture, 
a testament to Birmingham’s commitment to addressing present-day issues of race 
relations.110  Called “a solid symbol of the city’s pride in its history and its dedication to 
progress and unity” by the Birmingham World, creation of the Institute, what is essentially a 
representation of the past, is positioned as a statement on the present and the future.111  The 
Birmingham World elaborated, explaining, “this investment [in the Institute] will propel 
Birmingham into a future of racial harmony and prosperity.”  Although during the dedication 
ceremony Arrington stated that the city still had work to do in terms of racial reconciliation, 
media coverage almost universally reiterated the city’s present progressive stance.112 
 Another theme of the reform narrative represented by the mainstream media was that 
Birmingham as a city had come to terms with its past and individuals, too, could experience 
similar redemption or closure by visiting the museum.113  The Birmingham Business Journal 
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called the Institute, “Birmingham’s most visible attempt at healing the wounds of the past,” 
and explained:  
Many years have passed since Birmingham first earned the shameful nickname 
“Bombingham.”  Since that time concessions have been made, rights have been won, 
and the two races have moved beyond confrontation and co-existence to a level of 
reconciliation.  Yet the Civil Rights District today exists not to erase the scars of 
Birmingham’s wretched history, but rather to remember the past and to learn from it.  
Its very creation embodies a cleansing of the spirit—a key component of a healing 
process that time alone will not cure.114 
 
Holding out interracial cooperation in Birmingham during the 1980s as a sign of the “‘new’ 
Birmingham,” the Institute’s Task Force sincerely hoped that “the Institute will be an 
important catalyst in Birmingham’s continuing efforts to heal the wounds of the past and to 
become a truly biracial community.”115   
More than a museum, the Institute was interpreted as representing a stage in the city’s 
moral development.  Ron Casey, Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial page editor for the 
Birmingham News, made this citywide and individual moral progression tangible in his 
description of the final museum exhibit.  Explaining that “[t]he exhibit makes each patron of 
the museum a marcher for Civil Rights on the road from Selma to Montgomery,” he 
concluded, “Among the figures, there are young and old, black and white, from all walks of 
life.  The same is true for visitors.  And by design, they are all marching toward a common 
goal.”116  Acceptance of this message of moral evolution was widespread, as even the local 
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museum community, originally opposed to having to share limited city funding with yet 
another institution, began to coordinate programming and resources with the Institute.117 
Odessa Woolfolk believes that the Institute can not only present a version of the city’s 
past but also reinforce a new image of the city and civic identity.  In a recent interview, 
Woolfolk emphasized the popularity of the museum with international visitors, the white 
business community, and surrounding elementary and high schools as a way to illustrate this.  
She also stressed how African-American families, and not just ones living in Birmingham, 
hold their annual reunions at the Institute in the summer—tangible proof of the power of this 
new memory if so many people identify so strongly with it.118  She hopes the site can work to 
create a new collective memory and identity for Birmingham.119  In her view, this new 
identity has not only been embraced by current residents, but also serves to rehabilitate the 
city’s national reputation, substituting a new “frame of remembrance” for those in other parts 
of the country looking at Birmingham.  She relates how visitors are often surprised when 
they come to Birmingham and see the museum: “I think a lot of people are surprised at what 
this place looks like.  As if to say, ‘Oh, I didn’t think you people would be this creative down 
there.’”  She continues, “Now, I think the thing about Birmingham is that it’s clear that the 
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Birmingham of the 1960s isn’t the Birmingham of [today], and one would expect any place 
to have changed, but somehow people are shocked when they come here and find that we 
have with respect to the race situation, though we still have the residual issues that are 
American.”120  Without denying on-going racial issues, Woolfolk sees the Institute as an 
active agent in shaping collective memory, identity, and understandings of the past.121 
The success of a museum rests not in the facilities themselves but in the interaction of 
individuals with that building, those displays, and the message or messages that the facility 
attempts to convey.  While the Institute may represent the new “civil religion of toleration” 
and have finally cemented the “image of reform” so long sought by city leaders, residents’ 
interpretation of the site can tell us more about changing attitudes than boosters or 
politicians’ statements.  While some residents showed a strong identification with the history 
and message on display,122 the Institute, like all projects of commemoration, closely tracks 
the agenda of its founders and does not necessarily represent the attitudes or understandings 
of the larger Birmingham community.  The emphasis on unity and healing offered by the 
media and boosters during the opening of the Institute may have really been an expression of 
hope for the acceptance of the Institute and of future unity.  Many residents responded 
warmly to the potential and then presence of a civil rights museum in Birmingham.  Some, 
however, resisted the concept in its entirety.  This pushback by individuals against the 
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Institute results from a conflict between that presentation of the past and their present and 
past identities.  Theorist John Gillis explains, “Identities and memories are not things we 
think about, but things we think with.”123  Past history, individual experience—having lived 
through those times—necessarily predisposed some in the community to accept the 
museum’s articulation of Birmingham’s civil rights past while others cannot resolve this new 
vision with an understanding of their own identity. 
Fears that the Institute represented a partisan project—black history enshrined by a 
black mayor for his black constituents—animated some of the fears expressed by white 
community members.  In the Birmingham Business Journal, Arrington describes 
“considerable opposition” from white business leaders: “There were some very strong 
feelings expressed.”124  These leading businessmen also objected to the downtown location 
of the Institute and the idea of a civil rights district, presumably because this gave an official 
imprimatur to the civil rights movement.  In fact, Arrington addressed part of his State of the 
City Speech at the beginning of 1992 to the business community whom he hoped would 
begin to substantially contribute to the Institute.125  
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Other individuals interpreted the Institute as “solidifying” the past and getting it 
wrong.126  One white individual, Bill Ricker, who has worked in municipal government in 
the city for decades, invoked Birmingham’s national reputation for white violence, arguing 
that even that reputation is incorrect and that the Institute perpetuates this false image of the 
city:  “There will never be a television program, there will never be anything that doesn’t 
open with fire hoses and police dogs which, by the way, no police dog ever bit a black person 
in Birmingham, Alabama.  There was never a race riot in Birmingham, Alabama.  There 
were so many things there never was.”127  Railing against “political correctness,” he 
continued,  
I say, Yeah, Birmingham, Alabama, and I’m not a native of Birmingham, had a lot of 
bad things going on.  And so did Mississippi, but besides Mississippi Burning . . . you 
don’t hear that much about it, but you’ll never be forgotten here.  If you would repeat 
this in the next fifty years when I’m dead, the Civil Rights Institute will always 
remind you of it.128 
 
While Ricker can maintain that no police dogs ever bit anyone, what he is really fighting 
against is the portrayal of past white identity.  
Key to this critique of the Institute is the sense that the history presented within the 
Institute has been misinterpreted, filtered through a distorted lens that renders the story about 
black heroism and marginalizes the role of whites.  Pointing to the statue of a police dog 
attacking a young black man in Kelly Ingram Park, Ricker explained, “I think what happened 
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here in Birmingham will never be reported right.  I’ll give you a perfect example.  Have you 
been down to Kelly Ingram Park? . . . Did you notice that [the policeman is] left-handed?  
The man after who that is modeled was not left handed, and those dogs never bit 
anybody.”129  This seemingly quibbling point reveals the underlying anxiety that the 
Institute’s representation of whites as a community and individually is not accurate or fair.  
LaMonte explained, “I think by and large that white citizens regarded it as an unwanted and 
unnecessary dredging up of a past that would better be forgotten.”130  Explaining the “racial 
cleavage among the citizens,” LaMonte cited some of Arrington’s white supporters as 
sympathetic to the concept, but “the overwhelming response of white citizens and white 
business leaders was, ‘It’s a mistake; we shouldn’t do it.’”131   
 Another interviewee, Arthur Hanes, Jr., Chambliss’s defense attorney in 1977, rejects 
any present-day implications of the Institute for his or the city’s collective identity.  Hanes 
characterizes the Civil Rights Institute as a museum, and therefore a representation of the 
past with no relevance to the present:  
I think that the Civil Rights Institute is a very good thing because it’s a museum, and 
what is a museum for?  It’s to preserve history.  I believe that we must make the Civil 
Rights Movement history rather than current events to lay that issue to rest.  I think 
it’s important that we lay it to rest.  Just as the War Between the States has become 
history rather than current events . . . the Civil Rights Institute is part of the passage 
into history.  It’s much better to have to go to the Civil Rights Institute and remember 
marchers than it is to be marchers.  Wouldn’t you agree?132 
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Hanes assures me, a fellow white southerner, that the Institute preserves history, contains and 
neutralizes it.  This points to a danger of enshrining collective memory in museums—the 
potential that this memory will become commodified and removed from current identity.  
Irwin-Zarecka categorizes this as consuming versus remembering the past, and warns that 
this can serve to flatten out the experience of history and discourage confrontation with 
continuing identity issues in the present.133  This presentation of Birmingham’s history 
evokes strong feelings, ranging from residents who identify so strongly with the museum 
they hold their family reunions there to those who grudgingly accept its presence in the 
community while rejecting its connection to their own identity. 
But not everyone sympathetic to the movement felt their identities were reflected in 
the Institute.  Some civil rights activists from the 1960s objected that their role in the 
Birmingham movement had been overlooked in the crafting of the exhibits.  St. Paul A.M.E., 
located next door to the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church and a major meeting place during the 
movement, protested that its role in supporting the events of spring 1963 had been excluded 
from the Institute’s narrative and from the Civil Rights District opening celebrations.  The 
Birmingham News quoted the Reverend Clinton Hubbard, St. Paul’s pastor, as saying, “at 
this point, they don’t have the church playing any role in the Institute. . . . We have a rich 
history that we want told.”134  Additionally, one Birmingham World editorial writer objected 
that the Institute ignored the foot soldiers of the movement in favor of well-known heroes.135  
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While Kelly Ingram Park does feature monuments to lesser-known movement members and 
at its opening the Institute was preparing to launch a broad-based oral history initiative, other 
voices countered this criticism, insisting that commemorating each participant would be 
prohibitively costly and that Birmingham should unite behind the Institute: “This is our 
chance to show the world the changes and progress that have transpired in Birmingham since 
the 1960s.  When we project this image, we will give other cities that have struggled with 
problems of racial division hope that people can come together for positive change.”136  In a 
unique and striking attempt to include as many individual participants in its memorialization 
as possible, the Institute placed a sign-in book in the entranceway where visitors could log 
their role in the movement.137 
Fears that the Institute would create “division,” as one Birmingham World editorial 
writer suggested, found justification in the small protests surrounding the opening 
ceremonies.138  Several bands of protestors took advantage of the publicity surrounding the 
rededication of Kelly Ingram Park to promote their own agendas.  Reverend Abraham Woods 
suggested a march showing opposition to the on-going federal investigation of Arrington, but 
was convinced otherwise.139  While much of this protest activity simply piggybacked on the 
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attention paid to the dedication, it draws into question the “unified front” of black community 
support for the Institute remembered by its boosters. 
In his book on Watergate in memory, Michael Schudson writes: “What keeps 
Watergate alive in collective memory is that the political conditions that gave rise to it are 
still with us.”140  Birmingham struggles with the collective memory represented in the Civil 
Rights Institute because the past still weighs upon individual residents and the city.  While 
the Institute stands as Barry Schwartz’s “lamp”—a vision of collective memory that 
illuminates the present through an interpretation of the past—many in the community reject 
the reflection of the present they see in the “mirror” of the Institute’s displays.  Contestation 
is a key element of an evolving, vital collective memory and group identity; therefore 
perhaps disputes over the nature and function of the Institute will be productive in the end.141  
In The Texture of Memory, James Young reminds us, “In shouldering the memory-work, 
monuments may relieve viewers of their memory burden.”142  More insidious is the 
understanding, like that expressed by Art Hanes, Jr., that the Institute is a museum, a static 
portrayal of the past with no relevance to identity today.  
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The Ghost of an Unsolved Bombing 
 Media coverage of the Institute included the newly renovated Sixteenth Street Baptist 
Church as a symbol of the renewal of the city after violent resistance to desegregation.143  
And while reporters often reiterated the redemptive power of the bombing,144 something else 
hung heavy over Birmingham’s reputation.  The still open case stood as a silent contradiction 
to the reform image portrayed and endorsed by the museum.  The weight of this unsolved 
crime disrupted attempts to solidify the city’s national image in 1992 just as it did in 1963, 
pushing state-sponsored violence in defense of the segregated status quo, rather than 
nonviolent demonstrations that moved that status quo, again and again to the foreground of 
public discussion.  Although the Institute presented the official version of the city’s past, the 
memory of the civil rights movement remained contested. 
One community that could not avoid the memory of the bombing was the 
congregation of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church itself.  In 1963, Sixteenth Street’s 
congregation consisted mostly of black bourgeois initially reluctant to align themselves with 
the mass demonstrations.  Some time after street protests began in the city, the church’s then 
pastor threw his support behind King and Shuttlesworth and the church became the staging 
ground for many of the downtown marches.145  Current pastor Christopher Hamlin looked 
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back at the bombing from the mid-1990s and found it propelling an otherwise reluctant 
church into an activist stance: “Before the bombing, the congregation was unsure how active 
the church should be in the civil rights movement.  After it, they realized they had no 
choice.”146  He then pointed to recent anti-death penalty work, HIV/AIDS outreach, and other 
programs as keeping this “activist spirit” alive at the church.147   
Beyond the bombing itself, the church, through its promotional materials, has come to 
promote itself as a site of memory like the Institute, meant to represent a particular time—“a 
symbol of courageous spirit that helped make each American more truly free”—and serve as 
an engine of social transformation.  The church’s need to present itself as a viable presence in 
the Civil Rights District stems from the decline of its membership from a high of over a 
thousand attending services weekly in the 1940s and 1950s to about two hundred and fifty in 
the late 1980s, resulting in part from the bombing, suburbanization, and a succession of fired 
pastors.  In fact, at one point city leaders considered the church building for the civil rights 
museum itself.148  Although by the mid-1990s membership topped five hundred under the 
leadership of Hamlin, visitors still carried the widespread perception that the bombing had 
ended active worship at the church, converting the church into a historical monument rather 
than a living congregation. One article reported, “A tourist visiting Sixteenth Street Baptist 
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Church last week asked the question that makes Pastor Christopher Hamlin wince: ‘Are you 
open for worship on Sundays?’ . . . ‘People ask that all the time,’ Hamlin said.”149   
Beyond tourists’ misperceptions, the congregation had to come to terms with the 
bombing.  The weight of this trauma likely contributed to the infighting among the church’s 
leadership and is certainly responsible for a drop in membership.150  Moreover, as of 1982 
some of the victims’ families resisted church-sponsored memorialization of their daughters, 
pointing to a further schism in how the church would or would not deal with this memory.151  
Under Hamlin the church has come to embrace the bombing as a part of its identity and 
includes a tourism ministry in which volunteers lead tours of the church.152  Hamlin explains, 
“We don’t dwell on [the church’s role in the civil rights movement] as being the total focus 
point of what our ministry ought to be . . . It’s a very important aspect of ministry that we 
can’t deny.  This is an important part of what Sixteenth Street is.”153  Long-time church 
members agreed that that the church’s history should be a point of pride.  J.S. Goodson 
remarked: “The tourism is good. . . . It gives people an idea what we went through.  It gives 
them an idea what they were going through and didn’t know they were going through.  They 
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didn’t know it was as bad as it was.”154  Yet, even though the church has embraced its un-
asked for designation as a civil rights movement shrine, its current pastor also endorses the 
city’s narrative of racial progress with the bombing as the catalyst for change:  
I stress to our volunteers to show how far Birmingham has come. . . . It was an 
unfortunate era.  As a result of what we experienced, this community has changed.  
Birmingham has made a lot of progress in thirty-four years.  That doesn’t mean 
Birmingham doesn’t have problems.  Race relations can always be improved and 
people in the community are aware of that.155   
 
Despite the somewhat unsettled relationship of a living church and a historical bombing, 
Sixteenth Street Baptist made its peace with its role as tourist venue in the Civil Rights 
District and a church whose identity is forever linked to the bombing.156 
Wrestling with the memory of the bombing allowed Sixteenth Street to recast its 
reluctant participation in the movement and transform itself into a symbol of past tragedy and 
future progress alongside the Institute.  The contours of civil rights memory remained 
malleable, even as the image of reform hardened into an official version of the city’s history.  
Just as that memory could be used to retroactively position the church as always aligned with 
the movement, so too could individuals tap into the power of the bombing memory for their 
own ends.  Wary about exploitation of his personal tragedy, Chris McNair recognized the 
way that the memory of the bombing could be used for personal gain, explaining after the 
premiere of Spike Lee’s documentary “4 Little Girls,” “I must say to you, I pick the people I 
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talk to even now.”157  Individuals advertising a personal connection with the tragedy include 
a disgraced federal judge who claimed to be the brother of Virgil Ware, who was killed in the 
aftermath of the bombing by a young segregationist, and a dying Klansman who falsely 
confessed to the crime.158  Journalists and authors, either local or expatriated natives, return 
again and again to the subject of the bombing and Birmingham’s unclosed civil rights 
history, combining investigative reporting with anecdotes about their own conflicted 
relationship with what one called “the hidden, nightmarish side of the city of my 
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childhood.”159  Similarly, prosecutors and investigators remembered their quests to solve the 
case as personal missions of redemption.160  
Still, as of the late 1990s no public or permanent memorial to the bombing existed 
beyond the small shrine inside the Institute.  The lack of a city-sponsored memorial and the 
unclosed nature of the case pressed the bombing into public discussion again and again.  
Occasional gestures at memorialization would surface, like $25,000 for further bombing 
commemoration at the Institute or to maintain the graves of the victims tucked into an 
already pork-laden state house appropriations bill next to plans for a Hank Williams, a Rosa 
Parks, and a confederate memorial.  While those motions toward an official memorial never 
came through,161 a Memorial Fund established by the Birmingham News and Chris McNair 
distributed over $200,000 in scholarships by 1997.162 
More controversially, in 1995 Sixteenth Street Baptist and the local Unitarian 
Universalist church began a fundraising campaign to commission recreations of a sculpture 
grouping called “That Which Might Have Been, Birmingham, 1963,” installed on the 
grounds of the First Unitarian Universalist Church in Phoenix, Arizona.  Artist John Waddell 
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created the original sculptures in 1964.163  With a goal of almost a half a million dollars, the 
churches hoped to sponsor the artist to produce “That Which Might Yet Be, Birmingham, 
1995” to be placed in the vacant lot behind the church amid an ambitious landscaping 
project.164  In the sculpture grouping four women, not representational yet meant to evoke the 
four girls, stand each pointing outwards.  One woman stands erect, pulling her hair in her 
hands; another turns away from the viewer, with her arms wrapping in towards her body; a 
third holds a limp blanket, reminiscent of children’s swaddling clothes; the last throws her 
arms up, palms out, in a gesture of triumph or defiance.165  Public outcry against the 
sculptures, however, convinced Sixteenth Street to end its support of the project and when 
Mayor Arrington pressed the Parks and Recreation Board to place the sculptures at the 
Botanical Gardens, members of the board stalled, effectively ending discussion of the 
project.166   
The nudity of the figures lay at the heart of resistance to the sculptures.  One of the 
victims’ mothers objected to the memorial, and others agreed.  A park and recreation board 
member explained: “If it were my daughter who had died, I wouldn’t want her remembered 
that way. . . . I think of them as angels.”  Reading the sculptures as inappropriately 
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sexualized, the board president concurred, “I feel it is more of an embarrassment.”167  The 
artist insisted that the sculptures retained timelessness because of the lack of period-
identifying clothing and should be viewed as art rather than a literal representation of the 
girls.168  However, the figures outraged some because, besides the objections to nude 
sculpture, an important component of the memory of the bombing was the youth and 
innocence of the girls upon their death.169  The image of fully grown women simply did not 
fit within the narrative of rebirth long espoused by the city—conceptualizing the girls as 
adults pushes the bombing away from pure symbol, requiring an engagement with the present 
that drew forth questions such as what the girls’ lives might have been like and how the city 
had actually changed in the interim.  While the artist protested, “the memory of those 
innocent girls belongs to the world,” the News editors insisted that while the sculptures could 
be art in Arizona, in Birmingham the context made all the difference: “Here it would [be] a 
memorial to a dark, traumatic moment in this city’s history.  If anything, the nudity distracts 
from the tragedy and the historical importance of the bombing.”170  Vividly bringing the 
present to bear on the city’s well-worn story of the bombing, this memorial, despite some 
residents’ support, did not make it onto the civic landscape.171        
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Perhaps because of the lack of a memorial to the girls, and thereby the lack of a fixed 
interpretation or an “official story,” memory and interpretation of the bombing seems to float 
free within public discourse.  Like the movement in Birmingham, the bombing carried a 
heavy moral weight, but its unsolved status made it malleable and troubling, pushing 
questions about the past into view.  With the creation of the Civil Rights Institute the city was 
able to present its version of its civil rights history; however, this carefully constructed 
progressive image conflicted with some individuals’ understandings of their present identity 
and past events.  When the last two remaining suspects in the Sixteenth Street bombing went 
to trial in 2001 and 2002, the city and its residents had yet another opportunity to reckon with 
this past and reconfigure the “image of reform” to match present-day needs. 
                                                                                                                                                  
171See Walter E. Luft to Editor, Birmingham News, 24 May 1995, 8A, calling the editors “politically 
correct” and comparing them to Nazi pro-government art censorship.  
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Remembering “Bombingham,” Remaking Birmingham 
 
 
Scratch the surface of any person in the city—black or white, young or old—and you 
will find the unhealed scars of history, 
-Lori Johnson, co-chair of the Birmingham Pledge Task Force.1 
 
 
As the last of the downtown steel mills shut its doors in 1970, the air above 
Birmingham began to clear.2  One Birmingham resident remembers, “You used to come over 
the mountain, and you could tell how the economic life in Birmingham was by looking into 
the valley.  If you could see the buildings it was hard times.  If it was full of smog then you 
knew it was prosperous because the plants were working.”3  The transformation of 
Birmingham into a service economy centered on the medical center signaled its move from 
an outpost of Northern capital to a part of the emerging Sunbelt.  Along with this economic 
shift, political and demographic changes reworked the city’s topography of race and power.  
And, as the events of 1963 receded further into the past, some of the fear and anger 
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surrounding that time started to dissipate.  Within this changing cityscape, residents began to 
evaluate the legacy of the civil rights movement and the violence that accompanied it.  
Periodic public moments of remembering such as the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church 
bombing trials and the creation of the Civil Rights Institute allowed individuals to evaluate 
and contest the legacy of the civil rights movement for the city.  At the forefront of that 
struggle over how the civil rights history of Birmingham would be told stood the city’s 
reputation for racial violence, the dogs and fire hoses of civic imagination.  
Yet Birmingham’s negative image obscures residents’ attempts to confront not the 
past but the frustratingly common urban dilemmas of today.  The current issues facing 
Birmingham resemble the challenges facing urban areas everywhere: failing public schools; 
an increasingly poor city center composed disproportionately of people of color; crime; an us 
versus them ethos that prevents urban-suburban cooperation.  Since 1960, the population 
within Birmingham’s city limits has dropped from 340,887 to 231,000 and has become 
approximately 76 percent African American.  Birmingham has the eighth-highest percentage 
of persons living in poverty of America’s one hundred largest cities—a shocking 28.9 
percent or over 60,000 people.4  The city center also contains 22 percent of the larger metro-
area’s population, but sustains 55 percent of the violent crime and 43 percent of the property 
crime.5  The greater Birmingham metropolitan region spans seven counties and contains one 
                                                
4Jeff Hansen, Joseph D. Bryant, and Thomas Spencer, “Which Way Forward?” Birmingham News, 10 
March 2007. 
 
 
5Jeff Hansen, “What is the Real Picture of Crime in Metro Birmingham-Hoover?” Birmingham News, 
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hundred and two separate cities, with the people who can afford to do so working downtown, 
but buying property and raising families in the ever-expanding suburbs.6  
Birmingham’s history of rigid segregation has been re-inscribed in an urban-suburban 
divide that many residents see as the city’s number one challenge.  Former civil rights lawyer 
and current Chief Judge of the Northern District of Alabama U. W. Clemon locates the lack 
of regional urban-suburban cooperation as “historical, arising from the ugly fact of racial 
segregation.  The barriers that were created then still remain in the minds and the mind-set of 
the people who live here.”7  Another civic leader admits that the inability of city and “over-
the-mountain” leadership to work together is “frankly, racial in nature.”8  Politicians and 
other local leaders believe this lack of cooperation is a major deterrent to continued economic 
growth in the region,9 yet they are reluctant to anger their constituencies by reaching across 
race and class lines to create intraregional connections.10  Increased Hispanic immigration 
complicates the area demographics and has begun to shift the ground in the racialized politics 
to which many still cling.11  Despite real reforms and a changed context, the events of 1963 
continue to swirl in public discourse.12 
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Birmingham has more than its share of civic groups working on downtown 
development, regional planning, and current issues of race.  Leadership Birmingham, begun 
in 1981, promotes networking among leaders, broadly defined.  Designed to bring 
individuals together across the race, age, economic, and interest barriers that would normally 
dictate their interactions, the program is arranged into classes of around sixty people who 
hear speakers and work together on a variety of issues affecting the city.  By directly 
addressing the need for leaders who can work together across constituencies, Leadership 
Birmingham hopes to help the entire region move forward.  Although Leadership 
Birmingham often focuses on such pressing current problems as public transit and schools, 
executive director Ann Florie explains that because of the city’s history, “We have a lot of 
hard conversations” about current race relations as well.13  Similar programs attempt to unite 
the twelve-county region around common development issues and to develop youth 
leadership.  
Like most urban centers, Birmingham has a long-standing downtown development 
organization, but with a unique twist.  Operation New Birmingham (“ONB”) grew out of 
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business leadership’s concerns in the late 1950s over the fate of downtown when the first 
suburban mall and office park opened.14  Designed from the beginning as a public-private 
partnership and led by many of the same businessmen involved in the 1963 accords 
negotiations, Operation New Birmingham evolved into an urban development group with 
elite white and black participation.15  In the late 1960s, Lucius Pitts, president of Miles 
College, and other black leaders confronted city politicians about police brutality and the 
slow pace of black placement in high-level municipal jobs.  In response, Operation New 
Birmingham created a Community Affairs Committee.16  Comprised of nine black members, 
nine white members, and nine elected officials, the Community Affairs Committee has met 
every Monday morning since May 2, 1969.17  Although the Committee continues to meet, it 
plays a mostly symbolic function in race-related city crises.18  Operation New Birmingham 
focuses on downtown renewal, yet current president Michael Calvert explains: “It is unique 
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that our downtown development organization has a race relations agenda.  I know of no other 
group that has that.  It does not go together generally, but it is a historical accident.”19          
Beyond civic groups working for tangible reform, over and over individual residents 
attempt to confront Birmingham’s history of racial violence and the lingering image of 
“Bombingham.”  Perhaps the most far-reaching of these individual-initiated projects has been 
the Birmingham Pledge.  Drafted by a white native of Birmingham, Jim Rotch, the Pledge—
available at the Civil Rights Institute or online—asks individuals to commit themselves to 
eliminate prejudice and foster racial equality in their every day lives.20  Begun in 1998, and 
signed by over 100,000 people,21 the Birmingham Pledge gained a commendation from 
Congress, which recognized that “the people of Birmingham have made substantial progress 
toward racial equality” and that the Pledge itself “is a significant contribution toward 
fostering racial harmony and reconciliation in the United States and around the world.”22  A 
wide spectrum of residents looks favorably on such symbols of progress.  Louis Willie, III, 
son of a prominent civil rights demonstrator, embraced the Pledge, explaining: “A lot of [the 
denial of race problems] has changed, obviously, . . . and we felt like the Birmingham Pledge 
                                                
19Ibid. 
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was a way to promote the idea—that if Birmingham can make a genuine effort to racial 
reconciliation, then so can anywhere in the world.”23   
Another recent symbolic effort, co-sponsored by the Birmingham Pledge, involved 
the installation of a reproduction of the Chartres Labyrinth called “Walk Toward Racial 
Harmony.”  The founder of this project explained, “I live over-the-mountain in a white 
world. . . . I am isolated.  The question is: What am I going to do about it?”24  The labyrinth 
is an apt symbol of the struggle of individual Birmingham residents and the city as a whole 
with the residual image of 1963 and the city’s reputation as “Bombingham.”  The repeated 
attempts to grapple with this image underscore the unmoored nature of the city’s history of 
racial violence.  Unresolved on a citywide level despite the creation of the Civil Rights 
Institute and the dramatic bombing trials, the harms of Birmingham’s past continue to haunt 
its citizens even as they grapple with the present.  
 In interview after interview, residents reminded me that Birmingham has changed for 
the better, in large part because it has been forced to face its racial history.  Individuals point 
to an openness, a willingness of citizens and the city as a whole, to look back at the past and 
address lingering issues in the present.25  Even those who would rather forget the past agree 
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25See for example, Doug Carpenter, interview by author, tape recording, Birmingham, Ala., 2 June 
2003, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Leda Dimperio, interview by 
author, tape recording, Birmingham, Ala., 17 June 2005, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill; Edward LaMonte, interview by author, tape recording, Birmingham, Ala., 22 February 
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that Birmingham remains in constant discussion with itself about race relations and its 
image.26  Ann Florie, Executive Director of Leadership Birmingham, explains that each new 
leadership class discusses the city’s perceived negative image.  She speculates that this 
negative image is self-perpetuating; yet she disagrees with those who assert that discussing 
the city’s past is necessarily negative.27  Many civic leaders and residents genuinely struggle 
with the residual effects of Birmingham’s past.  These good faith efforts to discuss historic 
and current race relations are a challenging component of modern civic discourse.  However, 
without some kind of broad-based, city-sponsored means of addressing the collective and 
individual harms of segregation and its enforcement, the image of “Bombingham” will likely 
remain fixed in local discourse and imagination. 
Can there ever really be a resolution to the image of “Bad Birmingham”?  Is there a 
value to the relentless power of this memory? I do not think that historians or residents of 
Birmingham will ever truly be able to remove the stigma of massive white resistance in the 
city, and perhaps this landmark of hatred should be a permanent feature of the American 
landscape.  Yet, while an examination of this violence involves a necessary reckoning with 
the past, a therapeutic exposure of the wounds to air, it does not leave room for an 
acknowledgment of on-going civil rights struggles and victories, serving instead to trap 
Birmingham, in history and memory, under the weight of its own infamy.  
Inequality in America today no longer rests in Jim Crow laws defended with 
bombings and dogs.  Rather, a new urban landscape of disfranchisement has emerged, built 
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on a foundation of structural economic discrimination, abandoned or ignored by those with 
the resources to escape it.  Watching Birmingham enter the mainstream of America’s racial 
struggles, one feels almost a sense of relief.  No longer what one writer has called the 
“national warehouse for the white man’s burden,” 28 Birmingham can link its dilemmas and 
solutions to the greater national context, while at the same time the rest of the country can no 
longer posit “race” as a southern problem tagged to old images of resistance.  
 Odessa Woolfolk, president emerita of the Civil Rights Institute, often encounters 
visitors who arrive with a mental picture of “Bombingham”: “So I tell people, ‘Birmingham 
[today] is like the rest of America.  Forty years ago we were an anomaly, but we are like the 
rest of America.  We’re progressive, we’re struggling.’”29  An appreciation of present-day 
achievements need not deny continuing or past inequalities.  Rather, the history of 
Birmingham and the history that has been written about Birmingham should teach us that 
although the weight of the past should never be denied, to linger too long may undercut 
aspiration and obscure real change.   
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